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Abstract
The existing network of computing devices around the world created by the Internet gives
the possibility of establishing a global market for computing power, where anybody connected
to this network can acquire computing power or sell his own spare computing resources in
exchange for real money. This potential global market for computing power, which does not
exist yet, is what we study in this thesis. Specifically, we study the market with both analytic
and simulated models. This thesis predicts how a future global market for Grid computing will
behave.
We give arguments that such a large market, together with its potential indefinite growth,
would not be able to scale if it were organized with a central server, and therefore we study
a peer-to-peer market model in our simulations. We create a high-level model with the most
relevant characteristics of the market, where buyers and sellers trade a single commodity. In
our simulations, the parameters of the volume of contracts, proportion of satisfied agents and
number of messages in the network achieve stable values in the long run. We also derive
analytically the conditions that make the price get stable over time; we then implement these
conditions in the simulation as local mechanisms of the market participants, which make the
whole system achieve a stable price evolution.
We are also confident that, as soon as the Grid market emerges, a parallel market of derivatives
will be created as well. This market of derivatives will be important due to the non-storability
nature of computing power. We develop a futures market for computing power based on Markov
chains, where we initially model the behaviour of each participant with a particular Markov
chain, and then we derive a global transition probability matrix that models the market as a
whole. Furthermore, we analyse the performance of a futures trader operating in such a market,
and we obtain an optimal trading strategy with the use of Markov Decision Processes.
We finally develop a stochastic differential equation model that captures the essence of the spot
price evolution of computing power observed in our market simulations. This model is based
on a previously one proposed for the electricity market, and consists of the use of a Markov
regime-switching mechanism in order to model the existence of spikes in the spot price. We
then estimate the parameters in the model with the output data of our simulation program; the
estimation is carried out both by maximum likelihood and the generalised method of moments.
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‘Markets can remain irrational a lot longer than you and I can remain solvent.’
John Maynard Keynes
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Objectives
The development of the Internet has brought instantaneous worldwide connectivity, which cur-
rently is mainly used for communication and to find information [26]. However, the underlying
physical infrastructure that forms the Internet, i.e. the computing resources of the users con-
nected to the network, is heavily wasted. The fact that all these computing resources are
actually connected creates the possibility of making use of them all in a worldwide Grid.
This Grid, which is a computational Grid, is for computing resources what the electric power
grid is for electricity. A computational Grid is an infrastructure, formed both by hardware
and software, that provides reliable, consistent, pervasive, and inexpensive access to high-
end computational capabilities [45]. Reliability is necessary so that users can have a certain
guaranteed level of performance; the service has to be consistent, with standards that make the
network heterogeneity transparent to the user; the pervasive access must allow users to acquire
the resources anywhere within the network; and the price of the resources must be reasonable
so that many users can access them.
Anyone connected to this Grid (formed via the Internet) could ask for the use of computing
power or sell the computing power provided by his own resources. This would immediately
1
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
create a global market for computing power. In contrast to the private networks of some
companies, where spare computing resources are already being used by the same company for
other tasks 1; or in the BOINC project [2], where volunteers put their spare computing resources
at the disposal of a certain project; the global Grid Market would be open to anyone connected
to the Internet, and the acquisition of resources would be in exchange for real money.
It is a fact that there already exists a group of potential buyers of computing power, mainly
institutions like corporations and universities, and there also exists already an even larger group
of potential sellers of computing power, namely anyone with a computer that is not used 24
hours a day, who must be very willing to earn some extra cash by just hiring out their computing
resources. Therefore the potential global market for computing power already exists; it simply
remains an engineering problem to overcome the technical difficulties in order to provide a
feasible market platform. In fact, the research on the Grid has been identified as a key one by
the EU. This thesis assumes that this global market for computing power will be created, and
we do not deal in this thesis with the engineering problem of setting up the market. Instead, we
design a simplified simulation model for the market and we tackle the modelling of the market
behaviour both with simulations and analytically.
Scalability problems may arise in a system that has a potential ever-increasing number of
computing devices connected. It is for this reason that we have investigated decentralised peer-
to-peer models based on the concept of Catallaxy [90]. This setup eliminates the figure of the
middleman or broker, allowing users to deal directly between them.
Our objective has been to create a high-level Grid market model, which can be used to predict
how the future global Grid market will behave. It is not the objective of this thesis, therefore,
to use economic methods for the micromanagement of Grids, but to model, analyse and predict
a future market for Grid computing.
Both the fact that a global Grid market in the way that we envision does not exist yet, and
the fact that such a market may become quite complex in reality, make our task of designing
1HSBC uses a Grid with more than 3500 CPUs to carry out derivative trades, www.itu.int/dms_pub/
itu-t/oth/23/01/T23010000090001MSWE.doc
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a market model for it challenging. We have tried to focus on general aspects of the market,
making a model with the most relevant characteristics. We also consider that a model with a
large number of parameters that can get easily out of control may well lead to results that are
hard to interpret. Hence, we decide to keep our model simple.
We also believe that, as soon as the global Grid market emerges, a parallel market of derivatives
will be created. Financial instruments such as futures and options will be extensively used in
the Grid market to plan the future delivery of computing power, as well as for reasons of
hedging and speculation. As it happens with other commodity markets, the volume of traded
derivatives in the global Grid market may exceed that of the underlying commodity. This
situation can be accentuated for the case of computing power, since the perishable nature of
the CPU cycles makes its trading physically impossible, although it will still be a possibility
to decide its price for a particular time in the future. Consequently, we also analyse in this
thesis the trading of future contracts of computing power, and we look for an optimal trading
strategy.
We expect our models and analysis to be useful in the future to Grid users and market operators,
and to become the basis of other more sophisticated models that will arise as the global Grid
market develops.
1.2 Contributions
This thesis presents the modelling of a future global Grid market for computing power. The
analysis is carried out both with simulations and analytically, and represents a prediction on
how this market will behave.
1.2.1 A Discrete-Event Simulator of the Grid Market
We have developed a simulation program in C++ that models a peer-to-peer market for Grid
computing. In the simulation, we have been working with two different kinds of networks
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to implement the decentralised peer-to-peer network: scale-free and random networks. The
nodes of the network are the consumers and providers of computing power that form the
market. The market participants trade one single commodity in exchange of real money and
act selfishly. There is no central market place where deals are done, but the agents send
messages to each other via their closest neighbours and the dealing is done distributedly in
all nodes of the network. The parameters that we have analysed in the system (including
number of deals, number of messages, number of satisfied agents) achieve stable values in the
equilibrium state, after the initial transient. We have also derived analytically the conditions
under which the evolution of the market price over time gets stable, and we have locally
implemented mechanisms in the agents that make the system achieve equilibrium as a whole
in terms of average market price. These dynamic, local mechanisms allow the system to reach
the equilibrium state independently of the initial conditions, such as the proportion of buyers
and sellers in the market and the type of network.
1.2.2 A Markovian Futures Market for Computing Power
We have introduced a futures market for computing power where each of the market participants
is modelled by a particular Markov chain that reflects his aversion to risk. We have also
presented the new concept of market pressure that, by focusing on the variation of price rather
than on the price itself, has allowed us to obtain a Markov chain that models the evolution of
the market as a whole by combining the contributions of the individual agents and avoiding
the problem of state space explosion. The simulation results of the ideal centralised setup
had a perfect agreement with the analytic results in terms of the market’s equilibrium state
probabilities. For the case of the decentralised non-ideal setup of the simulation, both shifting
and scaling factors need to be found for the probability density function of the price variation
in order to obtain the same result as in the analytic centralised system.
Furthermore, we have presented the trading of future contracts of computing power, which
we consider will be of paramount importance due to the non-storability of the CPU cycles.
In this context, we have introduced a Markov Decision Process (MDP) model for finding the
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optimal trading strategy for a market operator. We solved our infinite-horizon MDP with
linear programming.
1.2.3 A Stochastic Calculus Model for the Spot Price of Computing
Power
Finally, we have introduced a stochastic differential equation model that closely follows the
evolution of the spot price of computing power shown by our simulation program. Specifically,
we have modelled the evolution of the logarithm of price, which shows both a general trend of
mean-reversion and short term down spikes. The mean-reversion is in agreement with other
commodity markets like crude oil, and the spikes are also common with the ones that appear
in the electricity market. In order to capture such two different characteristics of price in one
single model, we decided to use a Markov-regime switching model, similar to the ones applied in
the literature to the US business cycles or the electricity market. The Markov-regime switching
model is formed by different states, and each of them models a different characteristic of the
system. The changes between the states take place according to the evolution of a hidden,
independent Markov chain. In our case, we have used a model with three regimes: the first one
is a mean-reverting process, the second one is a mean-reverting process with a jump down and
the third one is a mean-reverting process with a jump up. The second regime followed by the
third one creates a down spike in the evolution of price.
We then estimated the parameters of the model with the market data provided by the output
of our simulation program. The estimation was carried out by maximum likelihood and by the
generalised method of moments. The exact stochastic numerical simulation of the results was
done by a previously proposed algorithm by Gillespie. Both estimation methods gave some
results that were in disagreement with the original market behaviour; we estimate that this
is due to the fact that the maximization function presents many local maxima, as well as to
the difficulty in detecting the spikes. However, just by trial and error we were able to find a
combination of parameters that makes the Markov-regime switching model have a very similar
behaviour to the original market data, which demonstrates the suitability of the model.
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Chapter 2
Background Theory
2.1 Introduction
The topic we deal with in this thesis is a multidisciplinary subject that covers several fields, in-
cluding computing systems, graphs and peer-to-peer networks, agent-based simulations, market
models, commodity markets and stochastic calculus. In this chapter, we make a short review
of the basic background work that has already been carried out in each of the fields that we
will be dealing with in the rest of this thesis. Due to the large scope of the background theory,
we do not go into the detail of every field, and we provide references for further information.
We structure this chapter as follows. Section 2.2 reviews a series of different past approaches to
Grid computing; Section 2.3 explains several concepts about graphs and peer-to-peer networks;
Section 2.4 deals with previous work on agent-based simulation models; Section 2.5 focuses on
MAGOG, a particular distributed market for Grid computing; Section 2.6 discusses the simi-
larities and differences of the Grid computing market with other existing commodity markets;
Section 2.7 presents concepts of Markov processes and Markov decision processes and their
connection with market models; Section 2.8 introduces the use of stochastic calculus for market
analysis and Section 2.9 covers the basic aspects of estimation of parameters for the methods
of maximum likelihood and the generalised method of moments.
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2.2 Grid Computing and its Market Models
Using economic incentives to facilitate fair use of computing power in a group is not new.
Greenberger [49] discusses this as far back as 1966. He mentions various ways and methods to
use economic ideas to make queueing systems fairer.
In 1968 Sutherland describes how access to a PDP-1 1 was organised at Harvard using an
auction-based system [91]. In a very simple auction, users bid for exclusive access to the PDP-
1. Their budgets were replenished every day and left-overs could not be saved. The more senior
the position held in the department the larger was the budget of an individual. This system
allowed fair access by not excluding anyone and also maximised the utilisation of the system
by refilling the budgets at the end of each day. Later, for instance, Nielsen [67] and Cotton [30]
discuss shared access to resources in a multi-user environment. In general there are two main
reasons to charge for computer access:
• Maximise utilization: Using real or fake money a group organises access to facilities by
means of charging for their use.
• Maximise profit: A company essentially hires out facilities to third parties for real money.
The first case is basically what Sutherland describes in a very simple setting where only one
user has access at a time. The money does not need to be real in this case but can be tokens.
Priorities can be implemented by giving different groups of people a different budget. In this
case micromanagement of resources might also make sense. The second case is actually not
too different from mobile phone use, for example. A company is unlikely to charge users for
detailed use of facilities but rather for accessing services over a certain period of time.
McKell et al. [65] make a survey of some of the different approaches at charging for comput-
ing resources during the 60’s and 70’s. In their survey, they differentiate between charging
approaches by cost, where the objective is to recover the expenses of the computing services,
1An 18-bit computer made by Digital Equipment Corporation in the early 1960s, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
PDP-1
2.2. Grid Computing and its Market Models 9
and charging approaches by pricing, where the focus is placed on models whose prices transmit
information about the demand of the resources to the user and try to allocate the resources
effectively. The problem with most of these approaches is that they are difficult to implement
and therefore they are not practical. Furthermore, these analyses are for centralized computing
services in a single organization.
Kleijnen et al. [59] describe a charging method used in a cooperative organization like a
university, where the user community decides the computer’s size and configuration: first at
the strategic level, users decide on the fixed costs, paying for them in advance and getting a
proportional share on the resources; second at the operational level, individual jobs are charged
if they incur on variable costs. The registration of the jobs at operational level also serves
as feedback for future planning. The authors in this paper also state that computer capacity
is perishable, and make the analogy with an open water tap. In their case of a cooperative
institution, they treat all consumers as equally important and, unlike in an open market, there
is no competition between the users.
The concept of the Grid [45] renewed interest in using economic incentives to manage computer
systems. The idea of the Grid is to provide access to computing power in the same way as
electricity is offered to end-users. This concept is also referred to as utility computing [24].
Authors have suggested the use of economics in micro and macro management and the methods
tend to be either auctions or commodity markets, see [103], Regev and Nisan [76], Waldspurger
et al. [96] and Buyya [27].
One of the major problems with any kind of scheduling or access-providing infrastructure is to
avoid centralised services since they are likely to become a bottleneck for a large number of
users or transactions. An example of a centralised system is presented in [52], which used a
three tier market set-up of producers, brokers and end-users. Another example of a centralised
system is Tycoon [60], which has a central service locator service and experienced the bottleneck
problem. There is therefore now a trend to try to build future Grid architectures using P2P
networks, which are de-centralised. Examples are the P-Grid, which is mainly a data Grid [7],
and more generally Catallaxy [11]. Catallaxy means to barter, and it is the basis of the free
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market where self-interested agents try to maximise their own utility and decide their actions
with incomplete information about the market. Catallaxy’s goal is to achieve a spontaneous
order that is the result of the uncoordinated actions of the agents; there is no need for a fictitious
auctioneer with global knowledge and the system is therefore the opposite of the plan economy.
In [11], the authors simulate a decentralised Grid market based on the notion of Catallaxy.
Their simulation includes three types of agents: resource providers, service-copy agents and
clients. Clients request services among the service-copy clients, who in turn create the services
by using the resources of the providers. There are consequently two markets: one market
between resource providers and service-copy agents, and another market between service-copy
agents and clients. The authors compare their Catallactic model with a centralised one, and
find that the Catallactic system has similar efficiency, but has the advantages of being scalable
and fault tolerant. In addition, the CATNETS project [43] is based on Catallaxy as well. In
[43], Eymann et al. present a similar distributed Grid market model with also three types of
market participants, and their simulations show how the agents learn to adjust their prices by
interacting with each other. Their results show that in scenarios with a large number of agents,
the Catallactic strategy takes longer to achieve stable market price estimations.
Another decentralised approach is Middleware for Activating the Global Open Grid (MAGOG)
[28, 78]. In MAGOG there are only two types of agents or market participants, the providers
and the consumers, and both types of agents send messages to the network advertising their
resources or their intention to acquire them. These two aspects differ with CATNETS, where
only buyers send messages and there are three types of agents. With a simplified model,
MAGOG represents a more elegant implementation of the Catallaxy concept for the Grid
market. MAGOG, which we describe in more detail in Section 2.5, will be one of our main
focus in this thesis.
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2.3 P2P networks and graphs
Since in this thesis we are going to work with decentralised networks in the form of peer-to-peer
(P2P) networks, we make here a small review of the basic concepts about them. P2P networks
are essentially overlay networks which live on top of existing infrastructure. The P2P networks
we evaluate here are non-centralised, unstructured networks. For an overview of other existing
P2P networks and their details, see [61].
Graph theory can be used to classify networks. A graph (or network) consists of N vertices
(nodes) and E edges (links) between the vertices. Vertices can be classified by their node
degree, which is the number of in or out going edges. For a directed graph, those numbers
can be different. Graphs are called connected when there is path from any node to any other
node. We will be working throughout this thesis with graphs that are both undirected and
connected. Of interest are measures like average node degree or the distribution of the node
degree. A network is also characterized by the diameter, which is the longest shortest path
between nodes of the network. In other words, in order to calculate the diameter of a network,
one would first compute the shortest path between each pair of nodes; the longest of these
paths is the diameter of the network. A measure indicating how connected nodes are is the
clustering coefficient. It is essentially the ratio of existing links a node and its neighbours have
compared to all possible links. An easy way to categorize graphs is to look at their node degree
distribution. On the one extreme there is the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs [41] (random graphs), where
the node degree distribution tends to a Poisson distribution; specifically, for a graph of N nodes
(with large N), the probability that a node has k links is
P (k) ≈ NKk e
−K
k!
, (2.1)
where K (fixed) is the mean of the distribution [42]. Then there are small world networks
described by Watts and Strogartz [38], which have a much higher clustering coefficient compared
to a random network with a similar average distance of all shortest paths between all nodes.
Baraba´si and Albert describe in [16] networks that have a scale-free or power law distribution
12 Chapter 2. Background Theory
of the node degrees; this means that the probability that a node has k links is
P (k) ≈ (k + constant)−α, (2.2)
where the gradient α of the power law tends to be between two and three for these networks.
These graphs described by Baraba´si and Albert are generated by a growing network. For a good
review and more details of complex networks, see for instance [42]. With regard to examples
of existing networks, it has been shown that Freenet is scale-free [70] and also Gnutella is a
small-world and scale-free network [98]. For our investigation, we choose to use both scale-free
(Baraba´si-Albert or BA) and random networks (Erdo˝s-Re´nyi or ER).
2.4 Agent-based simulations
Since the market we are studying in this thesis does not exist yet, we will be making use of
agent-based simulations to analyse the evolution of the system. Agent-based simulations consist
of simulation models where a generally large number of agents take decisions and interact with
each other, and the focus is placed on the effects of the agents in the whole system and its
evolution. Agent-based simulations can be useful to model several kinds of systems, among
them, markets.
For instance, in [14] the authors study the price variations in a stock market with two types of
agents: “noise” traders and “rational” traders. They find that with a very simple model they
obtain price variations that are similar to the ones found in real stock markets. They also point
out that large price variations might be due to a crowd effect, and that, according to physics,
fat tails distributions take place naturally in systems with many interacting parts, as it is the
case of economics. However, their model has a relatively small number of agents (≤ 500).
We can consider computing power in our market as perishable if we take into account that
CPU cycles are non-storable. An example of a market of a perishable commodity is the UK
electricity market, which has been investigated using a multi-agent simulation by Bagnall and
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Smith [13]. In their paper, the authors study the evolution of learning, cooperation and change
of behaviour of the agents when the market structure varies. The agents in their model try to
find rule sets that avoid losses and maximise profit; they implement these rules from a set of 32
actions, and they improve their strategies according to some reward functions. In our model,
introduced in Chapter 3, the agents decide on whether to increase or decrease their prices
based on a trial and error policy. Another example is the Marseille fish market investigated
by Kirman and Vriend in [57], where the authors analyse with a multi-agent simulation the
benefits of being a loyal customer for the buyers and having loyal customers for the sellers. In
their model, the sellers decide on quantities to supply, prices to ask and the treatment they
should give to loyal customers; whereas buyers decide which sellers to visit and which prices to
accept. In our simulation model introduced in Chapter 3, the agents take decisions on buying
or selling depending exclusively on price constraints, treating all market participants equally
regarding any other parameters.
Additionally, in relation to networks and agents, in the Physics community relevant related
research has for instance been conducted by Rosvall and Sneppen [82], who investigate the
information horizon of agents on a network. They study the propagation of information on
networks with agents that have only local knowledge. Our potential Grid computing market
is likely to consist of a large number of providers and users, similar to for instance the mobile
phone market and end-users will not be able to make completely rational decisions.
2.5 MAGOG
The Middleware for Activating the Global Open Grid (MAGOG) is described in [78], and rep-
resents one of the latest approaches of a market model for Grid Computing. The MAGOG
project is still in the development phase and there is no available data yet. In this thesis, we
implement a similar, simplified version of MAGOG in our simulations, and we therefore explain
some of the details of the MAGOG system here.
The Global Open Grid (GOG) is an uncentralised P2P network which is meant to connect all
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possible computing devices in the world from mobile phones to supercomputers as nodes using
the MAGOG software. The nodes can either be resource providers or consumers, i.e. sellers
or buyers. Using a micropayment system, nodes exchange real money for their services. Both
users and providers send out messages containing the maximum or minimum price the nodes
are willing to accept for a deal (these messages have been dubbed Ask/Bid bees). Nodes only
have local knowledge and know how to contact a finite number of other nodes, known as their
nearest neighbours.
Messages originate at a consumer or provider node and get sent to the nearest neighbours.
There they remain in a pub (in effect a buffer with memory) and wait until a matching other
message comes along. They are also cloned and sent to nearest neighbours of the current (pub)
node. The belief is that the usual problems associated with message flooding do not hamper
the GOG due to the idea of providers and consumers advertising their services. Additionally,
the pubs are a more clever message buffer as it retains memory of previously received messages
for longer. However, this is at the cost of more memory usage, which presumably is not an issue
nowadays. In his report [78], the MAGOG market is compared to that of currencies, stock and
futures. The underlying philosophy of Catallaxy [53] is thought to provide a stable market in
MAGOG. In contrast to the Walrasian [97], no centralised global knowledge is needed for the
economic agents to create a stable market.
2.6 Commodity markets
We believe that computing power may soon be provided as a commodity. There already exists
the case of Amazon [93], which sells computing power and storage space by the hour. However,
this case is a monopoly, since the market is not open and it is only Amazon that sets the prices.
We consider that there are two basic requirements for a real commodity market for computing
power to emerge: the establishment of a standard for the units of computing power and the
possibility of the open trading of computing power.
The standardization of a commodity and the establishment of some internationally recognized
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units for it are the key steps to facilitate its global trading. This happened for instance during
the twentieth century with some traditionally tropical commodities such as cotton, rubber and
cocoa [34]. Beyond the Sun power units of Sun Microsystems, the computon of HP or the
service units of IBM [93, 71]; there is a need to establish a real standard for computing power
units that allows its global trading. Throughout this thesis, we will assume we are working
with this future standard.
In addition, access to the buying and selling of computing power must be easily provided for
the general public so that a real open market appears. Since it has become common to own
computing devices and the Internet already provides the necessary connectivity to bring these
devices together, it just remains to set a trading platform that allows the trading of computing
power between market participants. It is already possible for a householder to sell his own-
generated electricity via solar panels or wind turbines to energy suppliers [5]; we estimate this
will soon be a possibility for the case of computing power.
The case of a worldwide computing power market, however, presents significant differences with
other commodity markets. An open global Grid market will provide the possibility of acquiring
computing power anywhere in the world, and transportation (of requests and data) will not be
a problem, very specially due to the latest developments in optical networks [75]. This is a clear
difference with other perishable commodities like electricity, which is consumed in a location
that is physically near to the generator, since energy is lost in the transportation [101]. It is also
unclear whether the global Grid market will show signs of seasonality; the possibility to buy
and sell computing power 24 hours a day, anywhere in the world breaks the influence of local
seasonalities. This is in contrast with the inherent seasonality of the agricultural commodities
[56].
Furthermore, the fact that the trading of computing power will be done internationally brings
the issue of potential significant differences in national taxation for this new commodity. If this
were the case, some countries would benefit from higher purchases in detriment to others, as it
happens with petrol in neighbouring European countries [102]. For the case of computing power,
this situation would be more extreme, since it would be possible to easily acquire computing
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power worldwide. The taxation might be applied similarly to the one of electronic commerce
activities [10].
Once a global market for computing power has been established, we expect a parallel market
of derivatives, mainly futures and options, to emerge as well. The trading of derivatives is
widespread for many commodities [84], and we expect computing power to be no exception.
Moreover, if we consider the CPU cycles to be perishable, or non-storable [9], then computing
power is non-tradeable, since it is not possible to buy some CPU cycles, hold them for some
time and sell them afterwards. This situation naturally brings the idea of computing power
derivatives, which will allow to set prices for the delivery of computing power at a certain future
date. These derivatives will provide the possibility of maximising the use of resources, as well
as to hedge a position or to speculate in the computing power market.
2.7 Markov Processes and Markov Decision Processes
A Markov process is a stochastic process that has the memoryless property or Markov property.
This property states that the state of the process at a particular instant of time contains in
itself all the past information of the process as well. This fact implies that we will not improve
our predictions on the future state of the process if we also have knowledge of the past values
of the process, since the current state of the process already has all the past information.
Mathematically, given that X(t) = xt, our estimate of X(s) for s > t will not improve by
knowing the values of the process at time instants before t [47]. When the Markov process has
a finite state space, then it is called a Markov chain.
A connection to highlight between the mathematical concept of Markov chain and the modelling
of markets is made by the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). In particular at the stock
market, the EMH states that market prices fully reflect all available information [44], and
therefore past information provides no additional insights on how the future value of price
will evolve. Consequently, the EMH suggests that the price of a stock follows a Markov chain
[99]. Assumptions and implications of the EMH include that [17] new information is quickly
2.7. Markov Processes and Markov Decision Processes 17
absorbed by stock prices and these prices are consistent with the economic fundamentals; stock
prices move randomly as they depend on the random arrival of new information; the analysis
of charts to predict future price movements (technical analysis [25]) is ineffective; investors are
rational; fund managers cannot systematically outperform the market.
The EMH has a large number of both supporters and opponents. On the one hand for instance,
one shortcoming of this hypothesis is that denies the existence of irrational bubbles in the price
of a stock. The technological bubble that burst in 2000 and the subprime mortgage one that
burst in 2007 clearly showed market prices well above their fundamental values, meaning that
investors acted irrationally, as opposed to the assumption of the EMH. It might be rational and
profitable, however, to buy a stock during a bubble and sell it before the bubble bursts. On the
other hand, if investors act irrationally, there are mispriced stocks and future price evolutions
are predictable, then professional fund managers should be able to systematically outperform
the market, which is not the case either [63], what gives some credit to the EMH.
Apart from their direct relationship with the efficient markets hypothesis, Markov processes are
a mathematical tool widely used in many other market models as well. It is worth mentioning
here the Markov-regime switching models introduced by Hamilton [51], where a hidden Markov
chain determines the changes between different regimes or states of the market, giving the
possibility of capturing very different market behaviours with a single model. Markov-regime
switching models have been applied extensively to multiple market aspects, including the US
business cycles [50], the spikes in the price of electricity [55], improved hedging of stock indices
[8] or the switching between fundamental and technical analysis to forecast exchange rates [94].
Markov decision processes (MDPs) model stochastic sequential decision problems mathemati-
cally. In other words, Markov decision processes model systems in which sequential decisions
must be taken in an uncertain environment. The expression ”MDP” was introduced by Bellman
in the 1950s [18]. In an MDP, the process changes its state at specific time steps; the state
the process changes to is partly random and partly influenced by the choice of the decision
maker. The decision maker obtains a reward that depends on his choice and the change that
has taken place in the process. MDPs can be considered Markov chains where actions and
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rewards have been added. Solving the MDP consists of finding an optimal set of choices for
the decision maker, and therefore MDPs are studied as optimization problems. MDPs have
diverse fields of application such as inventory control problems and communications models,
and it is in economics where they find one of their most suitable areas; for a survey on their
applications, see [100].
2.8 Stochastic Calculus
In this section we provide a short review on the elementary tools of stochastic calculus. We
do not go into the rigorous details or the pertinent proofs of the theorems. Instead, we aim
to provide an explanation of the reasons why stochastic calculus is used to model markets and
the mathematical results that we will be using in Chapter 6.
Stochastic calculus is, roughly, the branch of mathematics that deals with infinitesimal calculus
on non-differentiable functions [58], such as stochastic processes. A stochastic process is a
collection of random variables indexed by a set [79], which can be time in our case; and a
random variable is a function that assigns numerical values to the outcomes of an experiment
[89]. In finance, the outcome of an experiment can be that the stock price goes up or down at
a particular instant of time t; and this outcome can be assigned to a specific numerical value.
Therefore, a random variable can model the stock price at a particular instant of time t. In
addition, the information available at time t can be mathematically described as the σ-algebra
or σ-field, F(t) [37]. We say that a random variable X is adapted to the σ-field F(t), or is F(t)-
measurable, if the value of the random variable X is known with the information available at
time t [66]. If we consider the collection of the stock prices at the successive instants of time, we
have a collection of random variables indexed by time, i.e. a stochastic process. Consequently,
the evolution of stock price over time can be modelled as a stochastic process. Furthermore, the
collection of the different available pieces of information at successive instants of time, i.e. the
collection of the σ-fields indexed by time, is a filtration [73]. We say that a stochastic process is
adapted to a filtration if each of the indexed random variables that forms the stochastic process
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is adapted to its respective indexed σ-field in the filtration [73]. Finally, if a market participant
used a trading strategy, which could be modelled as a stochastic process (since a stochastic
process is basically a real-valued function of time and the state [73]), that were not adapted
to the filtration generated by the stock price, he would be using inside information, since his
strategy would be executed using future (privileged) information [20].
One of the simplest stochastic processes is a random walk. A random walk is a discrete stochastic
process that has the Markov property [104], i.e. we only need to know its present state to
estimate its future state. A random walk can be constructed by simply tossing a fair coin: we
start with a process that has an arbitrary initial value, and we add 1 when the outcome is
heads and add −1 when the outcome is tails. Since in this case the probability of each outcome
is 50% and we are adding or subtracting the same amount, this is a symmetric random walk
[77]. A random walk has independent increments, whose expected value is zero and whose
variance is the length of their time interval [85]. A random walk is a martingale, since it has
no tendency to rise or fall; this is because its expected value at the next time step is always
its value at the current time step [86]. A final note is that the quadratic variation of the
symmetric random walk over a time interval is equal to the length of that time interval [85].
The quadratic variation of a path of the random walk is calculated by summing up the squares
of all the one-step increments along that path. The fact that the quadratic variation is equal
to the variance is a coincidence for the case of the random walk, and it is not the general case
for a random process: the variance is calculated theoretically and it is an average of all paths,
considering the probabilities; the quadratic variation is calculated from a particular realization
of the process without considering the probabilities of going up or down [85].
Intuitively, when we reduce the length of the time steps in a symmetric random walk, in the
limit we obtain a Brownian motion [81], therefore a Brownian motion is the continuous time
version of the symmetric random walk. We will denote the Brownian motion as W (t) and we
set W (0) = 0. A Brownian motion (BM), which is a continuous process, has the properties of
the random walk:
• Markov property (or memoryless): The future state of the process only depends on its
20 Chapter 2. Background Theory
current state.
• Martingale: The process has no tendency to rise or fall.
• Independent increments: For 0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ t3 ≤ t4, the random variables W (t4)−W (t3)
and W (t2)−W (t1) are independent.
• Quadratic variation: Brownian motion accumulates quadratic variation at rate one per
unit time, what we can write as [85]:
dW (t) · dW (t) = dt (2.3)
Two other multiplication rules that will be useful are [85]:
dW (t) · dt = 0
dt · dt = 0
(2.4)
Nevertheless, there are two important differences between the Brownian motion and the sym-
metric random walk: the increments of the BM are normally distributed; and the BM has no
linear pieces in its path, while the random walk is linear between two time steps [85]. Irrespec-
tive of how much we zoom in between two time instants, the path drawn by the BM will never
be linear. In fact, the paths of the BM are very “pointy”, and they can not be differentiated
with respect to the time variable [85].
Bachelier considered the use of Brownian motion to model a stock price [12]. One problem
with this approach is that the Brownian motion can take negative values, and a stock price can
not. Generally, the stochastic process that models the price itself is defined in an equation that
includes the Brownian motion as a source of randomness. This is the case of, for instance, the
geometric Brownian motion (GBM), used to model the stock price by Black-Scholes, who later
on priced options on it [22]. The GBM is process S(t) in the following stochastic differential
equation:
dS(t) = µS(t)dt+ σS(t)dW (t) (2.5)
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In the geometric Brownian motion (2.5), the randomness is provided by a Brownian motion
W (t); µ is a constant drift coefficient, σ > 0 is a constant volatility (standard deviation)
parameter and t is time. Equation 2.5 has the following analytic solution [85]:
S(t) = S(0)e(µ−
σ2
2
)t+σW (t), (2.6)
where S(0) is an arbitrary initial value, which we will take as positive for the case of modelling
a stock price. It can be now deducted from (2.6) that the GBM S(t) is always positive and
log-normally distributed. These features of the GBM are much more in agreement with the
characteristics of a stock price than the ones of the simple Brownian motion. First of all because
with the GBM the stock price can not take negative values, but also because the fact that the
GBM is log-normally distributed is more sensible to model a stock price. An example here is
clarifying: if we model the stock price as a Brownian motion, then the probability of the stock
price going down a certain absolute amount is the same independently of the value of the stock.
For instance, the probability of the stock price going down 5 points is the same for a stock
price of 100 as for a stock price of 10; in the first case the fall in price is 5%, whereas in the
second case the reduction is 50%. However, if we model the stock price as a GBM, then it is
the relative variation in price what has the same probability of occurrence, i.e the probability
of a stock price going down by 5% is the same whatever the value of the stock price is.
Another example of a stochastic process used to model the evolution of price over time is the
following mean-reverting process S(t):
dS(t) = αS(t)(m− lnS(t))dt+ σS(t)dW (t), (2.7)
which is often used to model commodity prices, since they show mean-reversion [19]. In (2.7),
the randomness is again provided by a Brownian motion W (t); α > 0 is the mean-reversion
rate, m is a constant associated with the value to which the process S(t) tends to revert, σ > 0
is a constant volatility parameter as in (2.5), and t is time.
The S(t) processes appearing in (2.5) and (2.7) are examples of Itoˆ processes. In general, let
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W(t), t ≥ 0, be a Brownian motion, and let F(t), t ≥ 0, be an associated filtration; an Itoˆ
process is a stochastic process of the form
S(t) = S(0) +
∫ t
0
θ(u)du+
∫ t
0
∆(u)dW (u), (2.8)
where S(0) is nonrandom and θ(u) and ∆(u) are adapted stochastic processes to the filtration
F(t) (adapted as explained in Page 19) [85].
Equations 2.5 and 2.7 are examples of stochastic differential equations (SDEs), since they include
stochastic processes, W (t) and S(t), in a differential equation. Although equations like 2.5 and
2.7 provide an intuitive meaning of how S(t) changes (dS(t)) when there is an “infinitesimally
small” increment in time (dt) and in the Brownian motion (dW (t)); equations 2.5 and 2.7 are
not mathematically rigorous because there is no such mathematical concept as “infinitesimally
small”. It is for this reason that the rigorous mathematical way of writing an SDE is in its
integral form. For the case of (2.7), its integral form is:
S(t) = S(0) +
∫ t
0
αS(u)(m− lnS(u))du+
∫ t
0
σS(u)dW (u), (2.9)
In (2.9), and when we defined Itoˆ processes in (2.8) above, we have come across with inte-
grals that have a Brownian motion in the integrator and an adapted stochastic process in the
integrand, i.e.
I(t) =
∫ t
0
∆(u)dW (u) (2.10)
Integrals like (2.10) are called Itoˆ integrals. Some properties (which we will not prove here) of
an Itoˆ integral are [85]:
• I(t) is a martingale.
• Itoˆ isometry:
E[I2(t)] = E
∫ t
0
∆2(u)du (2.11)
The problem that arises when manipulating Itoˆ integrals is that, as we said above, the Brownian
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motion is not differentiable, and therefore dW (u) 6= W ′(u)du. In order to manipulate Itoˆ
integrals, we need the Itoˆ formula, which is the stochastic calculus version of the chain rule of
ordinary calculus [68]. The Itoˆ formula is going to help us differentiate expressions that are
functions of a Brownian Motion W (t), i.e. f(W (t)), and more generally expressions that are
functions of an Itoˆ process S(t), i.e. f(S(t)).
Itoˆ formula: Let S(t), t ≥ 0, be an Itoˆ process, and let f(t, s) be a function for which the partial
derivatives ft(t, s), fs(t, s) and fss(t, s) are defined and continuous. Then, for every T ≥ 0,
f(T, S(T )) = f(0, S(0)) +
∫ T
0
ft(t, S(t))dt+
∫ T
0
fs(t, S(t))dS(t) +
1
2
∫ T
0
fss(t, S(t))d[S, S](t)
(2.12)
[85]. We can also write the Itoˆ formula in differential form, which has not a solid mathematical
definition, but it is easier to apply:
df(t, S(t)) = ft(t, S(t))dt+ fs(t, S(t))dS(t) +
1
2
fss(t, S(t))dS(t)dS(t) (2.13)
An informal derivation of (2.13) can be made by expanding the Taylor series of f(t, s) in its
two arguments and applying the multiplication rules (2.3) and (2.4).
As an example of application of the Itoˆ formula, we come back to equation 2.7, and we apply
the function f(s) = ln(s) to the Itoˆ process S(t); we also define X(t) := ln(S(t)). Then we
differentiate function f , i.e.
df(S(t)) = d(ln(S(t))) = dX(t). (2.14)
In order to calculate (2.14), we apply the Itoˆ formula. Note that function f(s) = ln(s) has only
one argument. In other words, f only depends on S(t), and not on t, and therefore
ft(t, S(t))dt = 0 (2.15)
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when applying the Itoˆ formula. The other expressions that we need to calculate in (2.13) are:
fs(t, S(t)) =
1
S(t)
, (2.16)
fss(t, S(t)) =
−1
S2(t)
(2.17)
and
dS(t)dS(t) = α2S2(t)(m− lnS(t))2dtdt+ σ2S2(t)dW (t)dW (t)
+ αS(t)(m− lnS(t))σS(t)dtdW (t)
= σ2S2(t)dt,
(2.18)
where we have remembered the multiplication rules (2.3) and (2.4) in order to simplify (2.18).
Considering (2.7), (2.15), (2.16), (2.17) and (2.18), we can apply the Itoˆ formula (2.13) to
(2.14), obtaining:
df(S(t)) =
1
S(t)
dS(t) +
1
2
−1
S2(t)
dS(t)dS(t)
=
1
S(t)
[αS(t)(m− lnS(t))dt+ σS(t)dW (t)] + 1
2
−1
S2(t)
σ2S2(t)dt
= α(m− lnS(t))dt+ σdW (t)− σ
2
2
dt
= α(m− σ
2
2α
− lnS(t))dt+ σdW (t)
(2.19)
Now we remember that ln(S(t)) = X(t) and df(S(t)) = d(ln(S(t))) = dX(t), and we make the
change of variable µ = m− σ2
2α
; so we can finally rewrite equation 2.19 as:
dX(t) = α(µ−X(t))dt+ σdW (t) (2.20)
Equation 2.20 is an SDE that presents the mean-reverting Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process X(t)
[69]. In (2.20), α > 0 is the speed of mean reversion and µ is the long run mean to which
the process X(t) tends to revert [6]; σ > 0, as in (2.5), is a constant volatility parameter. In
Chapter 6, we will be using X(t) in equation 2.20 to model the logarithm of the spot price of
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computing power in our Grid market model. Similarly, it can also be shown that the GBM
in (2.5) has solution (2.6), using function f(S(t)) = ln(S(t)) and applying the Itoˆ formula to
calculate d(ln(S(t))).
Other models for the time series of prices can include, for instance, processes with stochastic
volatility [83] or jumps [29]. In Chapter 6, we will be using a combination of a regime-switching
model with mean-reverting processes like (2.20).
2.9 Estimation of Parameters
Once an analytic model that describes the behaviour of a real system has been established,
it is necessary to estimate the parameters of the theoretical model according to the data of
the real system. In our case, in Chapter 6, we will need to estimate the parameters of the
stochastic model that describes the evolution of price over time in our Grid market. Among
the different methods for estimation of parameters, we select two of them: maximum likelihood
estimation and the generalised method of moments. Once again in this section, we only provide
a summary of the essential concepts of these two estimation methods, and we refer the reader
to the appropriate references for further detail.
2.9.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) consists of finding the values for the parameters of
the model whose likelihood, which is the probability of the observations given that model, is
maximised [21]. Therefore the values for the parameters are found by maximising the likelihood
function, which is the probability density of a model for the occurrence of the measurements
for given parameters [80].
Mathematically, the observed data x is the outcome of a stochastic model that can be described
with a probability density function p(x|θ) indexed by a set of parameters θ. If we fix the
probability model and the set of parameters θ, the density p(x|θ) is a function of x, and
26 Chapter 2. Background Theory
describes the probability of the different values that x can take. The likelihood function is an
“inversion” of the density. The likelihood, denoted by L(θ|x), or simply L(θ), is any function
of θ that is proportional to p(x|θ) [88]:
L(θ|x) ∝ p(x|θ) (2.21)
Consequently, the likelihood is a function of the set of parameters θ for fixed data x. The value
of θ that maximises the likelihood is the maximum likelihood estimate of θ, normally written
as θˆ, and represents the most likely value of θ given the data [88]. Sometimes it is more useful
to work with the log-likelihood
l(θ|x) = ln(L(θ|x)), (2.22)
whose maximum likelihood estimate coincides with the one of the original likelihood L(θ|x).
This is because maximising the logarithm of a function is equivalent to maximising the function
itself. For further reading about the maximum likelihood estimation, see [39, 88].
2.9.2 Generalised Method of Moments
The generalised method of moments is based on the method of moments. The method of
moments consists of estimating the parameters of a model by matching the theoretical moments
(which are functions of the unknown parameters) with the experimental moments calculated
from the sample [64].
In order to estimate the parameters, we first need to define the moment conditions. Let us
suppose that we have a sample of data {xt : t = 1, . . . , T} from which we want to estimate p
parameters grouped in a vector θ with true value θ0. Then we define a continuous q× 1 vector
function of θ, f(xt, θ), and we assume that the expectation E[f(xt, θ)] exists and is finite for
all t and θ. The moment conditions are [64]:
E[f(xt, θ0)] = 0. (2.23)
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f(xt, θ) is a vector with q components or functions. Each function is a condition derived from
a different moment. In particular, each function is the difference between the sample moment
and the theoretical moment. If p = q, then we have the same number of parameters and
moment conditions, and we can exactly identify θ by solving E[f(xt, θ)] = 0. If we could
observe E[f(xt, θ)], we would solve the system and obtain the true value for the parameters,
i.e. θ0. However, since we can not observe E[f(xt, θ)], only f(xt, θ), we have to define the
sample moments of f(xt, θ). Taking into account that we have T samples of data x, we define
fT (θ) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
f(xt, θ), (2.24)
which is the method of moments estimator of E[f(xt, θ)] [64]. Now we can solve the sample
moment conditions
fT (θ) = 0 (2.25)
and obtain its estimator θˆT , which we expect provides a good estimate of the true value θ0 that
solves the theoretical (population) moment conditions E[f(xt, θ)] = 0 [64].
The generalised method of moments (GMM) is an extension of the method of moments, which
is used when the number of moment conditions is larger than the number of parameters θ,
i.e. q > p. In this situation, when it comes to solve (2.25), there are more equations than
unknowns, and therefore we can not find the estimator θˆT that makes fT (θ) exactly 0; instead
we will find the estimator that makes fT (θ) as small as possible. To this end, we define [64]:
θˆT = argminθQT (θ) (2.26)
with
QT (θ) = fT (θ)
′ATfT (θ), (2.27)
where AT is a stochastic positive definite weighting matrix. For the details, rigorous definitions
and properties of the GMM estimator, see [64].
Chapter 3
Agent-based Simulation Model
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present a first simulation model for the global peer-to-peer Grid market. We
introduce a market formed by two kinds of participants: buyers and sellers. The buyers are
consumers of computing power and the sellers are providers. Both consumers and providers
try to purchase, or respectively sell, one unit of computing power. We assume that in the same
way that there are standard units to measure length or gas, standard units will be created to
measure computing power, treating it therefore as a commodity. At this point, we consider in
our market that all units of computing power provided and purchased by the agents are equal.
The agents trade units of computing power on the spot for immediate delivery. We therefore
assume that these units of computing power are not storable and that an agent cannot buy a
unit of computing power, hold it, and sell it in a future date.
The market is decentralised and its physical infrastructure consists of a peer-to-peer network
of nodes. Nodes in this network are allocated to be either buyers or sellers. In this initial
simplified setting, 50% of the nodes are buyers and 50% of the nodes are sellers.
There is no central market place where the agents close deals, but several local market places
located at every node where messages of different agents meet and make deals. The trading
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of computing power is in exchange of real money and the agents are economically driven and
have a selfish behaviour.
We have set up in this chapter two simulation models for the peer-to-peer market: the plain
vanilla model and theMAGOG model. Both models are described in detail in the next sections.
We have also worked with two different simulation scenarios. The first scenario is a static one,
where agents that have closed a deal remained indefinitely in a satisfied state, holding the
resources they have acquired in the case of the buyers. In this case, it is the network structure
what determines the time it takes for the system to achieve steady state, in which all nodes
are satisfied, whenever this is possible. In the second simulation scenario, which we refer to as
dynamic, agents that have closed a deal release their acquired resources after a certain period
of time. This makes the sellers that have come out of the satisfied state re-advertise their
resources again, and the former satisfied buyers start looking for new resources again. The
dynamic scenario implies agents entering and leaving the market continuously. We find that
in this second scenario the system achieves an equilibrium state after an initial transient. This
equilibrium is defined as the measured parameters achieving stable values over time for all kinds
of networks we studied. The final stable values only depend on the kind of network and not on
its size.
Additionally, our simulations might also be useful to determine whether the market behaviour
is a consequence of the decisions of the agents or by contrast is the result of the market rules.
In this second case, market regulators could change regulations in order to make easier the
detection of cartels. Market rules determine, for instance, the way in which the deal price is set
between the ask price of a seller and the bid price of a buyer. In our simulations, the deal price
between a buyer and a seller is the average between the bid price of the buyer and the ask price
of the seller, whenever the bid price is higher than the ask price. There is therefore no auction
that clears the different orders, but a first come first served approach that matches the requests
that can make a deal. We choose this method because it avoids the need for an auctioneer
handling the requests, and leaves the market negotiation directly to the agents, following the
essence of Catallaxy. Consequently in our simulations, the market is basically a communication
bus that connects the different market participants. A change in the market rules could be, for
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instance, to set the deal price equal to the ask price of the seller, independently of how much
more the buyer is bidding, in order to slow down the increase in prices.
In the next sections of this chapter we describe first of all the two peer-to-peer simulation
models, then we analyse the results of the simulations and finally summarise the main points
in the conclusion.
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BUYER
BUYER
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SELLER
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Figure 3.1: The peer-to-peer Grid market model is formed by providers (sellers) and consumers (buy-
ers) from all over the world. They are connected in a peer-to-peer network, and they send out messages
advertising their resources or asking for the use of resources. The trading of the resources is in exchange
of real money.
3.2 The plain vanilla model
The peer-to-peer Grid market in our model is formed by a connected graph. The nodes of the
graph are the market participants, or agents, that trade computing power and they can be one
of the following types of agents:
• Buyers: try to purchase a unit of computing power, or more generally a resource, and bid
the maximum price that they are willing to pay for it.
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• Sellers: try to sell a unit of computing power, or more generally exclusive access to their
resources, and ask for the minimum price they are willing to accept for them.
Each node in the network from either type can be in one of two possible states: satisfied or
unsatisfied. A node or agent is in the unsatisfied state when he is looking for a deal, because
he is trying to buy or sell access to a resource. When an agent makes a deal, he goes into the
satisfied state.
In our simulation model, there is no central server where the agents close deals. Instead, the
nodes send messages through their peers trying to find a deal. Specifically, a buyer sends
messages to his nearest neighbours in the network. In this message, the buyer specifies that he
wants to acquire a resource unit for a maximum price pb. The buyer, as a node in the network
infrastructure, also performs the function of forwarding incoming messages that arrive from his
neighbours if the TTL (time to live) of these messages has not expired. The TTL is a parameter
attached to all messages and marks the number of hops a message can travel in the network.
The initial TTL is the same for all brand new issued messages.
As far as a seller is concerned, he checks the incoming messages that arrive to him in order to
find whether any of these messages matches the price he is asking ps. A seller also forwards
to his neighbours the messages that cannot match his offer. If a deal is made between the
seller and one of the incoming messages, both the seller and the buyer that issued the incoming
message go into the satisfied state and the message of the successful buyer is deleted. When the
seller is in the satisfied state, he ignores any other possible deals with later incoming messages.
However, satisfied nodes (both buyers and sellers) continue forwarding the messages that they
receive, keeping their role as part of the network infrastructure.
The simulation updates the nodes in the network asynchronously. According to [54], parallel
updates of the system can cause a presumably artificial behaviour. Furthermore, the assumption
that all nodes in the network operate under exactly the same global time is unrealistic. In our
simulation, at every time step, a single node in the network is selected randomly and the
updates that take place depend on the kind of node as explained below.
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For the case of an unsatisfied buyer node, the buyer checks whether he has been picked TTL
times since he issued his messages. If that is the case he assumes that his messages have
expired and sends out new messages to his neighbours. The new messages from this buyer have
a slightly increased price p′b = (1 +∆p)pb. This is because the buyer has been unsatisfied for a
considerable time period and he wants to increase the probability of closing a deal by bidding
a higher price. Furthermore, as part of the update process, the buyer node forwards all the
incoming messages that he has received from his neighbouring nodes.
For the case of an unsatisfied seller node, the seller checks all the incoming messages he has
received against his own ask price. If the seller can close a deal with one of the incoming
messages, he contacts the buyer node that issued that message. If this buyer is still in the
unsatisfied state, the two nodes make a deal and they go into the satisfied state. If the seller
can not close a deal with any of his incoming messages, he continues in the unsatisfied state.
After checking for a possible deal, the seller forwards all his incoming messages to his neighbours
in the network. If a seller stays in the unsatisfied state for too long (longer than the TTL), he
reduces his ask price p′s = (1−∆p)ps in order to attract buyers. In this simulation setup, the
agents (both buyers and sellers) are continuously changing their prices in order to find a deal; in
Chapter 4, agents can also leave the market temporarily (they might hibernate) if they detect
that the market conditions are clearly unfavourable to them, instead of keeping changing their
prices against their own interest.
When a buyer and a seller make a deal, the deal price is always the average between the ask
price of the seller and the bid price of the buyer. When a buyer or seller node forwards all his
incoming messages to his nearest neighbours, he excludes the neighbouring node that sent him
the message, avoiding therefore an unnecessary reforwarding.
In the dynamic scenario of the simulation, a satisfied node re-enters the market (and therefore
becomes unsatisfied again) after it has been selected for updates a preset number of times.
When this happens, its peer node (the node that was also satisfied because it made a deal with
the node that now re-enters the market) also goes into the unsatisfied state again, independently
of how many times it has been picked. When an agent re-enters the market, we have set up
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two methods that can be used to decide the new price the buyer starts bidding and the seller
starts asking:
• Method one: The agents that re-enter the market change their previous bid/ask price to
the price at which they made their last deal. This method is valid both for the buyer and
the seller. In practice, their new bid/ask price will be the average between their previous
price and their partner’s previous price p′n = (pn + pnpartner)/2.
• Method two: The agents try to look for a new deal at a more favourable price for them.
Consequently, the buyer reduces his bid price to a fraction of his last deal price, p′b =
(1−∆p)pb, and the seller increases his ask price similarly, p′s = (1 + ∆p)ps.
Figure 3.2: In the plain vanilla version of the system, only buyers issue messages, and all nodes forward
messages. In the figure, buyer nodes are marked with a B, while seller nodes are marked with an S.
We can see how the buyer in the centre of the network issues and sends out his own messages asking
for the use of resources. We can also see how the seller on the bottom left and the buyer on the right
forward messages to their respective neighbours, although neither this buyer node or this seller node
have issued these messages.
At the beginning of the simulation, the bid prices assigned to the buyers and the ask prices
assigned to the sellers are such that they make deals possible, i.e. Bid ≥ Ask. We have tried
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two different initial setups for the prices. In one setup, all buyers start with the same bid price
and all sellers start with the same ask price. In the other setup, buyers and sellers obtain
their prices from two overlapping uniformly distributed sets of prices. There are two occasions
during the simulation when price changes take place: when agents re-enter the market at the
end of their satisfied state (and they improve their previous prices) or when agents are unable
to find a deal (and they change their prices against their own interest to make a deal more
likely). With regard to the units of time used in the simulation, we define the Epoch as the
time it takes to carry out N simulation steps for a network with N nodes.
3.3 Middleware for Activating the Global Open Grid
(MAGOG)
The Global Open Grid (GOG) is meant to be a global decentralised peer-to-peer network that
will connect all computing devices in the world, ranging from small mobile phones to powerful
supercomputers. These devices are the nodes of the peer-to-peer network, and they can be either
providers or consumers of computing resources. TheMiddleware for Activating the Global Open
Grid (MAGOG), as explained in [78], provides the way of trading the computing resources in
the GOG. All nodes in the network will have the MAGOG software installed, which allows
them to take active part in the market. The trading of the computing resources is in exchange
of real money and the nodes use a micropayment system for their transactions.
In MAGOG, both consumers and providers send out messages to the network asking for the
computing services they need in the case of the buyers and advertising the services they offer
in the case of the sellers. They also specify in their messages the maximum price they are
willing to pay or the minimum price they are willing to accept, respectively. The messages of
the buyers have been named Bid bees, whereas the messages issued by the sellers are called Ask
bees.
The nodes only possess local knowledge of the system and therefore they can only contact a
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certain number of other nodes in the network, which are called their nearest neighbours. When
a node wants to make a deal, the first step consists of issuing a new message that is sent to
its nearest neighbours. When the message arrives at a neighbour, the message is stored in a
pub, which is implemented as a buffer with memory where the message waits for a matching
offer from another message to arrive. If the message that has just arrived to the pub finds no
immediate matching offer in that pub, the message is also cloned and forwarded to the nearest
neighbours of the current node (or pub).
Figure 3.3: In the MAGOG version of the system, both buyers and sellers issue messages, and all nodes
forward messages. In the figure, buyer nodes are marked with a B, while seller nodes are marked with
an S. We can see now how the seller on the top right of the network also issues his own messages
advertising his resources. In addition, all nodes in the network have a pub (essentially a buffer), where
a copy of the received messages is stored, allowing the possibility to that message of closing deals with
other future incoming messages.
The idea is that the system of double message flooding (with messages issued both from buyers
and sellers) will accelerate the process of finding deals in the network. This is also facilitated by
the pubs, which allow to close deals in multiple remote locations from the nodes that originally
issued the messages, due to the fact that the pubs keep copies of the messages they receive.
Although the pubs represent a higher memory usage, this is nowadays affordable and would
not be an inconvenient.
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The MAGOG system, as pointed out in [78], will entail the emergence of a new global market
that will bear similarities with those of currencies, stocks and futures. MAGOG is based on the
philosophy of Catallaxy [53], which assumes that individual market participants have no global
knowledge of the market; instead, the agents learn from the local knowledge that is available
to them through the spread of information in the network. Consequently, in MAGOG, the
agents get the information via their neighbours. The number of neighbours an agent has,
as well as their ’quality’ (some neighbours might be more reliable than others or have more
updated information), affects the knowledge of the agent and consequently the efficiency of
the market. An agent could therefore change his neighbours if he discovers that other nodes
in the network provide better deals. However, in this first simplified simulation setup, the
neighbours of a particular node are static (since the network is static), and in the long run
the information arrives to all nodes, because the network is connected (there is a path from
each node to every other node in the network). We will also see in the experimental results
section that the size of the network does not affect the value of the parameters analysed (see
for instance Fig. 3.7). Finally, in Catallaxy, the individual actions of all the agents result in
an unplanned equilibrium of the market. This is in contrast to the Walrasian auctioneer [97],
where a centralised auctioneer having global knowledge of the system sets the equilibrium price
that perfectly matches supply and demand in the market. In the case of a Walrasian auctioneer,
the setup would be a central node (the auctioneer) that is directly connected to all nodes in the
network (all nodes are neighbours of the auctioneer) and requests from all market participants
arrive to this central node. The Walrasian auctioneer is equivalent to assume that all market
participants possess global knowledge of the market, which is presumably unrealistic, and has
scalability problems, since it assumes a centralised system.
The simulation model for MAGOG is similar to the plain vanilla model described in the previous
section, although there are two significant differences. The first difference is that now both buyer
and seller nodes issue messages, asking for resources or advertising their own respectively. The
second difference is that the previous buffers are now converted into pubs. The pubs are a much
more efficient type of buffer, since now messages are stored at them as long as possible and
only copies of the messages are forwarded to the nearest neighbours.
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In this simulation program we simplify the original MAGOG system, and therefore we avoid
the modelling of very specific features such as the elaborated details of the payment process.
Similarly to the plain vanilla model, the update of prices in the MAGOG model takes place
according to one of the two methods described in the previous section.
3.4 Experimental Results
We present in this section the results of our simulation program, both for the plain vanilla model
and the MAGOG model, as well as for the static and the dynamic versions. We have used the
igraph package [32] in order to create the overlay network that represents the peer-to-peer
Grid market. In this respect, we have worked with two different kinds of graphs: Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
(ER) random graphs and Baraba´si-Albert (BA) graphs. The ER graphs, also known as random
graphs, have a low clustering coefficient (as described in section 2.3) and are highly connected,
as opposed to the BA graphs, which have a higher clustering coefficient, but are less connected.
Since we try to model a network like the Internet, whose structure is increasingly becoming
more and more chaotic, it is difficult to know exactly how this topology is. It is for this reason
that we have decided to use two kinds of graphs that differ in the mentioned characteristics, in
order to find whether different network topologies affect the market results.
We have run simulations on differently sized graphs, ranging from graphs of 512 nodes to graphs
of 1,048,576 nodes. The results that we have obtained are independent of the size of the graph,
and they only show dependence on the kind of graph, i.e. ER or BA. We present in this section
a representative selection of the simulation results in order to show clearer plots and to omit
redundant information.
3.4.1 Static Model
In the static setup of the simulation, nodes that have found a deal remained permanently in the
satisfied state. This means that both the buyer and the seller that have made a deal stay out of
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the market from that moment and do not re-enter it again. However, they keep on forwarding
messages from other nodes. This setup allowed us to check that our simulation was working
properly. For instance, if the diameter of an overlay network is greater than the preset TTL of
the messages, some nodes in the network might not be able to find a partner.
For graphs of the same size, we find that nodes in an ER graph are satisfied faster than nodes
in a BA graph. This is because ER graphs are more connected than BA graphs.
For the plain vanilla model, Fig. 3.4 shows the evolution of the system in a static setup. The
figure shows the ratio of satisfied nodes in the network over time for different TTLs and different
types of networks. Fig. 3.5 presents the same results for the MAGOG model.
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Figure 3.4: Demand satisfaction in the plain vanilla static version of the model for different values of
TTL and the two kinds of graphs analyzed (BA and ER). The top right plot is for ER graphs of sizes
4096, 65536 and 131072, as indicated in the legend, whose diameters are 6, 7 and 9 respectively; the
TTL for the messages in this case is 7. The other three plots correspond to simulation results in BA
graphs: the top left result is for messages with a TTL of 7, in the bottom left the TTL is 10 and in
the bottom right the TTL is 15. The sizes of the BA graphs are 4096, 65536 and 131072, as indicated
in the legend, with respective diameters of 10, 15 and 17.
As we can see in Fig. 3.4 and 3.5, in some cases the ratio of the satisfied nodes does not reach
1, which means that not all nodes in the network manage to find a deal. Since half the nodes
are buyers and half are sellers, and nodes that find a deal leave the market permanently, the
reason why some nodes remain unsatisfied is because they are unable to contact their potential
partners far away in the network. This happens because the TTL of the messages (which
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establishes the number of hops a message can travel from the node where it was originated) is
smaller than the diameter of the network, causing the messages to be deleted before reaching
their potential clients.
Generally, the ratio of satisfied nodes in an ER network is larger than in a BA network due to
the fact that the ER graph has a higher degree of connectivity than the BA graph. This also
explains that nodes in ER graphs achieve the satisfied state faster than in BA graphs. We can
observe both aspects in Fig. 3.4 and 3.5.
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Figure 3.5: Demand satisfaction in the MAGOG static version of the model for different values of
TTL and the two kinds of graphs analyzed (BA and ER). The plots have the same simulation settings
as the one in Fig. 3.4.
With regard to the MAGOG version of the model, whose results are shown in Fig. 3.5, we
can see that there are now more nodes that achieve the satisfied state than in the plain vanilla
version of the model. Furthermore, the nodes become satisfied faster in the MAGOG version.
This is obviously due to the fact that the MAGOG setup has less restrictions than the plain
vanilla model. In particular, the two incorporations of MAGOG are: on the one hand all nodes
(buyers and sellers) issue messages, which increases the reach of potential clients further away in
the network, since this technique more than doubles the TTL in practice; on the other hand the
nodes retain a copy of the messages that pass through their pubs, what allows these messages
to close deals at a later stage with new incoming messages to the pubs.
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3.4.2 Dynamic Model
In the dynamic simulation setup, the nodes that find a deal and become satisfied do not remain
in that state permanently, but they come back into the unsatisfied state and therefore re-enter
the market after they have been picked a certain number of times since they achieved the
satisfied state. This number of times was set to 10 for the simulation results shown in Fig. 3.6.
Moreover, the TTL of the messages used in this simulation is 10, and all nodes in the network
have a buffer of size 10.
As expected in this dynamic simulation, the nodes are continuously changing their state from
satisfied to unsatisfied and vice versa. However, after an initial transient time period, the
analysed parameters of the system settle to stable values, reaching an equilibrium or steady
state. These parameters of the system are the number of messages per buffer, the number of
deals per node and the ratio of satisfied nodes. The equilibrium is achieved in both the plain
vanilla model and in MAGOG. Although the simulation in the MAGOG model needs more
time to reach the steady state, the parameters in this model achieve more stable values than
in the plain vanilla one. We estimate that the copies of the messages kept in the pubs in the
MAGOG model contribute to the higher stability of the system.
For the plain vanilla model, the results are shown in Fig. 3.6. This figure shows the values of
the three parameters that have been measured, in networks of different sizes and of the two
types studied, BA and ER.
For the case of the BA graphs, the largest network used in the simulations was formed by
1,048,576 nodes. The results for this case were similar to the ones obtained in smaller networks.
In addition, we did not handle in the simulations an ER graph of the same largest size as the
BA graph, and consequently we have no equivalently sized ER graph to compared it with the
BA one. It is for these reasons that we do not include here the results for the largest BA graph.
Observing Fig. 3.6, we can see that the average number of messages per node’s buffer on each
epoch is around 1.4 in a BA graph, while for the case of a random network this number goes
up to around 7. Apart from that, the ER graphs (random graphs) present a certain variation
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Figure 3.6: Measures of the messages per buffer, deals per node and ratio of satisfied nodes for
differently sized BA (left) and ER graphs (right) in the plain vanilla version of the model. The graph
is formed by errorbars, in which the central point of the bars is the average value of the parameter
and the vertical line that goes up and down from the central point is the standard deviation of that
parameter. The lower value of the parameters in the largest ER network seems to be associated to the
fact that the measures were taken at an Epoch when the system had not reached stability for such a
large network.
in the number of messages depending on the graph size.
Regarding the volume of contracts, understood as the number of deals, we find that almost
3.5% of the nodes in a BA graph participate in a deal during one epoch. With respect to the
ER network, there is once again a larger number of around 4.7%. These results are independent
of the network size. However, a higher connectivity in the network causes a higher number of
deals; this is the reason why the ER network presents a higher volume of contracts, since the
ER network is more connected than the BA graph.
Furthermore, it is also in the random networks where the ratio of satisfied nodes per epoch is
higher than in the BA graphs. There are roughly 85% of happy nodes per epoch on an ER
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graph, while only 63% on an BA graph. For this parameter, there is no noticeable dependence
on the network size for any of the two types of graphs. The ratio of satisfied nodes in the
network can be seen as a measure of the utilisation of the system.
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Figure 3.7: Measures of the messages per buffer, deals per node and ratio of satisfied nodes for
differently sized BA (left) and ER graphs (right) in the MAGOG version of the model. The graph
is formed by errorbars, in which the central point of the bars is the average value of the parameter
and the vertical line that goes up and down from the central point is the standard deviation of that
parameter. The larger standard deviation of the measures in the BA graphs is due to the fact that the
system takes longer to achieve equilibrium in the BA graph than in the ER graph, and these measures
were taken at the same Epoch, when only the system in the ER graph was actually stable. The three
plots on the left-hand side of Fig. 3.8 show, for the case of a BA graph of 65536 nodes, the actual
values of the parameters in equilibrium in the MAGOG version of the model; note in Fig. 3.8 that
the x axis for the case of the ER graph goes until just 2000 epochs, whereas it goes until 106 epochs
for the case of the BA graph.
With respect to the MAGOG dynamic version of the system, its results are shown in Fig. 3.7.
Observing in Fig. 3.7 the measures for BA graphs in the MAGOG model, one might get the
impression that these values have a higher degree of volatility than in the plain vanilla model.
Nevertheless, this is because for the BA graphs the MAGOG version takes longer to achieve
3.4. Experimental Results 43
equilibrium than the plain vanilla model, and some of the data that was used to calculate
the averages and standard deviations in Fig. 3.7 came from the initial transient state, when
the system had not totally reached the equilibrium state. We can see in Fig. 3.8 an example
showing that the simulation for a BA graph takes a lot longer to achieve equilibrium than for
an ER graph.
In the MAGOG model, nodes in the network retain a copy of each message that passes through
them. This is the reason why in this case the number of messages per buffer each epoch is larger
than in the plain vanilla model. Taking into account that the buffer size of the pubs in the
simulation is 10, we see that in a BA graph the number of messages per buffer in equilibrium
is 6 (3 if we consider the results in Fig. 3.8, where the system for the BA graph is much more
stable), whereas this parameter converges to 9.4 for the case of a random network. We can see
in Fig. 3.7 that these results show negligible variations with the network size.
With regard to the number of transactions in the MAGOG model, 2.5% of the nodes in the
network find a deal per epoch in a BA graph (4% according to Fig. 3.8), while in an ER graph
there is a 5% of the nodes that make a deal per epoch. If we compare these values with the
ones obtained in the plain vanilla model, in MAGOG there are slightly more deals in both a
BA graph (with the results of Fig. 3.8) and an ER graph. Similarly to most of the other cases,
we find no dependence of this parameter on the network size.
Moreover, considering the results of Fig. 3.7, in the MAGOG model the ratio of satisfied
nodes per epoch is lower than in the plain vanilla one. In equilibrium, the utilization of the
system is approximately 45% in a BA graph and 70% in an ER graph. These results show little
dependence on the network size. However, if we consider the results of Fig. 3.8, the ratio of
satisfied nodes per epoch in the MAGOG model is around 70% for both the BA and the ER
graph, which is slightly higher than the plain vanilla model for the case of the BA graph, and
slightly lower than the plain vanilla model for the case of the ER graph.
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3.4.3 Variation in the initial price
In order to further verify the stability of the system, we ran new simulations with modified
conditions in the initial price of the agents. Specifically, we previously assigned the same initial
bid price for all buyers and the same initial ask price for all sellers. In this occasion, buyers
randomly pick their initial bid price from a uniformly distributed interval of prices, and sellers
do likewise from another price interval that overlaps the one of the buyers.
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Figure 3.8: Comparison between the two different initial setup for prices in the evolution of different
parameters in the MAGOG dynamic version of the model. In one of them, all buyers/sellers start
bidding/asking the same price. In the other one, buyers/sellers start bidding/asking different prices
that have been uniformly picked up from an interval. The three figures on the left column are the
results for a BA graph of 65536 nodes, whereas the three figures on the right column are the results
for an ER graph of the same amount of nodes. Note that the system takes a lot longer to achieve
equilibrium in the BA graph, since it is less connected than the ER graph. We also observe that the
values in equilibrium of the deals per node and the ratio of satisfied messages are the same in both the
BA and the ER graph; whereas the value of the messages per buffer is larger in the ER graph than in
the BA graph. This last discrepancy is again due to the higher connectivity of the ER graph, which
makes messages achieve all pubs in the network faster (before the messages are deleted because their
TTL expires), and therefore they increase the average of the number of messages in pubs.
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The results of the evolution of the MAGOG dynamic version of the system for the two different
initial conditions for the prices of the nodes are shown in Fig. 3.8.
Fig. 3.8 shows, by overlaying the plots of the two different conditions for the initial prices of
the nodes, that after a different start, the system rapidly converges to the same evolution for
both cases, which shows the stability of the system and its tendency towards equilibrium.
3.4.4 Price evolution in the MAGOG Dynamic version
Since the underlying model of our simulation is in the end a market, we have also analysed the
price evolution in the system. In particular, we show in this subsection the evolution of price
in the MAGOG dynamic version of the system.
We recall here that in the dynamic simulation nodes change their state continuously. Nodes
that have been picked a certain number of times and still remain in the unsatisfied state because
they have not been able to reach a deal, change their price against their own interest to make
a deal more likely. For the case of the buyers, this fact means increasing their bid price by a
parameter, while for the sellers this situation implies decreasing their ask price by the same
parameter.
On the other hand, satisfied nodes that re-enter the market, i.e. nodes that had made a
deal with another node and were for some epochs in the satisfied state and now they become
unsatisfied again, use a different bid/ask price as well. We have worked with two different
pricing strategies to set this new price. The first pricing strategy is called the average pricing
strategy; in this case both the new bid price of the buyer and the new ask price of the seller
are set to the price of the deal they have made, which is the average between their former bid
and ask prices respectively. The second pricing strategy is the ∆p pricing strategy; with this
strategy the new bid price for the buyers is the deal price decreased by a coefficient, and the
new ask price for the sellers is the deal price increased by the same coefficient. This coefficient
is passed as a parameter in the simulation. Therefore the agents try now to look for the same
deal, but with a more favourable price for them.
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We ran simulations with both pricing strategies and with the two kinds of networks analysed
to find how the price evolution in the system behaves. The results are shown in Fig. 3.9. In
the figure we can see the evolution of the deal price, which is the average price of all deals in
the network per epoch.
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Figure 3.9: Price evolution in the MAGOG dynamic version of the system for a graph of 65536 nodes;
BA (top) and ER (bottom); average pricing strategy (left) and ∆p pricing strategy (right). The
bottom plot shows the price evolution in the MAGOG dynamic version of the system for different
buffer sizes in a BA graph.
It is straightforward to realise by observing Fig. 3.9 that the type of network causes an almost
opposite price evolution in the system. The top two figures show the evolution of price for
the case of a BA graph, where price increases exponentially. Underneath them, the other two
figures show how the price in an ER graph decreases over time. The differences between the two
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figures of the same kind of graph are due to the two different pricing strategies used (average
and ∆p). However, one can immediately see that the change of pricing strategy does not modify
the general tendency of prices; instead, it is the kind of graph the crucial factor that conditions
the price evolution.
In order to understand why the type of graph determines such a different price evolution, we
make the following reasoning. With our pricing strategy, there are two occasions on which
nodes change their prices: one occasion takes place when unsatisfied nodes are unable to find
a deal after a certain number of Epochs; the other occasion takes place when nodes re-enter
the market after some time in the satisfied state because they had previously closed a deal.
We have found that, in our setting, the change of prices due to the first case tends to increase
prices, while the change of prices due to the second case tends to decrease prices. Therefore the
final price evolution of the system will be determined by the proportion between the number of
times that the first kind of price change takes place and the number of times that the second
kind of price change occurs.
Furthermore, we find that each of the two types of graphs analysed favours one of these two
price changes. On the one hand, the degree of connections in a BA graph is low, which causes
nodes to spend more time looking for a deal. When an unsatisfied node has been picked TTL
times and has not been able to find a deal, the node changes its price due to the first case
described above, which tends to increase prices. On account of the fact that this case of price
change takes place much more often than the other one, prices in a BA network increase steadily.
On the other hand, the degree of connections in an ER graph is high, which means that nodes
find deals quickly and posteriorly change their prices due to the second case explained above.
This action tends to decrease prices, and because this kind of price change is much more than
the other one in an ER graph, prices decrease globally in this kind of network.
Experimentally, we can further justify this explanation by increasing the buffer size of the pubs
(or nodes) in the BA network. Larger pubs mean that more messages can meet at them, and
therefore it is now more likely to close deals. As a result, the system behaviour under these
conditions approaches the one that takes place in an ER graph, and prices do not rise so heavily.
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The last plot in Fig. 3.9 shows that price in a BA graph increases at a slower rate for a larger
buffer size of the nodes. This plot is for a BA graph of 65,536 nodes, where the average pricing
strategy was used. Prices in this plot still increase, because the buffer sizes used are not large
enough to increment the number of deals in a way that balances the number of times that the
two types of price changes take place. Despite the fact that the simulation time for a network
with larger buffer sizes increases considerably, it might be interesting to find the buffer size of
the nodes in the BA network that makes the price evolution behave like the one in the ER
network.
Since the indefinite exponential increase in prices that occurs in the BA graph contrasts with
a real market scenario in which buyers possess a limited budget, our next step will consist of
tackling this particular issue in order to make the model more realistic.
3.4.5 Scalability
We present in this subsection the analysis of the execution time of our simulations. We have
analysed the execution time depending on the kind of network, as well as on its size. The
results are shown in Fig. 3.10, where we have run the simulations for 2000 Epochs.
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Figure 3.10: Average execution time for different sized networks (BA on the left and ER on the right);
the simulations were run for 2000 Epochs.
We can see from Fig. 3.10 that the execution time increases linearly with the graph size in a
BA graph; this is also the case in an ER graph, although it is not so precise. In addition, for
networks of the same size, the execution time in an ER graph is larger than in a BA graph.
The green points in Fig. 3.10 are the exact experimental values, whereas the red line is a linear
approximation.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have introduced a first version of a simulation program that models a peer-to-
peer market for Grid computing. This market is formed by both owners of computing resources
and consumers, who exchange the use of the resources for real money. The fact that the model
is peer-to-peer allows the system to increase indefinitely without the requirement of a single
central point of service.
Our simulations have shown that the system achieves an equilibrium state, where the measured
parameters reach stable values which are generally independent of the network size. These
parameters are the utilization of resources, the volume of contracts and the messages in buffers.
We have worked with two versions of the model, plain vanilla and MAGOG, and have found
that the MAGOG version achieves more stable values in equilibrium, although it is in this
version where it takes longer to achieve the steady state. We estimate that these two facts
in the MAGOG version are due to the presence of copies of the messages in the pubs of the
nodes, which contribute to stabilize the state of the system. Apart from the global analysis of
the system, it would also be interesting to study in future work how long it takes to reach the
satisfied state for an average individual node.
Furthermore, we have used in our simulations two different kinds of networks (Baraba´si-Albert
and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi), as well as networks of different sizes. We have found that the evolution of
the system and the values that the parameters reach at equilibrium are independent on the
network size. However, the type of network has a strong influence on the system evolution, and
very in particular on the price.
In relation to this matter, the simulations have shown that price increases exponentially in
a BA network. This result is also encouraged by the fact that buyers have at the moment
an unlimited budget. Considering that nodes exchange real money for the use of computing
resources, one of the next improvements to our simulation program will consist of setting limited
budgets for the buyers in order to make the model more realistic. This addition, together with
a general analysis of price stability in the system and uneven distributions of buyers and sellers
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in the market, is carried out in Chapter 4.
Moreover, upgraded versions of the model can include the implementation of more developed
strategies for the nodes, so that in essence they become more intelligent and can act as real
traders. This would include the possibility for the nodes to change from buyers to sellers and
vice versa. Future work can also tackle the analysis of prices in different parts of the network,
and study the arbitrage opportunities that might exist in a distributed system.
With respect to the products traded on the computing market, we have been working in this
first model with nodes that trade a single unit of resource. Further work will need to consider
the trading over several units at the same time, as well as with providers with different levels
of computing power and consumers with a different level of demand.
Finally, we also expect to be able to validate our simulation results against real data from the
Global Open Grid or a similar Grid computing market. Unfortunately, the MAGOG project is
still in the development phase and can not provide real data yet.
Chapter 4
Adaptive Agents for a Stable Price
Evolution
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we make a further analysis of the simulation program for the peer-to-peer
Grid computing market introduced in Chapter 3, and we specifically tackle the analysis of
the obtained price evolution, which evolved either to zero or infinity. In order to understand
this price behaviour, we make an analytical approximation of the simulation model which is
essentially a mean field approximation. Then we use the results of the analytic analysis to
implement changes in the simulation program that allow the system to achieve a stable price
evolution. These changes in the program are introduced in the way of adaptive agents that
only have local knowledge. Furthermore, in this chapter we provide numerical justification of
the advantages that a decentralised system like MAGOG could have over a centralised one, and
we study the response time distributions for individual nodes in the market as the time they
wait until they get to the satisfied state, i.e. they buy or sell a resource.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents an analytic approximation for the
development of the price in our simulated Grid computing market; and checks the validity of
the analytic approximation by comparing its results with the simulation ones. Based on the
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analytic analysis, section 4.3 describes the implementation of an improved simulation program
that incorporates adaptive agents that use local knowledge to achieve global price stability;
and section 4.4 presents the new simulation results. Section 4.5 compares the performance
of the peer-to-peer network with a centralised system, and conclude that, as the number of
market participants increase, the workload that a single central server would have to handle is
several orders of magnitude larger than the load handled by the distributed nodes in MAGOG.
Section 4.6 presents results of the response time distributions for an individual node to trade
its resource and Section 4.7 summarizes and concludes the chapter.
4.2 An analytic approximation
If we assume that the peer-to-peer network is fully connected, then we can approximate the
system as a single central market place, where the orders of all nodes get together and match
according to price constraints and supply/demand. Price constraints refer to the fact that deals
will be done only if the bid price of a buyer is higher than the ask price of a seller; supply and
demand refer to the fact that there might be a different number of buyers and sellers, and
therefore not all agents will be able to find a deal. Under these conditions, the average price of
all deals in the system after n time steps is given by
P (n) = P0(δ
b
+δ
1−b
− )
n (4.1)
where P0 is the initial price and δ± = 1 ± ∆. The price change ∆ ranges between 0 and 1.
The proportion of buyers b (the rest of the nodes in the network are sellers) ranges from 0 to
1 inclusively.
The details of the derivation of expression 4.1 are presented in Appendix A; we explain here
the basic assumptions. First of all, it is considered that time is synchronous and discrete for
all nodes in the system. At every time step, all nodes submit their orders of buying and selling
with their respective bid and ask prices. All orders of a certain time step meet at the central
market place, where deals are made.
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A deal is made between a buyer and a seller if the bid price of the buyer is greater or equal
than the ask price of the seller. The deal price for these two market participants is always the
average between their ask and bid prices. The nodes that have found a deal in a certain time
step change their ask/bid price in their own interest for the next time step: the bid price of the
buyer for the next time step will be the one he has used in the present time step multiplied by
δ−; the ask price of the seller for the next time step will be the one he has used in the present
time step multiplied by δ+. The average deal price in the system at a certain time step is the
average of all deal prices in that time step.
Some nodes will not be able to find a deal in a particular time step. This may happen because
their prices do not match or because there is a shortage of supply or demand (respectively
for buyers and sellers). In this case, the unsatisfied nodes will change their respective bid/ask
prices for the next time step against their own interest: the bid price of the buyer for the next
time step will be the one he has used in the present time step multiplied by δ+; the ask price of
the seller for the next time step will be the one he has used in the present time step multiplied
by δ−.
We further assume that at the first time step (n = 0) all buyers are bidding P0 and all sellers
are asking P0. Following the evolution of time as explained above, one arrives to the general
expression for the average deal price in the system given by (4.1).
Therefore the price development in the system depends on the expression in the bracket of 4.1,
which we define as F :
F (∆, b) = δb+δ
1−b
− . (4.2)
Depending on the value of F , the deal price in the system will evolve towards one out of three
possible values:
P (n)→


∞ if F > 1
P0 if F = 1
0 if F < 1
(4.3)
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We can now calculate the critical value of b(∆) for which F = 1:
b(∆) = log(1−∆)/(log(1−∆)− log(1 + ∆)) (4.4)
Equation 4.4 is plotted in Figure 4.1, and represents the combination of values of b and ∆ (which
make F = 1) for which the deal price in the system will evolve towards P0. A combination of
b and ∆ situated above the line plotted in figure 4.1 (F > 1) will make the deal price evolve
towards infinity, whereas a pair of b and ∆ situated below the line (F < 1) will make the deal
price evolve towards 0.
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Figure 4.1: The proportion of buyers b as a function of ∆ for a stable deal price in the analytic
solution. In the figure, it is marked with an “X” the point with the combination of b and ∆ that the
simulations normally achieve in the equilibrium state (see Section 4.4).
As one can see from Figure 4.1, the proportion of buyers has to be greater than 0.5 to achieve
a stable price in this simple model, independently of the value of ∆.
In order to have a realistic market model, both a simulation and a real system should avoid
prices evolve towards extreme values (0 and infinity), achieving a permanent price fluctuation
with a certain stability. This may be achieved by a dynamic system where the values of price
change (∆) and proportion of buyers (b) can vary.
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4.2.1 An updated simulation program
We describe in this subsection a few number of changes that we now introduce in our simulation
program with respect to the version used in Chapter 3. These changes, inspired by the results
of the previous chapter, are aimed at providing a clearer operation of the market in terms of
prices.
First of all, we introduce a new parameter for the simulation limiting the amount of money
buyers can bid for. Buyers have now a budget that gets replenished after B time epochs, if they
have used all their funds before then they cannot bid anymore until their funds are filled up
again; this way we limit the amount of money available to buyers in the system. In addition,
we use integer money which has a smallest unit, so that buyers cannot make infinitesimally
small bids; this also means that the minimum ask price for the sellers is now 1.
Figure 4.2: Illustrative example of overlapping prices in a pub. Several buyers can make a deal with
the same seller and vice versa. For instance, buyer A can make a deal with any of sellers Z, Y or X;
but buyers B and C can also make a deal with sellers Z and Y; and buyer D can make a deal with
seller Z as well. This situation takes place in our simulation because of its asynchronous updates. To
solve the problem, we use a call auction algorithm similar to the one used in the stock market as an
approximation to the continuous trading that would take place in the real MAGOG.
Furthermore, we redefine the way deals are made in a pub. In a pub, the prices of the messages
that are looking for a deal might overlap, and several deals might be possible between several
messages at different prices (see example in Fig. 4.2). It is for this reason that we need an
algorithm to decide which message is going to make a deal with whom and what the price of
the deal is going to be. We now use a call auction algorithm for matching the orders in the
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pubs, similar to the one used to set the opening and closing prices at the stock market [40],
as an approximation to the continuous trading that would take place in the real MAGOG.
It is important to note that this algorithm is just an approximation that is necessary in our
simulation, but it would not be needed in the implementation of the real system. The algorithm
is based on the application of four principles. The first principle, determining the maximum
executable volume, establishes the price at which maximum volume will be executed. If there
are multiple prices that accomplish the first principle, the algorithm applies principle two:
establishing the minimum surplus, which determines, from the pre-selected prices by principle
one, which one will leave the minimum quantity of unmatched orders. If there are still several
possible prices, the application of principle three ascertains where the market pressure exists. If
this is not enough to clear the orders, the algorithm consults a past reference price in principle
four.
4.2.2 Comparison of the analytic model and the simulation
We compared the simulation (that now includes the updates of Section 4.2.1) and analytical
approximation for a variety of percentages of buyers. This comparison was carried out for the
following different percentages of buyers: starting at b = 0 (0% buyers and 100% sellers), and
incrementing this proportion by 0.1 until arriving at b = 1 (100% buyers and 0% sellers). We
found that the analytic model presents very similar results to the ones obtained in the simulation
for all the range of different proportion of buyers. Consequently, we omit in this section the
whole range of comparisons and we only present an illustrative example that demonstrates how
closely the simulation coincides with the analytical approximation. In particular, we present
the comparison for a mixture of 60% buyers and 40% sellers. This turns equation (4.1) into
P (n) = P0[F (∆, 0.6)]
n. (4.5)
When we make n go to infinity, equation 4.5 provides the final price according to the theoretical
model. This final price will depend on the value of F (∆, 0.6), and specifically, it will depend
on whether F (∆, 0.6) is equal, greater or lower than 1. We can graphically see the value of
4.2. An analytic approximation 57
F (∆, 0.6) for different values of ∆ by plotting F (∆, 0.6) as a function of ∆. For a clearer
graphical viewing, we decide to plot F 10(∆, 0.6) instead of F (∆, 0.6), since both expressions
are greater, equal or lower than 1 for the same ∆ values. This is shown in figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Plot of F 10(∆, 0.6)
From figure 4.3 we can see that for ∆ = 0.3894 the initial price will not change as F = 1, for
∆ < 0.3894 the price will tend to infinity (since F > 1) and for ∆ > 0.3894 the price will tend
to zero (because F < 1).
We compare this theoretical result to a simulation using a BA graph with 16,384 nodes and
show the results in table 4.1.
The simulation achieves a large price, bounded only by the limit on the budgets and the
time the simulation has run (and therefore equivalent to the theoretical final price of infinity),
for ∆ ≤ 0.4; and a price of 1.0, the minimum asking price in the simulation (and therefore
equivalent to the theoretical final price of 0), for ∆ ≥ 0.5. The ∆ value for which the final
price in the simulations reverts from tending to infinity to tending to zero is between 0.415 and
0.425. This fits fairly well with the prediction from the analytic model, taking into account
the simplifications made to derive the analytic model. We also note that the final price in the
simulations follows a similar development as the value of F 10(∆, 0.6) (the greater the value of
F 10(∆, 0.6), the faster the final price in the simulations approaches infinity), up until ∆ = 0.3,
as it is possible to see from Table 4.1. In summary the results from the analytic model and the
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∆ Value of F 10(∆, 0.6) Theoretical FP FP in the Simulations
0.01 1.0197 > 1 ∞ 3032.53 ± 11.37
0.05 1.0915 > 1 ∞ 31197.39 ± 241.79
0.1 1.1623 > 1 ∞ 35357.35 ± 211.37
0.2 1.2231 > 1 ∞ 37684.15 ± 346.19
0.3 1.1589 > 1 ∞ 36621.40 ± 521.83
0.4 0.9758 < 1 0 5973.94 ± 681.17
0.5 0.7119 < 1 0 1.00 ± 0.01
0.6 0.4295 < 1 0 1.00 ± 0.00
0.7 0.1955 < 1 0 1.00 ± 0.01
0.8 0.0544 < 1 0 1.00 ± 0.00
0.9 0.0047 < 1 0 1.00 ± 0.00
0.99 6.2104 · 10−7 < 1 0 1.00 ± 0.00
0.99999 6.3998 · 10−19 < 1 0 1.00 ± 0.00
Table 4.1: Comparison of the simulation results with the analytical model for different ∆ values and a
fixed proportion of buyers of 60%. The network used in the simulations is a BA-graph of 16384 nodes.
FP stands for Final Price. The final price in the simulations is taken at epoch 3000, when the system
for this particular simulation has achieved equilibrium in terms of the average number of messages
per node, average number of deals and proportion of satisfied nodes. In the column of the final price
in the simulations, the number on the left is the average of the final price in the simulations for 10
different seeds, and the number on the right is two times the standard deviation for that sample.
simulation are not identical but show very similar results.
4.3 Simulation with adaptive agents
By taking into account the results of the analytic model presented in section 4.2, we introduce
additional mechanisms in the simulation program with the objective of obtaining a stable price
over time.
These mechanisms are introduced locally in every node, so that each of them, individually and
by using only its local information, pushes the system towards a stable price. In particular, the
two new introduced mechanisms are the hibernation and the change of ∆.
Each node in the network keeps count of the number and the type of the messages that are
forwarded from its pub over a period of time. As a reminder, the messages that are forwarded
from a node’s pub are the ones that belong to still-unsatisfied nodes, which have not been able
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to close a deal in the current pub. Therefore these messages allow the node to roughly estimate
the current ratio of active buyers and sellers in the network. In other words, to estimate the
current proportion of buyers in the system b. The nodes could keep in memory the estimated
ratio in the past Epochs, and make a continuous weighted average of the estimated ratio with
the information of every new Epoch. This method would guarantee an accurate ratio estimation
in the long run. However, we decide to erase the memory of the nodes about their past ratio
estimations every 10 epochs; this is because we consider more convenient that the nodes weigh
more the new information in order to have a more dynamic system, at the cost of sometimes
estimating inaccurate ratios. As we find in the simulation results, Section 4.4, this approach is
enough to achieve a stable price evolution. If the calculated proportion of buyers indicates an
excess of a particular type of nodes in the network (buyers or sellers), the node contributes to
balance this ratio by going into hibernation for a while, if it belongs to the group of agents that
is in excess. In hibernation, the node is in a virtual satisfied state, where it is not looking for a
deal (and consequently is in practice out of the market), although its pub is kept in operation,
matching and forwarding other nodes’ messages. This is the way the proportion of buyers b is
dynamically changed by the system.
In short, an agent in the network estimates the current proportion of buyers and sellers in the
market by counting the number of messages from buyers and the number of messages from
sellers that pass through him. If the ratio of buyers and sellers that the agent has estimated
is unfavourable to him (for instance, if he is a buyer and there are a lot of buyers), the agent
will go into hibernation, i.e. he will leave the market temporarily until the market conditions
improve. The hibernation mechanism is therefore an alternative for the agent, who can decide
to simply remain out of the market for a while, instead of changing his price against his own
interest forced by the current market conditions. The agent comes out of hibernation when
he estimates that the proportion of buyers and sellers in the network is favourable to him (for
instance, if he is a buyer and there are much more sellers than buyers), which implies that the
price will be changing in his preferred direction.
In addition, a node also changes the ∆ that makes its bid/ask price change, which means that
each node has its own ∆. The node uses again local information for this purpose; in particular,
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it uses the prices of the deals that are closed in its pub. Following the results of the analytic
model, the node increases its ∆ when price increases (the proportion of buyers increases) and
reduces its ∆ when price decreases (the proportion of buyers decreases), trying to reach a
condition for stable prices. In particular, when the increase in the deal price in the pub of a
node is lower than 30%, the node increases its ∆ by 0.1, i.e. ∆′ = ∆+ 0.1. When the increase
in the deal price in the pub is between 30% and 60%, the node increases its ∆ by 0.2, i.e.
∆′ = ∆ + 0.2. If the increase in the deal price in the pub is greater or equal than 60%, the
node increases its ∆ by 0.3, i.e. ∆′ = ∆ + 0.3. In all cases, the individual ∆ of the node is
forced to remain lower than 1. Similarly, the node decreases its ∆ by 0.1 when the decrease in
the deal price of its pub is lower than 30%, i.e. ∆′ = ∆− 0.1; the node decreases its ∆ by 0.2
when the reduction of the deal price is between 30% and 60%; and the node decreases its ∆
by 0.3 when the decrease in the deal price in its pub is greater or equal than 60%. In all cases,
the individual ∆ of the node is forced to remain greater than 0.
This behaviour is based on the observation of Figure 4.1 for a fixed percentage of buyers, i.e.
tracing an horizontal line. For any horizontal line in Figure 4.1, a larger ∆ will push the system
towards the area where price tends to 0, whereas a smaller ∆ will push the system towards the
area where price tends to infinity.
The hibernation mechanism implemented by the nodes in the simulation is a selfish behaviour
that contributes to price stability, whereas the change of ∆ that the nodes implement is a neutral
behaviour that also contributes to price stability. The rest of the details of the simulation with
adaptive agents are the same as in Chapter 3, together with the updates introduced in Section
4.2.1.
4.4 Simulation results
With the objective of obtaining an evolution in the system where price does not go to 0 or
to infinity, we introduce in our simulation the two new parameters explained in Section 4.3
(hibernation and change of ∆), following the results provided by the analytic model of Section
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4.2.
With these two new parameters, each node in the network tries to push the system towards a
stable price by using only its local information. A node goes into hibernation when its estimated
proportion of buyers shows an excess of agents in the network who are of the same type (buyers
or sellers) as the node. The node also changes its ∆ according to the information obtained from
the deal prices that take place in its pub. This means that the node increases its ∆ when the
reference price of its pub goes up, and decreases its ∆ when the reference price of his pub goes
down, following the guidelines from the analytic model.
With this new simulation model, we find that price over time does not evolve to 0 or infinity,
but stays oscillating around a stable value. Fig. 4.4 shows an example of this case.
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Figure 4.4: Average deal price evolution in the system for an initial proportion of buyers of 50% and an
initial ∆ = 0.7. The TTL of the messages is 7; the pubs’ size is 100; initial bid/ask price of the agents
is 1200; the budget of the buyers is 10000, re-filled every time the nodes are picked 10 times; nodes
re-enter the market after they have been picked 4 times; the graph is BA with 512 nodes and diameter
of 9; nodes spend 150 epochs in hibernation; buyers hibernate when their estimated proportion of
buyers in the network is greater or equal than 0.5; sellers hibernate when their estimated proportion
of buyers is lower than 0.5; the information a node has about past ratio estimations is erased every
10 epochs.
In Fig. 4.4, the TTL of the messages is 7 and the nodes’ pubs have a size of 100. Both buyers
and sellers in the network start bidding/asking an initial price of 1200, and the buyers have a
limited budget of 10000, which is re-filled after they have been picked 10 times. A node must
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be picked 4 times after making a deal in order to re-enter the market again. The network is a
BA graph of 512 nodes and has diameter of 9.
Also in Fig. 4.4, the initial proportion of buyers is 50% (b = 0.5), and all nodes have a starting
∆ = 0.7. The time nodes spend in hibernation is 150 epochs. Buyers go into hibernation when
the proportion of buyers they have estimated is greater or equal than 0.5, whereas sellers go into
hibernation when their calculated proportion of buyers is lower than 0.5. Both buyers and sellers
calculate this estimated proportion making an average of information taken for a maximum of
10 epochs, after which their calculated proportion is erased and they start calculating a new
estimated proportion during the next 10 epochs without considering any past information.
We have run several other simulations for the same BA network of 512 nodes, setting different
initial proportions of buyers and an initial ∆ for all nodes. During the simulation, the system
self-evolves to a point where price gets stable, oscillating around a certain value. We find that,
whenever this happens (as in the case of Fig. 4.4), the final percentages of buyers and sellers
in the network are always around 79% and 21% respectively (b = 0.79 in our analytic model),
and the average ∆ of all nodes has always a value around 0.8. This is precisely the point in the
analytic model where the line for a stable deal price has an inflection point (see the “X” mark
in Fig. 4.1). It appears this inflection point in the analytic model is an absorption point for
the simulations, a point where the system is pushed to, and where it remains stable. Although
we cannot prove this fact, it seems reasonable that the simulations achieve equilibrium around
this point, since the system is pushed up when it is below the line in Fig. 4.1, pushed down
when it is above the line, and similarly left and right; and it is near the “X” point where the
line turns, and the system can get stuck, and therefore in equilibrium. We can see in Fig. 4.5
the evolution of the average ∆ of all nodes in the system for the same simulation parameters
as in Fig. 4.4.
We find that this stable final price is obtained in the simulations whenever the initial parameters
of the proportion of buyers (b) and ∆ are close to the line for a stable deal price of the analytic
model. When these initial parameters are much further away, the system evolves to a final price
of 0 or infinity, since the effects of hibernation and change of ∆ do not have time to counteract
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Figure 4.5: Evolution of the average ∆ of all nodes in the system for an initial proportion of buyers
of 50% and an initial ∆ = 0.7. The TTL of the messages is 7; the pubs’ size is 100; initial bid/ask
price of the agents is 1200; the budget of the buyers is 10000, re-filled every time the nodes are
picked 10 times; nodes re-enter the market after they have been picked 4 times; the graph is BA with
512 nodes and diameter of 9; nodes spend 150 epochs in hibernation; buyers hibernate when their
estimated proportion of buyers in the network is greater or equal than 0.5; sellers hibernate when
their estimated proportion of buyers is lower than 0.5; the information a node has about past ratio
estimations is erased every 10 epochs. We see that, in equilibrium, the average ∆ has a value around
0.8, which is the “X” mark in Fig. 4.1.
the weight of the initial conditions. We do not have confidence intervals to show exactly at
which point the initial conditions cause instability in the final price. However, we show later
on that in a simulation with dynamic hibernation times, the final price gets always stable for
any initial values of b and ∆.
In the current simulation with static hibernation times, the results also show that, in order to
achieve a final stable price, the time the nodes have to spend in hibernation depends on the
relative position of the point of the initial conditions (the point that is the intersection of the
initial values of b and ∆) with respect to the line for a stable price derived with the analytic
model. Fig. 4.6 shows the numbers of the static hibernation time for a final stable deal price
for several initial points. We see in Fig. 4.6 that there is a direct relation between the static
hibernation time to achieve a stable price in the simulation depending on the initial conditions,
and the results of the analytic model. The static hibernation time increases for initial points
that are in the lower part of the analytic line for a stable deal price, and the further away
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Figure 4.6: Hibernation time that makes the dynamic simulation go to a final stable deal price, for
several initial values of b and ∆ and a BA network of 512 nodes and diameter of 9. The rest of the
parameters in the simulation are as follows: the TTL of the messages is 7; the pubs’ size is 100; initial
bid/ask price of the agents is 1200; the budget of the buyers is 10000, re-filled every time the nodes
are picked 10 times; nodes re-enter the market after they have been picked 4 times; buyers hibernate
when their estimated proportion of buyers in the network is greater or equal than 0.5; sellers hibernate
when their estimated proportion of buyers is lower than 0.5; the information a node has about past
ratio estimations is erased every 10 epochs. Initial combinations of b and ∆ whose intersecting point
in the figure is above the shown hibernation times make the overall price go to infinity, whereas initial
combinations of b and ∆ whose intersecting point in the figure is below the shown hibernation times
make the overall price go to zero. We do not have confidence intervals to show exactly where this limit
is. However, we show later on that this problem is solved in a simulation with dynamic hibernation
times, which make the system achieve a stable price independently of the initial values of b and ∆.
from the line these points are, the larger the hibernation time is. The static hibernation time
decreases for points in the upper part of the line, and it gets even lower as the initial points
move further up from the line. These results reinforce the validity of the analytic model.
The explanation for these values of the hibernation time is as follows. When the simulation
reaches stability, the proportion of buyers in the network is around 0.8 (80% of buyers and
20% of sellers). This means that the hibernation mainly affects the sellers. Therefore a higher
hibernation time causes sellers to be out of the market for longer, which makes buyers continue
increasing prices. In other words, a higher hibernation time causes a higher increase of prices.
Consequently, for initial points that would cause a deeper drop of price according to the analytic
model (those in the lower right part of Fig. 4.6), the hibernation time must be higher in order
to compensate it and produce a deeper increase of price, achieving in this way an equilibrium.
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4.4.1 Dynamic hibernation times and additional realistic parame-
ters
The results shown in Fig. 4.6 indicate a fixed hibernation time that makes the simulation
achieve a stable price evolution for different initial combinations of the proportion of buyers
and the change of ∆. Since these numbers are fixed and dependent on each initial combination,
and we were not able to find an appropriate hibernation time for all the initial combinations,
we decided to implement an upgraded simulation model where the agents automatically adjust
their own hibernation time. Therefore in this new version of the simulation, each agent has a
different hibernation time and each agent decides how to adjust his hibernation time depending
on his local market conditions.
In particular, all agents start with a preset hibernation time of 2 epochs. Then, if after coming
out of hibernation, a node decides to go into hibernation straight away again, the new hiber-
nation time for this node will be 22 = 4 epochs. If the agent decided to go into hibernation for
a third time in a row, he will go into hibernation for 42 = 16 epochs, and so on unboundedly.
This mechanism is similar to the exponential backoff used to avoid collisions in the Ethernet
networks 1. By contrast, if the node decides to go into hibernation directly from the active
state, he will spend in hibernation an amount of epochs that is the square root of his previous
hibernation time, with an absolute minimum of 2 epochs. Furthermore, we decide to set the
threshold of the proportion of buyers that makes nodes go into hibernation at 65% buyers, i.e.
a buyer hibernates when he detects a proportion of buyers that is greater or equal than 0.65,
whereas a seller hibernates when he detects a proportion of buyers that is lower than 0.65. This
update is explained by the fact that in the analytic result shown in Fig. 4.1, the horizontal
line b = 0.65 represents a fairer separation between the area where the price tends to infinity
and the area where the price tends to zero, and therefore a fairer separation between the area
where the sellers want the system to be and the area where the buyers prefer the system to stay.
Following this chain of reasoning, we also set the buyers to have ∆ = 0.9, because this vertical
line is situated on the right-hand side of Fig. 4.1, where the system has a higher probability
1IEEE Standard 802.3 - 2008, http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/download/802.3-2008_
section1.pdf
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of staying in the area where price tends to zero; similarly, we set the sellers to have ∆ = 0.1,
since this vertical line is on the left-hand side of Fig. 4.1, where the system has more chances
of being in the area where price tends to infinity. This implementation accentuates the selfish
behaviour of the agents.
Additionally, in the simulations of this subsection we incorporate some other realistic modi-
fications. Specifically, the distribution of wealth among the buyers is established as a Pareto
distribution, with most of the agents having a small amount of wealth and a few of them having
a large amount of money, which resembles a real social situation [72]. The probability density
function in a Pareto distribution is given by
f(x; k, xm) = k
xkm
xk+1
, for x ≥ xm. (4.6)
In our simulation, the Pareto distribution from which buyers get their budget has k = 10 and
xm = 10
4. We choose xm = 10
4 as the minimum budget for the buyers, since this is the amount
all of them used to have; we decide to use a very high value for the Pareto index k = 10 to check
whether this has an effect on the distribution of prices. We also implement in this simulation
a bounded Pareto distribution for the demand of the buyers, since computer workloads fit in
many cases heavy-tailed distributions according to [15]. The probability density function of a
bounded Pareto distribution is
f(x; k, L,H) =
kLkx−k−1
1− ( L
H
)k
, for L ≤ x ≤ H. (4.7)
For the demand of the buyers in this simulation, we use L = 4, H = 1010 and k = 1. Moreover,
the computing power of the sellers in this simulation is proportional to their respective number
of connections in the network, which is also Pareto distributed. Finally, we include in this model
the time delays that affect transactions between the nodes due to the network characteristics.
With these changes introduced in our model, we ran new simulations for networks of different
types and for different initial proportions of buyers. We found that the evolution of price over
time gets stable in all cases, as we can see in Fig. 4.7. We also find in these results that the
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evolution of price in the ER network presents much larger oscillations than in the BA network;
this is because the ER network is more connected and has a shorter diameter, which accentuates
the price changes caused by the change in the states of the nodes.
0e+00 1e+05 2e+05 3e+05 4e+05 5e+05
0
2
0
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
Time in Epochs
P
ri
c
e
0e+00 1e+05 2e+05 3e+05 4e+05 5e+05
0
2
0
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
Time in Epochs
P
ri
c
e
0e+00 1e+05 2e+05 3e+05 4e+05 5e+05
0
4
0
0
0
0
8
0
0
0
0
1
4
0
0
0
0
Time in Epochs
P
ri
c
e
0e+00 1e+05 2e+05 3e+05 4e+05 5e+05
0
e
+
0
0
1
e
+
0
5
2
e
+
0
5
3
e
+
0
5
Time in Epochs
P
ri
c
e
Figure 4.7: Average deal price evolution in the system for networks of different types and different
initial proportions of buyers. The two top graphs correspond to a BA network of 512 nodes and
diameter 9; the two bottom graphs correspond to an ER network of 512 nodes and diameter 4. The
two graphs on the left correspond to an initial proportion of buyers of 30%; the two graphs on the
right correspond to an initial proportion of buyers of 80%. The rest of parameters are as follows for
the four cases: the TTL of the messages is 7; the pubs’ size is 100; the budget of the buyers is re-filled
when they are picked 10 times. The distribution of wealth among the buyers is Pareto as indicated in
the text; the distribution of computing power between the sellers and the demand for the buyers are
also Pareto as indicated in the text. All buyers use ∆ = 0.9 and all sellers use ∆ = 0.1; the threshold
for hibernation is 65% buyers, i.e. buyers hibernate when they estimate b ≥ 0.65 and sellers hibernate
when they detect b < 0.65. The nodes adjust individually the time they spend in hibernation as
indicated in the text.
4.5 Performance of the peer-to-peer network compared
to a centralised system
In this section, we compare the performance of the distributed version of the Grid computing
market that we propose with the one of an hypothetical central version of the system.
In MAGOG, the completely decentralized system, agents try to find deals in the network by
sending messages to their closest neighbours, who then forward these messages if no deal has
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been found in their pubs. Therefore deals can be closed at the buffer of any agent connected
to the network. Every connected entity participates in the task of matching the requests of the
consumers and the offers of the providers. The network itself, as stated above, is modelled by
a Baraba´si-Albert graph.
On the other hand, with the aim of comparing the performance of MAGOG, we also consider in
this section a centralized system, where all market participants have a direct connection with a
central node in the network. This graph is modelled as a star, with one node in the centre with
branches to all nodes in the network. The connections with the central node can be physically
indirect via other nodes; however, all nodes send their messages exclusively to the central node.
The central node is in charge of matching all orders of buyers and sellers in the network.
One of the main advantages of the MAGOG system is its capability to increase indefinitely due
to the non-existence of a central server. A central server version will not be able to cope with
an ever increasing amount of agents connected to the network, what will avoid the deployment
of a global computing market. In this section, we give numerical evidence that proves this fact,
and we show how MAGOG outperforms any centralised system.
Since the load of the system will be given by the amount of requests the server will have to
handle, we measure the average amount of messages that are present in the buffers of the
system. In the case of the central system, the only buffer is the one of the central server;
whereas in the case of MAGOG, all nodes contribute with their respective buffers to handle
the requests.
We make the comparison with networks (central and distributed) of different sizes. For a
network of a particular size, we increase the capacity of the buffers in the system until there
are no losses, i.e. no messages are dropped from the buffers due to a lack of space. From
the moment the size of the buffers provides no losses, our simulations show that the average
number of messages in the buffers remains constant no matter how much more we increase the
size of the buffers. We then measure the average number of messages per buffer, which is an
indicator of the amount overhead experienced in either system. We find that the centralised
one has to handle an amount of messages that is several orders of magnitude larger than the
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load handled by each of the distributed nodes in the de-centralised system. This takes place for
each network size that we have investigated and is shown in figure 4.8, where we plot the total
numbers of messages in the central node and the average number of messages in an individual
buffer in the de-centralised system, per epoch.
 10
 100
 1000
 10000
 100000
 10  100  1000  10000  100000
N
um
be
r o
f m
es
sa
ge
s
Network size
Average number of messages in buffers
Centralized
Distributed (MAGOG)
Figure 4.8: Comparison of the average number of messages in buffers for a centralized grid computing
market and MAGOG (completely distributed grid computing market). The number of messages in
the centralised system increases linearly with the number of nodes, since the centralised node receives
one message per node at all times. Since we do not have results of the average number of messages in
buffers in the decentralised system for larger networks than the ones shown in the figure, we cannot say
that their number is bounded, although in any case the evolution of their plot indicates a substantial
reduction of messages from the centralised system, and their growth is less than linear.
It becomes obvious that individual MAGOG nodes on a BA graph certainly deal with far
fewer messages than the central node on a star graph. Therefore it should take less time and
computing power for individual nodes to make decisions in finding matches between nodes in the
distributed case. On the other hand, the centralised system has the advantage of receiving the
information from all market participants immediately, and therefore it has a better perspective
of the whole market, as well as the capacity to obtain new information quickly as soon as the
market conditions vary.
It is necessary to mention that this is just one possible way of comparing the centralised system
and the peer-to-peer system. Since these two systems are completely different, it is difficult to
find a parameter for comparison that fully reflects the differences. Other comparisons could be
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done regarding the latency or the administration of the system by a regulator.
4.6 Response time distributions
An important metric of a computer system from a user’s perspective is its response time.
In our system this could be defined as the time that elapses between sending out a message
advertising or requesting services to finding a matching partner. By analysing a long-running
simulation we present the response time distribution for sellers and buyers in Figure 4.9. The
simulation used in this case has the same parameters as the one plotted in Figure 4.4, with
the only exception of having an initial ∆ = 0.5. We have looked at highly connected and less
connected nodes and found that the response time distributions look very similar and rather
than the degree distribution, it appears to depend on the type of the node. In Figure 4.9, we
0 20 40 60 80
0.
00
0.
01
0.
02
0.
03
0.
04
Waiting time in epochs to get service for buyers (highly connected)
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
De
ns
ity
 F
un
ct
io
n
0.
00
0.
01
0.
02
0.
03
0.
04
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
De
ns
ity
 F
un
ct
io
n
0 5 10 15 20 25
0.
00
0.
04
0.
08
0.
12
Waiting time in epochs to get service for sellers (highly connected)
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
De
ns
ity
 F
un
ct
io
n
0.
00
0.
04
0.
08
0.
12
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
De
ns
ity
 F
un
ct
io
n
0 20 40 60 80
0.
00
0.
01
0.
02
0.
03
0.
04
Waiting time in epochs to get service for buyers (less connected)
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
De
ns
ity
 F
un
ct
io
n
0.
00
0.
01
0.
02
0.
03
0.
04
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
De
ns
ity
 F
un
ct
io
n
0 5 10 15 20 25
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
Waiting time in epochs to get service for sellers (less connected)
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
De
ns
ity
 F
un
ct
io
n
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
De
ns
ity
 F
un
ct
io
n
Figure 4.9: Normalized histograms for the response time of buyers (left) and sellers (right); highly
connected (top) and less connected (bottom). The black dotted lines are the real histograms, whereas
the blue continuous lines are normal probability density functions of the same mean and standard
deviation as the real distributions. The mean and standard deviation of each case are: µ = 26.78 and
σ = 15.93 (highly connected buyers); µ = 29.99 and σ = 14.80 (less connected buyers); µ = 6.73 and
σ = 4.76 (highly connected sellers); µ = 6.69 and σ = 3.46 (less connected sellers).
show typical distributions for both a highly connected and a less connected seller node and a
highly connected and less connected buyer node. There are 80% buyers and hence they have a
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longer mean response time. The response times appear to be more related to the type of the
node, i.e. whether it is a buyer or seller node, rather than its level of connectivity. In the tail,
all of the response time distributions appear to approach a normal distribution. However, the
Shapiro-Wilk normality test gives a p-value < 2.2·10−16 for the four data sets, and consequently
the four distributions are not normal. Furthermore, it is interesting that the response times do
not reflect the power law of the node degree distribution at all, since the distributions in Fig.
4.9 do not present fat tails. We would need to investigate in more detail what is causing this
as it suggests that the network topology is not important for this aspect of the system. In this
regard, in order to find out more precisely the types of distributions obtained in Fig. 4.9, we
would need to analyse larger systems, i.e. systems with more nodes, since the ones analysed in
Fig. 4.9 do not allow us to exactly determine the type of distribution.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have tackled analytically the behaviour of price in our simulated Grid
computing market in order to understand previous results from Chapter 3, where price tended
either to zero or infinity. This analytical approximation has allowed us to comprehend the
conditions under which price gets stable in our simplified market. Following this analytical
analysis, we have implemented an adaptive behaviour in the agents of our simulation, namely
hibernation and change of ∆. The hibernation allows nodes to temporarily stay out of the
market while the market conditions are unfavourable for them, while the change of ∆ allows
nodes to individually decide the proportion in which they change their prices. Both conditions
are implemented locally in the sense that nodes only use local information to change their
behaviour. The incorporation of these new conditions has resulted in a stable price evolution.
The addition of a budget for the buyers, a minimum ask price for the sellers, as well as integer
prices and a call auction algorithm to clear the orders in the pubs of the nodes have completed
the improvement of our simulation program.
We have also given numerical reasons why a distributed Grid Computing market like MAGOG
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outperforms a centralized system. The increase of computer interconnection and the eventual
deployment of a global Grid Computing market will only be possible by using a decentralized
system, since numerical results show that a centralized one will not scale. In addition, we have
studied the response time of individual nodes as the time it takes for them to acquire service.
The results show that the response times in our system mainly depend on the type of node,
and not on the degree of connectivity of the node.
Extensions of the work presented in this chapter might consider the introduction of utility
functions for the agents, which would include, for instance, response times (delays), quality of
service and gain in the transaction (price). Future work should also analyse more simulation
results under an exhaustive sweep of all parameters. Moreover, the inclusion of simultaneous
trading of several interrelated computing resources (such as CPU time and disk space) will
move the model closer to a real Grid Computing market. In this respect, nodes could also keep
the account of the reliability and quality of service provided by other nodes in the network, so
that deals would more often be made with trustworthy nodes.
Now that a stable price evolution has been achieved in the simulations, one of our next steps
will point out to the development of a mathematical model for the Grid Computing market,
establishing a theoretical basis for this particular commodity market. This mathematical model
is aimed at capturing the essence of the Grid market behaviour, in the same way that other
models have been presented in the literature for different commodities and stock markets. This
model is introduced in Chapter 6.
Furthermore, we consider that derivatives will play an important role in the future global Grid
computing market. If we think about the impossibility of storing CPU cycles, then we come
to the conclusion that computing power is not tradeable. This situation immediately brings
the idea of trading computing power for delivery at a future date, which can be accomplished
by the use of future contracts. We present in Chapter 5 a futures market for computing power
based on agents that take Markovian decisions, and introduce an optimal strategy for trading
futures in this market.
Chapter 5
Markov Market Model
5.1 Introduction
In Chapters 3 and 4, a simulation approach to a Grid Computing market model was carried
out, where market participants traded computing power on the spot for immediate delivery. In
this chapter we present an integral analytic approach of a futures market for computing power
using Markov chains and Markov decision processes. More generally speaking, a market for
CPU cycles is going to be a market of a perishable commodity as it is not possible to store
unused CPU cycles, what will cause the emergence of a futures market for computing power.
Other examples of markets with perishable commodities are the UK electricity market, inves-
tigated by Bagnall and Smith [13] using a multi-agent simulation, where the authors study
whether adaptive agents can learn real-world bidding strategies, as well as the possible coop-
eration between them and its influence on the market. Another example of a market with a
perishable commodity is the Marseille fish market investigated by Kirman and Vriend [57], who
study the loyalty between buyers and sellers, which makes buyers that are loyal to particular
sellers receive a better utility, and the sellers in return receive higher revenue from the loyal
sellers. In contrast to these studies, in our market model in this Chapter, the agents that form
the market have a static behaviour, which is determined by the particular aversion to risk of
each agent; and there is no cooperation between the market participants. The agents in our
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market are assumed to make Markovian decisions. On top of the derived market, we also in-
troduce the trading of future contracts on Grid computing and investigate an optimal trading
strategy for an informed trader that observes the evolution of the market.
The analysis of an optimal trading strategy carried out in this Chapter uses Markov decision
processes (MDPs). MDPs are widely used in systems in which sequential decisions must be
taken in an uncertain environment. They have several fields of applications [100], and very in
particular in economics. For instance, they can be used to achieve an optimal bidding strategy
for the electricity supply [87] or an optimal inventory order policy [46]. In a similar way to
other perishable commodity markets, like for instance the electricity market, we expect that a
futures market for computing power will also emerge. A futures market allows the possibility of
trading the underlying computing power, since the agents trade future contracts on computing
power instead of the computing power itself. In this manner, market participants can agree
on the price of computing power for delivery at a future date, extending therefore the trading
spectrum in time. With future contracts, the use of the resources is maximised, and agents can
hedge their positions or speculate on future price movements. In this context, market operators
will try and look for an optimal trading strategy in such a market, which here we achieve by
the use of MDPs.
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 5.2 we describe our model in more detail.
Simulation results are compared to analytic computation in section 5.3. In section 5.4 we discuss
a futures market for trading compute resources. This is all summed up in the conclusions,
section 5.5.
5.2 The Market Model
In Chapter 4, we presented an analytical approximation to understand the price evolution in
the simulation of our peer-to-peer Grid computing market. This approximation assumed that
the network was fully connected, and therefore that the system would behave as a single global
market place. The results showed that this is actually a good approximation, and therefore
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we again make this assumption for the present work. In other words, for the derivation of the
mathematical model in this Chapter, we work with a centralised market place. If the results
for this model in a peer-to-peer setting differed from the centralised version, the effects would
be offset with the incorporation of both shifting factors (additive, e.g. communication times)
as well as scaling factors (multiplicative) in order to have an equivalent result to the analytical
centralised system.
Modelling a market from the basis requires modelling its participants, or agents, since these
are its raison d’etre. Initially, we describe the behaviour of each agent by a Markov chain. The
Markovian character of the agents is presented as a first approach to modelling the system;
which is supported by the fact that most (if not all) mathematical models for financial markets
[74, 85] consider the price follows a Markov process.
In this chapter, for each individual, there are three possible trading actions available: buy, sell
or hold. We model these as the three states of a stochastic process, labeled by −1 (sell one
unit of the product), 0 (hold / do nothing) and 1 (buy one unit of the product); these states
are usually abbreviated to {−, 0,+} in the sequel. In addition, we assume that the process
is memoryless and therefore that the behaviour of an agent i can be described by a discrete
time Markov chain, which in turn is defined by its transition probability matrix Ti. This has
elements Ti(a, b) equal to the probability that agent i moves from state a to state b in the next
time slot by taking the appropriate action, for a, b ∈ S = {−, 0,+}
The values of the transition probability matrix of a particular agent will depend on the attitude
and approach to risk of that agent, reflected in his behaviour. In this way, the behaviour of
every market participant can be captured, no matter how different they are: greedy buyer,
fearful seller, neutral, etc. Each of them is characterised by a particular transition probability
matrix Ti and each takes decisions independently. The market is formed by the collection of
these agents and hence characterised by the set of all the transition matrices.
The evolution of the market as a whole is determined by the actions of all agents. To represent
the value of the market itself as a stochastic process would require an infinite number of states,
(0 to +∞), and consequently market analysis by traders for decision making would become
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Figure 5.1: The market is formed by its market participants. We therefore specify the behaviour of
each individual agent Ai.
infeasible. To simplify the model, we consider here the variation in price rather than the price
itself. This allows the price to increase or decrease unboundedly and circumvents the problem
of having prices become negative, whilst allowing for the possibility that prices approach zero
(without actually reaching zero).
Figure 5.2: We focus on the price variation of the market, instead of on the market price itself. At a
particular time step ti, the maximum price variation is limited by the number of agents in the market,
N . This avoids the problem of having to analyse an infinite number of states for the market price
(0 to +∞). Furthermore, the price variation can be both positive and negative, what eliminates the
constraint of dealing exclusively with positive market price values.
For this purpose, we introduce the new concept of market pressure, which determines the
direction of the market price and is established by supply and demand from the agents. We
define market pressure to be the sum of the individual states of all agents. Each agent can be in
one out of three possible states {−, 0,+}; market pressure is then the sum of all these individual
states. An excess of demand will push the price up (there are more agents in state + than in
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state −, and therefore their sum is positive, i.e. market pressure is positive), whereas an excess
of supply will force it down (there are more agents in state − than in state +, and therefore
their sum is negative, i.e. market pressure is negative). If supply and demand equalize, the
price will remain the same (there are an equal number of agents in state − as in state +, or all
agents are in state 0, for instance, and therefore their sum is equal to 0, i.e. market pressure is
0).
We now define a new, discrete time Markov chain to model the evolution of the whole market
(whose transition probability matrix is given by expression 5.1), taking into account the con-
tributions of the individual Markov chains of every agent. If we were to define a global Markov
chain whose possible states were all possible combinations of the individual states of the agents,
the global chain that models the market would have 3N states, where N is the number of agents
in the market, since every agent can be in any of his three possible states {−, 0,+}.
To avoid this state space explosion, with the objective of simplifying a posterior market analysis,
we make use of the concept of market pressure to reduce the number of possible states in the
market model. We define the market state to be the sum of the states of the individual agents,
so that a buy action of one agent is cancelled out by a sell action of another agent. With this
consideration, the number of states for the global Markov chain is reduced to 2N + 1, namely
−N (where every agent is in sell-mode), −N + 1, . . . , N (where all agents are in buy-mode).
5.2.1 The transition probability matrix of the market
The new, reduced, global Markov chain that models the market as described above has one-step
transition probability matrix:
M = (msd | −N ≤ s, d ≤ N), (5.1)
where each element msd is the probability of the market going from state s to state d, among
the 2N + 1 available states (see for instance expression 5.5, as an example of this transition
probability matrix for the case of two market participants, i.e. N = 2, and 2N + 1 = 5).
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The calculation of each element msd is computationally complex since the states s and d of
the market may comprise any of several different combinations of local states of the individual
agents. Each element must be calculated as a weighted sum of the probabilities of going from
each of the initial combinations of agent-states, comprising the global state s, to any of the
final combinations of agent-states that give global market-state d.
As an illustrative example of this situation, we consider a small market with only two partici-
pating market agents. The first one is considered ‘neutral’, with transition probability matrix:
TA =


0.3 0.4 0.3
0.3 0.4 0.3
0.3 0.4 0.3

 , (5.2)
where the first row contains the probabilities of going from state {−} to, respectively and in
order from left to right, states {−, 0,+}. The second and third rows specify the corresponding
transition probabilities from states {0} and {+} respectively.
The second agent could be termed a ‘fearful seller’, showing a slight tendency towards state −1
(selling). This is given by a state transition matrix such as:
TB =


0.4 0.3 0.3
0.4 0.2 0.4
0.3 0.4 0.3

 (5.3)
The transition probability matrix of the global market will have dimensions 5 × 5, and each
element (each element in expression 5.5) will be the transition probability of the market going
from any initial combination of the agents’ states to any final combination of the agents’ states.
We exemplify the calculation of the probability of the market going from state s = −1 to state
d = 0. Since there are two agents, the possible agents’ combinations that make the market
state be s = −1 are: (A = 0, B = −1) and (A = −1, B = 0). From these two situations,
the market should evolve to state d = 0, which can be achieved with any of the three possible
agents’ combinations: (A = 0, B = 0), (A = 1, B = −1) and (A = −1, B = 1). Therefore, the
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probability of the market going from s = −1 to d = 0 is calculated as
P (d = 0 | s = −1)
=
πA,0πB,−1
πA,0πB,−1 + πA,−1πB,0
[PA(0 | 0)PB(0 | −1) + PA(1 | 0)PB(−1 | −1) + PA(−1 | 0)PB(1 | −1)]
+
πA,−1πB,0
πA,0πB,−1 + πA,−1πB,0
[PA(0 | −1)PB(0 | 0) + PA(1 | −1)PB(−1 | 0) + PA(−1 | −1)PB(1 | 0)]
= 0.326178,
(5.4)
where πK,l is the steady state probability of agent K being in state l, and PK(f | i) is the
transition probability of agent K going from state i to state f . Similarly, we can calculate the
rest of the elements in the transition probability matrix of the market, obtaining:
M =


0.120000 0.250000 0.330000 0.210000 0.090000
0.120000 0.238533 0.326178 0.213822 0.101467
0.111000 0.236000 0.329333 0.222667 0.101000
0.102222 0.231852 0.331852 0.231852 0.102222
0.090000 0.240000 0.340000 0.240000 0.090000


(5.5)
The equilibrium probabilities for the market state are then:
P =


0.110092
0.237615
0.330275
0.222936
0.099083


(5.6)
This demonstrates one obvious effect of adding a ‘fearful seller’ to the ‘neutral’ agent: the
equilibrium probabilities of the lower numbered states ({−2,−1}) are higher than those of the
upper numbered states ({1, 2}).
Now we generalise the calculation of the global transition probability matrix for any market.
In a heterogeneous market, let agent k’s Markov chain be irreducible and have equilibrium
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probability state vector pik = (πk−, πk0, πk+), with components corresponding to local states
{−, 0,+} respectively. Further, let the probability generating function (pgf) of the transition
probabilities out of state i ∈ {−1, 0,+1} at agent k have pgf Ak(z; i) = Tk(i,−)z−1+Tk(i, 0)+
Tk(i,+)z.
Now define the N -component vector random variable ~Yn to be the joint state of the agents just
after the nth transition instant, with ~Y0 being the initial joint state. Similarly, let Xn = |~Yn|
be the corresponding global state just after the nth transition, where |~v | =∑Nk=1 vk is the sum
of the elements of a vector ~v. Then,
msd = lim
n→∞
P (Xn = d | Xn−1 = s)
where the limit exists provided the agent-chains are irreducible. Hence msd is the coefficient
of zd in the generating function G(z; s) = limn→∞Gn(z; s) where the pgf Gn(z; s) = EI [z
Xn |
Xn−1 = s], which is what we now determine.
Proposition 5.1. Let πklk be the lk (lk ∈ {−1, 0,+1}) component of the equilibrium probability
state vector of agent k, and Ak(z; lk) the probability generating function for row lk of agent k,
as described above. Then, for a market of N agents, the probability generating function (pgf)
of the market state, one epoch after the state being s, is:
G(z; s) =
∑
~ℓ:|~ℓ|=s
∏N
k=1 πkℓkAk(z; ℓk)∑
~ℓ:|~ℓ|=s
∏N
k=1 πkℓk
Proof
Gn(z; s) = EI [z
Xn | Xn−1 = s]
= EI [ EI [z|
~Yn| | ~Yn−1, Xn−1 = s] | Xn−1 = s]
This first step is by conditional expectations.
= EI
[
EI [
N∏
k=1
zYnk | ~Yn−1, Xn−1 = s] | Xn−1 = s
]
In the above equality we have decomposed ~Yn in the individual
states of the N agents: z|
~Yn| =
∏N
k=1 z
Ynk
5.2. The Market Model 81
= EI
[ N∏
k=1
EI [zYnk | ~Yn−1, Xn−1 = s] | Xn−1 = s
]
And now we have applied the fact that the agents are independent to
take the product of the expectations, instead of the expectation of the product.
= EI
[ N∏
k=1
EI [zYnk | Yn−1,k] | Xn−1 = s
]
Because of the independence of the agents, the kth component of ~Yn, i.e. Ynk,
only depends on the kth component of ~Yn−1, i.e. Yn−1,k.
= EI
[ N∏
k=1
Ak(z;Yn−1,k) | Xn−1 = s
]
Here we have applied the definition of the pgf Ak(z; i) stated above.
=
∑
~ℓ:|~ℓ|=s
P (~Yn−1 = ~ℓ | |~ℓ| = s)
N∏
k=1
Ak(z; ℓk)
And finally we have applied the definition of conditional expectation.
The result now follows as n → ∞, when we take all the combinations of the steady state
probabilities of the agents π that make the market state be s. ♦
This pgf is a polynomial in z, whose coefficients give the probability of the market going from
a given state s to each possible state d (destination); the coefficient of zd is the probability of
the market going from state s to state d in one step, i.e. msd. Notice that the sums of products
over vectors ~ℓ, the components of which sum to a given number s, are simply convolutions of
N sequences. They are most conveniently computed by multiplying generating functions of the
sequences and extracting the coefficients.
Note also that we are assuming that we know the exact transition probability matrix of each
agent (expressions such as 5.2 or 5.3), and therefore we know the exact probability generating
function of each agent (all the Ak(z; ℓk)). We make these assumptions because we are using here
a bottom-up approach, where we start the study of the system from the point of view of the
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individual agents, and then we come up with the general result. However, this approach might
be challenging to implement in practice, since it is difficult to actually know the exact behaviour
of each agent. Therefore it would be interesting, as future work, to study how sensitive the
system is to small changes in the transition probability matrices of the agents. For instance, to
study what happens to the results when expression 5.7 is modified from Tn to Tn +∆.
When all the agents are identically specified, proposition 5.1 simplifies greatly as follows.
Corollary 5.1. If all the agents are identical with local states u = −, 0,+ row-transition pgf
A(z;u) and equilibrium probability vector pi, for s ≥ 0,
G(z; s) =
⌊(N−s)/2⌋∑
n=0
N !
n!(N−s−2n)!(n+s)!
B−(z)
nB0(z)
N−s−2nB+(z)
n+s
⌊(N−s)/2⌋∑
n=0
N !
n!(N−s−2n)!(n+s)!
πn−π
N−s−2n
0 π
n+s
+
where Bu(z) = πuA(z;u) for u = −, 0,+. For s < 0,
G(z; s) =
⌊(N+s)/2⌋∑
n=0
N !
n!(N+s−2n)!(n−s)!
B+(z)
nB0(z)
N+s−2nB−(z)
n−s
⌊(N+s)/2⌋∑
n=0
N !
n!(N+s−2n)!(n−s)!
πn+π
N+s−2n
0 π
n−s
−
Proof Since now all agents have the same equilibrium probability vector pi, each term in
the product in the numerator of the proposition is πℓkA(z; ℓk), where ℓk takes one of the three
values −, 0,+. Let there be a fixed number of occurrences for each of the three values, which we
name n−, n0, n+ respectively, and which correspond to having n− agents in state −, n0 agents
in state 0 and n+ agents in state +. Since the total number of agents is always N , we have
that n− + n0 + n+ = N . Moreover, to have global state s, we must have n+ − n− = s. Then,
in this particular situation of n− agents in −, n0 agents in 0 and n+ agents in +, there are a
total of N !
n−!n0!n+!
permutations with repetition that give global market state s, and therefore
the numerator in the proposition is N !
n−!n0!n+!
B−(z)
n−B0(z)
n0B+(z)
n+ . Now, if instead of fixed
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values, we consider all possible values of n−, n0, n+, where n−+n0+n+ = N and n+−n− = s,
we have that the numerator of the proposition is
∑
(n−, n0, n+) :
n+ − n− = s
n− + n0 + n+ = N
N !
n−!n0!n+!
B−(z)
n−B0(z)
n0B+(z)
n+
Similarly, the denominator of the proposition is
∑
(n−, n0, n+) :
n+ − n− = s
n− + n0 + n+ = N
N !
n−!n0!n+!
π
n−
− π
n0
0 π
n+
+
For s ≥ 0, n+ must be at least s. We also have in any case that n− = n+ − s, and therefore
we can write N = n0 + 2n+ − s, or equivalently 2n+ = N + s− n0. Since by definition n0 ≥ 0,
we have that 2n+ ≤ N + s, or equivalently n+ ≤ (N + s)/2, and consequently the range of n+
is [s, ⌊(N + s)/2⌋. For each n+, the values of n0 and n− are fixed at n0 = N + s − 2n+ and
n− = n+ − s. The result now follows by changing the summation variable n+ to n = n+ − s.
For s < 0, we must have n− ≥ −s and the analogous result follows by interchanging the roles
of n+ and n−. ♦
As already noted, the elements ofM are defined by the coefficients of G(z; s), which are routine
to compute – by primitive operations in many mathematical software packages.
When all the agents are identical, the generating functions G(z; s) are quick to compute by
Corollary 5.1. At the other extreme, if the agents are all different (completely heterogeneous
case), then Proposition 5.1 must be used and requires, for each of the 2N + 1 values of its
second argument, sums over state spaces of 3N elements. This is completely impractical for
even moderate N . However, typically we will have neither of these extremes but more likely a
partition of a small number of sets of identical agents. For example, there may be 4 types of
agents and 100 agents of each type, i.e. 400 agents in total, with a partition of 4 sets. Consider
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a partition of r agent-types containing n1, . . . , nr agents. The i-th set in the partition has 2ni+1
aggregate states (1 ≤ i ≤ r), so the total number of aggregate states is ∏ri=1(2ni + 1), which
is 2014, or 1, 632, 240, 801. This is a large number but one for which it is perfectly feasible to
derive the global state transition matrix M , with just 801 states.
In the following, we shall deal with systems that consist of types of similar agents. To this
end, we derive the following proposition. Let the equilibrium probability vector for the 2ni+1
aggregate (sub)states of the ith agent-type be denoted φi, defined by φiv =
∑
~ℓ:|~ℓ|=v
∏ni
j=1 πkjℓkj
for −ni ≤ v ≤ ni, where the sequence numbers of the agents of type i are here denoted
k1, . . . , kni . Again, this follows because the agents are independent. Now let the transition
probabilities out of aggregate state v in type i have pgf Ci(z, v), computed using Corollary 5.1
with s = v, applied to states numbered k1, . . . , kni instead of 1, . . . , ni. Then we have the
following result.
Proposition 5.2. For a collection of agents partitioned into r types, as defined above, the pgf
of the market state, one epoch after the state being s, is
G(z; s) =
∑
~ℓ:|~ℓ|=s
∏r
k=1 φkℓkCk(z; ℓk)∑
~ℓ:|~ℓ|=s
∏r
k=1 φkℓk
where ℓk ranges over [−nk, nk] for 1 ≤ k ≤ r (as opposed to [-1,1] for 1 ≤ k ≤ N in Proposi-
tion 5.1).
Proof The proof follows that of Proposition 5.1, but with the probabilities φ replacing π,
the products being taken over agent types instead of individual agents, and the sums being
over vectors of aggregate type-states instead of individual agent-states. Similarly, Ck(z; ℓk),
the pgf for a group of agents of the same type, replaces the pgf of a single agent, used in
Proposition 5.1. ♦
This is the proposition that we used in our experiments, described in the next section, where
we considered a market with a small number of types of traders – just two in fact – but large
numbers of each type. In the previous illustrative example with only two agents of different
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types, propositions 5.1 and 5.2 become equivalent.
5.3 Simulation Model & Results
In this section we compare the results of the market evolution derived from the previous section
with results from a simulation of the market. To this end we compute the global steady state
probabilities of the market. The simulation in this section is a slight adaptation of the ones
presented earlier in Chapters 3 and 4. In particular, market participants submit in this case
‘market orders’, with their direct intention of buying, selling or holding at the current market
price; whereas in Chapters 3 and 4, market participants submitted ‘limit orders’, with the
intention of buying or selling only at a specified price.
We make the comparison between the analytical model and the simulation results with regard
to their probability functions for two different scenarios. These correspond to two different
kinds of networks. The first kind of network is fully connected, and we refer to this as the ideal
simulation setup. The second kind of network is a random network (BA), which might not be
fully connected, and we call this the non-ideal simulation setup.
In the ideal simulation setup, agents can exchange messages with all other nodes each time
step. In this case the simulation results are identical within the errors of the simulation to the
analytical model. This can be seen in Fig. 5.3 where we have a market with 128 agents, who
all have the same transition probability matrix given by (5.7).
We have also run simulations with the non-ideal setup on BA graphs with 128, 512 and 1024
nodes. The results are summarized in table 5.1.
For the 128 node simulation, we chose a pub size of 128 messages and a TTL of 7 and ran the
simulations for 200,000 epochs. First we chose all agents to have the same neutral transition
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of the probability functions for the global market state, calculated analytically
(red solid line) and with the simulations (blue dashed line), for the ideal simulation setup (fully
connected network) and 128 market participants. The small vertical lines that cross the simulation
plot correspond to 95% confidence intervals.
probability matrix:
Tn =


0.3 0.4 0.3
0.3 0.4 0.3
0.3 0.4 0.3

 . (5.7)
In Fig. 5.4 we show the results of the comparison between the analytical centralised system
and the distributed BA network of the simulation. The probability function of the analytical
model and the relative frequency histogram of the simulation both appear close to Normal, as
one would expect from the Central Limit Theorem. As one would also expect from the different
network infrastructures, the results are different. Both distributions have a zero mean; however,
the simulated one has a lower variance than the analytical. This might be due to the fact that
past messages stored in the several pubs of the BA network tend to decrease the variance in
the global state of the market.
In the second, non-ideal setup, all 128 nodes have a tendency to sell:
Ts =


0.6 0.2 0.2
0.4 0.2 0.4
0.2 0.6 0.2

 , (5.8)
As can be seen in Fig. 5.5, again both models have a probability function/histogram that
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Figure 5.4: Probability functions for the global market state, calculated analytically (red solid line)
and by simulation (blue dashed line), for the first non-ideal setup of the simulations and a random
network of 128 nodes.
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Figure 5.5: Probability functions for the global market state, calculated analytically (red solid line)
and by simulation (blue dashed line), for the second non-ideal setup of the simulations.
appears Normal. However, the simulation has a smaller negative mean than the analytical
solution. This is because the market state obtained in the simulations tends to have a lower
absolute value for a non-fully connected network, since some nodes might not receive copies of
all messages.
The third and last model is a network of 64 agents with a transition probability matrix given
by (5.7) and 64 agents with a transition probability matrix given by (5.8). We work with a
relatively small number of agents to show our results, since the simulations can take too long to
complete for a large number of agents. We expect this setup to have a mean somewhere between
0 and that of the previous case. Fig. 5.6 shows that this is the case and again the distributions
appear Normal. The discrepancy in the means and variances is again almost certainly due to
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Figure 5.6: Probability functions for the global market state, calculated analytically (red solid line)
and with the simulations (blue dashed line), for the third non-ideal setup of the simulations.
the BA network.
In Table 5.1 we summarize the simulation results for different network sizes. As mentioned
before, both the mean and the variance in the simulations tend to have a lower absolute value
than in the analytical model. Also, the variance of the market state increases with the number
of agents in the market. This is as expected from the Central Limit Theorem.
N h µa µs σ
2
a σ
2
s
First non-ideal simulation setup
128 4.4 0 0 76.80 34.46
512 6.6 0 0 307.20 43.56
1024 6.9 0 0 614.40 72.25
Second non-ideal simulation setup
128 4.4 -22.26 -20.50 85.17 40.96
512 6.6 -89.04 -43.70 340.69 53.29
1024 6.9 -178.08 -78.00 681.38 90.25
Third non-ideal simulation setup
128 4.4 -11.13 -9.93 80.99 37.21
512 6.6 -44.52 -18.30 323.94 48.02
1024 6.9 -89.04 -33.60 647.89 79.21
Table 5.1: Summary of simulation results for the three non-ideal simulation setups and the three
different-sized networks. N is the network size; h is the average number of hops between nodes in
the network; µa is the mean obtained with the analytical model and µs is the mean obtained in the
simulation; σ2a is the variance of the analytical model and σ
2
s is the variance of the simulation.
In summary, the ideal simulations show very good agreement with the analytical model. In the
cases where BA networks are used, there are slight discrepancies that can be explained by the
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inefficiencies of a non-fully connected network. In this non-ideal simulation setup, both shifting
factors (additive, e.g. communication times) as well as scaling factors (multiplicative) need to
be found in order to have an equivalent result to the analytical centralised system.
In the following section we make use of the full global transition probability matrix of the whole
market rather than just the probabilities of the market state at equilibrium. We only looked
at these probabilities here to be able to make a comparison between the simulations and the
analytical model.
5.4 Futures trading of computing power
Once a global computing power market has been established, we expect that a parallel market
of derivatives of computing power will emerge, in a similar way to what happens in other
perishable commodity markets, such as electricity. This is a natural development, since the
inability to store a CPU cycle makes its trading physically impossible, but still allows its price
to be decided for a fixed time in the future. Institutions and individuals connected to the global
peer-to-peer market will trade future contracts of computing power in order to maximise the use
of their resources, acquire resources when needed or for purposes of hedging and speculation.
Figure 5.7: Computing power is non-storable, and therefore non-tradeable. Future contracts allow
trading the underlying computing power. With different delivery dates (t + T1, t + T2, etc), future
contracts extend the trading spectrum, allowing maximization of the use of resources, as well as
hedging and speculation.
It is for this reason that we explore in this section the trading of future contracts of computing
power. Specifically, we analyse the performance of a futures trader that operates in such a
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market, and adapts his decisions according to the optimization of a certain objective, with the
expectancy of finding a pattern in the behaviour of the market. We specify this problem as a
Markov Decision Process (MDP).
Figure 5.8: Graphical representation of an arbitrary example of a Markov Decision Process. MDPs
are used for decision-making in sequential, uncertain environments. In this example, the states of the
MDP are the large yellow circles, the possible actions at each state for the decision maker are the small
blue circles, and the arrows that come out of the blue circles are the possible evolutions of the system
after that particular action is taken; the probability of each of these possible evolutions happening is
indicated on the arrows, together with the reward that the decision maker receives when this happens.
In our model, the set of decision epochs is discrete and infinite:
I ≡ N\{0}, (5.9)
i.e. decisions are made at all decision epochs for infinity. We could have chosen a finite-horizon
formulation of the problem (i.e. six months or one year); however, our decision epochs do not
have a direct correspondence with real time (i.e. a decision epoch does not correspond to a
day or any other time measure), and therefore we choose the general approach of an infinite
horizon setup. Furthermore, the state of the MDP is formed by the state of the market on the
one hand, and by the state of the trader on the other hand.
We assume one of the general hypothesis of perfect markets, where the decisions of a single
individual cannot determine the evolution of prices, and therefore a single agent is unable to
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manipulate the market. In particular, we assume that the price evolution of the market is given
by a certain transition probability matrix, which has been generated as described in section
5.2.1.
In addition to the price evolution, we include a second variable to model the state of the market:
the trading volume. The trading volume gives information about the number of transactions,
and its evolution over time is usually indicated in parallel with the evolution of price.
Therefore the evolution of the market is given by a transition probability matrix like the one in
expression 5.1. The state (an integer between −N and N inclusively) indicates the variation in
price with respect to the previous deal price. This variation can be understood to be relative (a
percentage of variation) or absolute (points of variation in price). The trading volume is given
by the absolute value of the price variation, i.e. the volume will always be a natural number
between 0 and N inclusively. This volume can be understood as the number of units of future
contracts available to be bought or sold at the given price. This specification of volume implies
that the higher the variation in price (up or down), the higher the trading volume will be. This
correspondence between price variation and trading volume is not an arbitrary choice, and it
can be observed in many graphs plotted, for instance, from stock market data.
These two variables, price variation (i) and trading volume (|i|), define the state of the market:
Mi = (i, |i|), for i ∈ Z,−N ≤ i ≤ N (5.10)
which in turn determines the first two variables that define the state of the MDP.
The third and final variable that defines the state of the MDP is the open position of the futures
trader. The trader can buy, sell or hold at every time step. He can only buy or sell 1 futures
contract at every time step, but over time he can accumulate up to N contracts. His actions
therefore imply an integer number between −N and N inclusively, which is his open position,
i.e. the number of futures contracts he has (bought or sold) and are pending liquidation. The
92 Chapter 5. Markov Market Model
open position of the trader is:
Tpos = pos, for pos ∈ Z ∩ [−N,N ] (5.11)
Consequently, taking into account both the market state and the trader’s position, the state
space of the MDP, S, is formed by:
Si,pos = (i, |i|, pos), for i, pos ∈ Z ∩ [−N,N ] (5.12)
where i is the market price variation given by expression 5.1, |i| is the trading volume and pos
is the open position of the trader. Since the price variation can have 2N +1 values, the trading
volume is directly determined from the price variation and the trader can be in 2N+1 different
positions, the total number of states of the MDP is (2N + 1)2.
Furthermore, the actions the trader can take are:
As = {−1, 0, 1}, for s ∈ S, (5.13)
with the condition of having an absolute open position that is limited to be between −N and
N inclusively. Therefore the available actions for the trader will depend on his current open
position, being limited to {0, 1} when his open position is −N and to {−1, 0} when his open
position is N .
To complete the definition of the MDP, a reward for the trader is established, which is condi-
tioned by his actions. The reward that the trader is given is divided in two parts. The first part
comes from the profit/loss in the operation he is immersed in due to the market price variation
and his current open position. This reward is given as the multiplication of the trader’s open
position at the next decision epoch (which will depend on his current open position and his
action taken at the current decision epoch) by the market price variation at the next decision
epoch, which is uncertain and depends on the transition probabilities in expression 5.1. In other
words, the reward depends, not only on the current state of the MDP and the action taken by
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the trader, but also on the next state of the MDP, and consequently we will have to calculate
its expected value in the current state of the system. Taking this into account, this first reward
given to the trader when the system is in state s and he chooses to do action a ∈ As, is:
r1(s, a) =
∑
j∈S
r1(s, a, j)p(j|s, a), (5.14)
where r1(s, a, j) is the reward given to the trader when the system is in state s, the trader
chooses to do action a ∈ As and the system evolves to state j at the next decision epoch.
Numerically, this reward is evaluated as:
r1(s, a, j) = ij ∗ posj, (5.15)
being ij and posj the market price variation and the position of the trader respectively when
the system is in state j. The action (a ∈ As) the trader can choose is any of {−1, 0, 1}, being
limited to {0, 1} when his open position is −N and to {−1, 0} when his open position is N .
With regard to p(j|s, a), this is the probability of the system going from state s to state j
when the trader chooses to do action a ∈ As. Since the open position of the trader at the next
decision epoch is immediately calculated at the current decision epoch from his current open
position plus his action a ∈ As, this conditional probability is directly given by expression 5.1,
i.e. by the transition probability matrix of the market.
The second part of the reward is determined by the availability to buy or sell the remaining
future contracts that the trader still has, which depends on the available trading volume. This
second reward is actually a penalty, and therefore it will be zero in the best case and negative
in the other cases. This penalty can be understood as a way of forcing the trader to have
an open position that can be easily closed in the market, in order to avoid an important loss
due to a drastic change in market conditions, as well as be to able to immediately liquidate
a position that is no longer needed. Since the available trading volume at the next decision
epoch is unknown at the present decision epoch, this reward also depends on the next state
of the system (and not only on the current state of the system and the trader’s action), and
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therefore its expected value is given by:
r2(s, a) =
∑
j∈S
r2(s, a, j)p(j|s, a), (5.16)
with the same interpretation as expression 5.14, except for the fact that in this case:
r2(s, a, j) = −c ∗max(|posj| − |i|j, 0), (5.17)
where c ∈ R+ is a penalty factor, and |posj| and |i|j are, respectively, the absolute open
position of the trader and the available trading volume when the system is in state j. The
action (a ∈ As) the trader can choose is exactly the same as explained for expression 5.15.
The total reward the trader is given when the system is in state s and he chooses to do action
a ∈ As, is:
r(s, a) = r1(s, a) + r2(s, a) (5.18)
5.4.1 An optimal trading policy
We now approach the problem of finding an optimal trading strategy for a futures trader that
operates in a market as defined in section 5.4. In practice, this consists of finding an optimal
policy for the MDP.
We specify our problem to be an infinite-horizon Markov decision process, and we apply the
expected total discounted reward optimality criterion [74]. This means that the MDP continues
in time for infinity, although we apply a discount factor λ, with 0 ≤ λ < 1, which makes future
rewards less valuable.
With this setting, the expected total present value of the income stream obtained by using a
policy π, when the system is in state s at the first decision epoch, is:
vπλ(s) = E
π
s {
∞∑
t=1
λt−1r(Xt, Yt)}, (5.19)
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where r(Xt, Yt) is the reward received when using action Yt in state Xt, and t is the decision
epoch (t ∈ I, see (5.9)). Using a discount factor, together with finite rewards, ensures the
convergence of the series [74]. The objective is to find the policy π that maximizes expression
5.19.
Among the different algorithms for finding an optimal policy, we use here linear programming,
due to its easy formulation. A detailed explanation on how to transform a discounted Markov
decision problem into a linear programming problem can be found in [74, p. 223]. Specifically,
choosing α(j), j ∈ S (being S the state space of the MDP) to be positive scalars with
∑
j∈S
α(j) = 1, (5.20)
the primal linear program consists of minimizing:
∑
j∈S
α(j)v(j), (5.21)
subject to:
v(s)−
∑
j∈S
λp(j|s, a)v(j) ≥ r(s, a), (5.22)
for a ∈ As and s ∈ S, and v(s) unconstrained for all s ∈ S.
The dual linear program consists of maximizing:
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈As
r(s, a)x(s, a), (5.23)
subject to: ∑
a∈Aj
x(j, a)−
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈As
λp(j|s, a)x(s, a) = α(j), (5.24)
and x(s, a) ≥ 0 for a ∈ As and s ∈ S.
We choose to solve the dual formation of the problem, because with its solutions (i.e. the
x(s, a)) we can directly obtain a decision rule for each state by choosing the action that gives
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the highest probability as given by:
P{dx(s) = a} = x(s, a)∑
a′∈As
x(s, a′) (5.25)
The set of the decision rules for each of the states of the MDP forms the policy.
Example
We present in this section an example of an MDP as defined in section 5.4. To model the
evolution of the market, we take the transition probability matrix of the example in section
5.2.1, i.e. expression 5.5. Therefore the number of agents that defines the market is N = 2 and
the market can be in one of the following 5 states:
Mi = (i, |i|), for i ∈ Z,−2 ≤ i ≤ 2 (5.26)
For each of the above market states, the trader can be in one of his five positions:
Tpos = pos, for pos ∈ Z,−2 ≤ pos ≤ 2, (5.27)
and therefore the MDP has 25 states, which form the state space S, defined as the set of states:
Si,pos = (i, |i|, pos), for i, pos ∈ Z ∩ [−2, 2], (5.28)
being i the value of the price variation, |i| the trading volume and pos the position of the trader.
The possible actions of the trader are:
As = {−1, 0, 1}, for s ∈ S, (5.29)
except for the states in which the trader has a position of −2, where his possible actions will
only be {0, 1}, and for the states in which the trader has a position of 2, where his possible
actions will only be {−1, 0}.
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We apply rewards as indicated in expressions 5.14, 5.16 and 5.18, with a penalty factor of
c = 0.1, and build the dual linear program as indicated in expressions 5.23 and 5.24. The dual
is solved with GLPK (GNU Linear Programming Kit), using a discount factor λ = 0.95 and
the same value for all the α(j). In particular, the standard LP solver of GLPK, glpsol, is used,
and an optimal solution is found by the simplex method.
The solutions to the 65 variables of the dual problem are shown in Table 5.2, where x(Si,pos, a)
corresponds to a variable that is associated to the fact that when the MDP state is Si,pos =
(i, |i|, pos), the trader chooses to do action a. By applying expression 5.25, we obtain a decision
rule for each state, and therefore a policy, which in this case is optimal, and it is shown in table
5.3. As can be seen in Table 5.3, the action −1 is predominant among the trader’s decisions,
which makes sense in a bear market as defined by expression 5.5.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter has approached the modelling of a future global Grid Computing market by the
use of Markov chains, which is a fairly common method used for financial markets. A first
mathematical model has been introduced, in which each of the market agents is modelled by
a Markov chain that reflects its behaviour. We have also presented the concept of market
pressure, which has allowed us to obtain a global Markov chain that models the market as a
whole by combining the individual contributions of all market participants, and avoiding the
problem of state explosion. Specifically, we have shown how to calculate the one-step transition
probability matrix for an aggregation of this market.
The analytical results we obtained for the market’s equilibrium state probabilities compared
well against simulation for the ideal setup. For the non-ideal setups, further work will consist
of finding both shifting and scaling factors in order to obtain an identical result to the analytic
centralised system, as well as explaining and predicting these factors.
The possibility of including the attitude of any kind of agent in the market gives the model
a great degree of flexibility and robustness, which is crucial in the case considered, since the
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a
- 0 +
Si,pos
S0,−2 - 0 88.9405
S0,−1 88.9916 0 0
S0,0 88.9916 0 0
S0,1 0.108839 0 0
S0,2 0.04 0 -
S1,−2 - 101.02 0
S1,−1 50.5129 0 0
S1,0 0.133 0 0
S1,1 0.115239 0 0
S1,2 0.04 0 -
S2,−2 - 93.9005 0
S2,−1 22.0828 0 0
S2,0 0.124293 0 0
S2,1 0.112039 0 0
S2,2 0.04 0 -
S−2,−2 - 0 96.6009
S−2,−1 74.8694 0 0
S−2,0 0 0 0.11533
S−2,1 0 0.159157 0
S−2,2 0.04 0 -
S−1,−2 - 118.988 0
S−1,−1 73.6971 0 0
S−1,0 0 0 0.133
S−1,1 0.190716 0 0
S−1,2 0.04 0 -
Table 5.2: Solution to the dual linear problem. The numbers in the cells where Si,pos and a intersect
are the solutions to x(Si,pos, a). When in the intersection there is a dash (-), it means that the
combination is not possible because the trader cannot choose that action in that state.
S0,−2 1 S2,−2 0 S−1,−2 0
S0,−1 -1 S2,−1 -1 S−1,−1 -1
S0,0 -1 S2,0 -1 S−1,0 1
S0,1 -1 S2,1 -1 S−1,1 -1
S0,2 -1 S2,2 -1 S−1,2 -1
S1,−2 0 S−2,−2 1
S1,−1 -1 S−2,−1 -1
S1,0 -1 S−2,0 1
S1,1 -1 S−2,1 0
S1,2 -1 S−2,2 -1
Table 5.3: Optimal policy. The trader’s optimal action for each state of the MDP is specified.
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global Grid Computing market is yet to emerge, and therefore we are working on the field of
predictions. However, our approach still presents some limitations, such as the simplicity of
the agents’ behaviour, as well as their static interaction with the surrounding environment.
Although the trading of other computing products in this market is not ruled out, the Grid
Computing market considered has been assumed to be a market for CPU cycles. The im-
possibility of storing this commodity immediately brings similarities to the case of electricity
markets, where derivatives are traded. It is for this reason that this chapter has also introduced
the trading of future contracts of computing power. Just as in financial markets, buyers and
suppliers will be able to use derivatives as insurance policies against market fluctuations. The
analysis of futures trading has been modelled as an MDP with rewards that match the par-
ticular characteristics of this market. A way of obtaining an optimal trading policy has been
presented.
Continuing the analysis of derivatives in the Grid Computing market, an extension of this
chapter can consist of the transformation of the agents’ behaviours, given by their individual
Markov chains, into utility functions, which then may be used to price options on futures.
On another note, as an alternative approach to the bottom-up method that we have used in
this chapter (from the particular cases of the agents to the general case of the market), in
Chapter 6 we consider the top-down method, starting the study of the market as a whole
from the global perspective. We develop this second approach in a mathematical model with
stochastic differential equations that capture the essence of the market evolution shown in
the last simulations of Chapter 4, where the price evolution achieves stability with permanent
fluctuations. In this case, however, we will be modelling the evolution of the spot price instead
of the future price.
Chapter 6
Stochastic Calculus Model
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present an analytic model based on stochastic calculus for the development
of the spot price of computing power in our proposed global Grid market. This market, which is
implemented as a peer-to-peer computer network as for instance suggested by [78], is a potential
development for the open trading of computing power around the world, around the clock. We
have described and simulated this market in Chapters 3 and 4. It is output data from our
previously developed simulation program that we use here as market data.
The modelling of time series of prices is very common in finance [92]. Hamilton [50] introduced
the use of Markov regime-switching systems to model the US business cycles. Huisman and
Mahieu [55] describe the evolution of electricity prices and its characteristic spikes with a
regime-switching model with three states. The reason why they used a model with different
regimes is because it is very difficult to capture the evolution of a system that presents many
different characteristics with a single stochastic differential equation. By using a model with
different regimes (or states), each characteristic of the real system can be easily modelled with
a different regime. In the case of Huisman and Mahieu, the two different characteristics are
the mean-reversion and the spikes in the electricity price. The mean-reversion is modelled
with a general mean-reverting process in the main regime, whereas the spikes are modelled
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with two additional regimes that first push the price towards one direction and immediately
after push it back in the opposite direction. With this setting, they are able to separate the
modelling of the mean-reversion from the modelling of the spikes. If one uses a single stochastic
differential equation that includes both mean-reversion and a jump process, the mean-reverting
coefficient in this case is used to push prices back to the original value after a jump. This makes
the mean-reverting coefficient be unusually high on the one hand, and avoids its use for the
original mean-reversion on the other hand. Since our system also presents both mean-reversion
and spikes, we choose the setup of Huisman and Mahieu as a first approach to model the spot
price of computing power in our global market.
Regarding the estimation of parameters in our model, we decide to use firstly maximum likeli-
hood estimation. This is because our model is formed by a combination of three mean-reverting
stochastic processes, all of which are normally distributed, and therefore it is straightforward
to write their likelihood functions. As an alternative approach, we also use a second estimation
method, the generalised method of moments, which is less efficient than maximum likelihood,
but requires less time to compute.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 specifies the simulation
model of our Grid market that we are using in this chapter. Section 6.3 points out the main
characteristics observed in the spot price evolution of this market simulation. Section 6.4
analyses the returns in the global Grid market and compares them with other existing markets.
Section 6.5 presents the Markov regime-switching model that we use to describe the spot price
evolution. Section 6.6 estimates the parameters of the model via maximum likelihood and
section 6.7 estimates them via the generalised method of moments. In section 6.8, we show
how to do an exact numerical stochastic simulation of the calculated stochastic model via a
previously proposed algorithm by Gillespie [48]. Section 6.9 concludes the chapter.
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6.2 The simulation model
Our simulation model for the global Grid market is the one used in Chapter 3, with the im-
provements of Chapter 4, specifically sections 4.2.1 and 4.3. We also introduce in the simulation
program used in this chapter the Pareto distribution for the wealth of the buyers of section
4.4.1. In addition, some sellers might spontaneously disconnect from the market for a certain
time. This is implemented by making the sellers hibernate twice than usual with 1% probabil-
ity. We consider that demand will be much more constant than supply in the global computing
power market. In the current oligopoly market of utility computing (formed by only a few
providers such as Amazon, IBM, Sun or HP) [24], the supply is supposed to be quite constant
due to the fact that is provided by a few large companies; and the demand is supposed to be
variable and have spikes, since a company is expected to have a certain amount of computing
resources and turn to the utility computing market to ask for extra power when the company is
overtaken by its workload. However, in our future envisioned global computing power market,
the providers will be a much more heterogeneous group, formed by literally anyone in the world
who has a computer or a smartphone, and therefore these suppliers are expected to connect
and disconnect from the market much more frequently and randomly, causing a high variability
in supply. This situation may cause spikes in the spot price of computing power, as it happens
with electricity, when there is a shortage of it [4].
The rest of the parameters used in our simulation program in this chapter are as follows: a
BA graph of 512 nodes (its diameter is 9); a TTL of 7; a buffer size for the pubs of 100; the
budget of the buyers is refilled every 10 epochs; the nodes spend 150 epochs in hibernation;
the initial ∆ for the price change is 0.7; the percentage of buyers and sellers in the network is
50% each; a node that has been picked up 4 times re-enters the market; and buyers and sellers
start bidding/asking with an initial price of 1200.
In our simulation, we consider the global spot price to be the average of the deal prices in every
pub of the network at every epoch. With the parameters specified above, the evolution of the
logarithm of the spot price of computing power in our simulation program is shown in Fig. 6.1.
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Figure 6.1: Evolution of log-price of computing power over time.
6.3 The spot price evolution
The global Grid computing market as suggested by the MAGOG system [78] will be formed
by nodes from all over the world. This fact implies an extremely dynamic market, with both
providers and consumers permanently joining and leaving the market.
The market will also be open 24 hours a day, every day of the year, in a similar way to currency
markets. In contrast with traditional markets, consumers of computing power do not necessarily
need a human presence to make the transactions: a requirement for computing power is sent,
and if matched, the transaction starts. Usually, one submits a task that waits in a queue until
it is completed, and no further human action is necessary after submitting the task. The same
happens with the providers: they leave their computers connected to the network, automatically
asking for a certain price so that their resources can be used. The implementation of automatic
trading mechanisms will further reinforce this situation.
Amazon EC2 spot instances [1] is an existing example for the spot price of computing services.
However, the Amazon system is a monopoly, since Amazon itself sets the prices. In the simu-
lations of our Grid computing market, we consider a free market where the price is set as the
result of the interaction of all market participants.
Both the fact that the market is global and the fact that it is open 24 hours create an interesting
behaviour. The concept of seasonality (which has a strong influence on the electricity market
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due to the succession of the seasons, as well as the day and the night) is unclear in the global
Grid computing market. The possibility of asking for computing power anywhere in the world
breaks the influence of local seasonalities. Furthermore, computers are used both at work and
during the spare time, which makes even more random the time at which they are going to be
available for the Grid computing market. We consider no deterministic seasonality in the Grid
computing market, but large stochastic short-term variations in price due to sudden connections
and disconnections of market participants.
This situation creates the first characteristic of the spot price evolution: spikes in the short
term, where sudden increases (or decreases) in price are immediately followed by variations in
price of similar magnitude, but opposite direction. This is explained by the sudden connections
and disconnections of nodes in the global Grid, causing sudden changes in supply and demand
that are reflected in the spot price. This behaviour is natural in a commodity like computing
power, whose non-storable nature causes large sudden oscillations in its spot price, depending
on its current availability and demand. This is in tune with other non-storable commodities
like electricity.
The other characteristic that we observe in this global Grid market is a long term evolution,
where the price oscillates around a certain mean value, or mean-reverting price. This is in
agreement with the amount of available computers over time in an organization, as shown in [23].
This mean-reverting behaviour has actually been considered a characteristic of commodities,
such as crude oil. Since computing power is a commodity as well, the long term behaviour of
price observed in our simulation data is in agreement with this consideration.
The development of the logarithm of the spot price of computing power over time in our
simulation program is shown in Fig. 6.1. We observe in this figure both the long-term mean-
reversion and the short-term spikes, which are downside spikes for the case of the logarithm of
the spot price. From now on, we will treat these data as real market data.
We decide to model the logarithm of the spot price of computing power. This is because
the logarithm of the price can have negative values, which avoids the need of establishing the
additional constraint of obtaining only positive values in the estimation of parameters. We
6.4. The nature of computing power returns 105
introduce the analytic model for the logarithm of the spot price of computing power in section
6.5.
We emphasise that we work here with the spot price of computing power. A model of a futures
market for computing power was previously presented in Chapter 5.
6.4 The nature of computing power returns
We explore in this section the characteristics of the computing power returns in our simulated
Grid market, and compare them with other returns in real markets. We calculate the computing
power returns as:
R(t) =
S(t+ 1)
S(t)
, (6.1)
where S(t) is the spot price of computing power at epoch t. As explained in section 6.2, the spot
price is the average of the deal prices in all pubs of the network in our simulated peer-to-peer
market.
The evolution of computing power returns is shown in Fig. 6.2.
0 50000 100000 150000
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
Time in epochs
R
(t)
Figure 6.2: Evolution of computing power returns over time.
We now proceed to analyse the logarithm of the computing power returns, for which we simply
take the natural logarithm in expression 6.1:
LR(t) = ln
S(t+ 1)
S(t)
= lnS(t+ 1)− lnS(t) (6.2)
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In Fig. 6.3 we plot the evolution over time of the log-returns of computing power.
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Figure 6.3: Evolution of log-returns of computing power over time (in epochs).
The distribution of these log-returns is shown in Fig. 6.4 via their normalized histogram
(probability density function), where a comparison is presented with a normal distribution of
the same mean and variance. Note that the y axis is in log scale.
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Figure 6.4: Probability density function of the log-returns of computing power. The red solid line is
the density of a normal distribution with same mean and variance. The y axis is in log scale. It is
possible to see that the distribution of log-returns of computing power is normal in the central part,
but it also presents some “fat” tails on the sides.
As we can see in Fig. 6.4, the distribution of the log-returns of computing power follows a
normal distribution in the central part, while spreads more than the normal distribution in
the tails. This distribution of the computing power returns is similar to the one of other
commodities like cotton [95].
With the objective of further analysing the distribution of log-returns of computing power,
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and in particular to find out whether this distribution is a power law, we now plot the log-log
histograms for both the positive and negative log-returns. In order to do this, we first separate
the positive and the negative log-returns:
PLR(t) = LR(t)+ (6.3)
NLR(t) = LR(t)−, (6.4)
and then we normalize both sets dividing them by their respective minimum values:
NPLR(t) =
PLR(t)
min(PLR(t))
(6.5)
NNLR(t) =
abs(NLR(t))
min(abs(NLR(t))
, (6.6)
where in the case of the negative log-returns, we work with their absolute value.
Now we plot the log-log histograms for the normalized positive log-returns (NPLR) and the
normalized negative log-returns (NNLR), which are shown in Fig. 6.5 and Fig. 6.6 respectively.
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Figure 6.5: Log-log histogram for the normalized positive log-returns of computing power. The red
solid line is a normal distribution of the same mean and variance.
If the distribution of log-returns were to follow a power-law distribution, the log-log histogram
would be formed by a straight line, as it can be deduced from the following reasoning.
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Figure 6.6: Log-log histogram for the normalized negative (in absolute value) log-returns of computing
power. The red solid line is a normal distribution of the same mean and variance.
A power-law distribution is given by:
y(x) = x−α, (6.7)
which by taking the logarithm on both sides of the equation becomes
log[y(x)] = −αlog[x]. (6.8)
Making the changes of variable, Y (X) = log[y(x)] and X = log[x], equation 6.8 reads as:
Y (X) = −αX, (6.9)
which is a straight line with negative slope (assuming α > 0). This is not the case of the
histograms in Fig. 6.5 and 6.6.
To compare the prices in our simulated computing power market with real markets, we also
plot the probability density functions, as well as the log-log histograms for both positive and
negative normalized log-returns of electricity prices in New England and the daily closing prices
of the DAX index.
The electricity prices are from the wholesale day ahead prices in New England, USA, from
January 2001 to April 2010 [4]. The probability density function of their log-returns is shown
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in Fig. 6.7. The log-log histograms, for both normalized positive and negative log-returns of
the electricity prices, are show in Fig. 6.8 and Fig. 6.9. We can see from Fig. 6.7 that the
log-returns of the electricity prices are also close to a normal distribution, although they are
slightly narrower in the centre and wider in the tails. Fig. 6.8 and Fig. 6.9 indicate that their
distribution is not a power law.
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Figure 6.7: Probability density function of the log-returns of electricity prices in New England from
January 2001 to April 2010. The red solid line is the density of a normal distribution with same mean
and variance. The y axis is in log scale.
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Figure 6.8: Log-log histogram for the normalized positive log-returns of electricity prices in New
England from January 2001 to April 2010. The red solid line is a normal distribution of the same
mean and variance.
The data for the DAX index is taken from its daily closing prices since December 1990 until
April 2010 [3]. The probability density function of its log-returns is shown in Fig. 6.10. The
log-log histograms are show in Fig. 6.11 and Fig. 6.12 for the normalized positive and negative
log-returns respectively. Fig. 6.10 shows that the distribution of the log-returns of the DAX
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Figure 6.9: Log-log histogram for the normalized negative (in absolute value) log-returns of electricity
prices in New England from January 2001 to April 2010. The red solid line is a normal distribution
of the same mean and variance.
index is very similar to an ideal normal distribution; Fig. 6.11 and Fig. 6.12 show that there
is no strong evidence of power law.
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Figure 6.10: Probability density function of the log-returns of the DAX index from December 1990 to
April 2010. The red solid line is the density of a normal distribution with same mean and variance.
The y axis is in log scale.
We can conclude that the distribution of log-returns in our simulated Grid computing market
is similar to the ones found in real markets.
6.5 The analytic model
The analytic stochastic model that describes the behaviour of the spot price evolution in our
system must therefore consider both the long term and the short term characteristics observed
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Figure 6.11: Log-log histogram for the normalized positive log-returns of the DAX index from Decem-
ber 1990 to April 2010. The red solid line is a normal distribution of the same mean and variance.
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Figure 6.12: Log-log histogram for the normalized negative (in absolute value) log-returns of the DAX
index from December 1990 to April 2010. The red solid line is a normal distribution of the same mean
and variance.
in Fig. 6.1.
The fact that these two characteristics are so different makes it difficult to implement a simple
model that contemplates both behaviours at the same time. It is for this reason that the idea
of regimes or states appears. We consider a Markov regime-switching model, where a hidden
Markov chain changes the regime of the system by changing its state according to certain
transition probabilities. Each regime, or state, models a particular characteristic of the whole
system.
In particular, we make use of the following model:
112 Chapter 6. Stochastic Calculus Model
M : dxt = α(µ− xt−1) + σǫ (6.10)
D : dxt = α(µ− xt−1)− ǫs (6.11)
U : dxt = α(µ− xt−1) + ǫs (6.12)
where ǫ ∼ N(0, 1) and ǫs ∼ N(µs, σ2s) with µs > 0, and t ∈ N.
This model was initially proposed by Huisman and Mahieu to describe the evolution of the
electricity price [55]. This stochastic model has three states. The first state (M: mean-reverting)
corresponds to the evolution of the logarithm of the spot price of computing power in the long
run, which is given by a mean-reverting Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. In this state or regime,
the logarithm of the spot price tends to an average value of µ; and σ > 0 is the constant
volatility parameter for this regime.
The other two states of the model (D: down, U: up) describe the spiky behaviour of the
logarithm of the spot price of computing power in the short term observed in Fig. 6.1. The
first of these spiky states (D), or regimes, keeps the mean-reverting characteristic of the long
term state (and therefore the value of the logarithm of the spot price tends to an average value
of µ), but introduces a sudden drop in price (−ǫs). The normal random variable ǫs models the
jumps that have an average value of µs and a standard deviation of σs. A change of the system
to state D will therefore pushes the price down. The second spiky state (U) is equal to the
first one, but its variation in price is of opposite sign, returning the price to a value similar to
the one in the starting mean-reverting regime (M). The D regime is always followed by the U
regime, producing in this way a negative spike in price, as the ones observed in Fig. 6.1
The Markov transition probability matrix that specifies the evolution between the three regimes
is:
T =


1− p p 0
0 0 1
1 0 0

 , with p ∈ R ∩ [0, 1], (6.13)
where the first row corresponds to the probabilities of going from the ’normal’ mean-reverting
regime to, respectively, the ’normal’ mean-reverting regime, the down regime and the up regime.
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The second row of the matrix specifies the probabilities of going from the down regime to the
three regimes, and the third row specifies the probabilities of going from the up regime to the
three regimes.
As can be seen in matrix 6.13, the down regime is always preceded by the ’normal’ mean-
reverting regime; the down regime is always followed by the up regime; and the up regime is
always followed by the ’normal’ mean-reverting regime. This system guarantees the existence
of spikes, since a jump in one direction is always followed by another jump in the opposite di-
rection. This specification avoids other solutions which include unrealistic high mean-reverting
coefficients in order to revert prices back after jumps [36].
6.6 Estimation of Parameters via Maximum Likelihood
In this section, we focus on how to estimate the parameters of the analytic stochastic model
presented in the previous section so that the model fits the output data shown in Fig. 6.1.
Specifically, we apply here the method of Maximum Likelihood.
The first step consists of deriving, analytically, the likelihood function of the model. In general,
the likelihood function is given by:
L(θ) = ΓLt(θ), (6.14)
where Γ represents the recursive multiplication of function Lt(θ) evaluated at the time instants
that have been analysed, from the final instant t to the initial instant 1. Our objective is to find
Lt(θ), which in our regime-switching model, is given by the weighted average of the likelihood
function of each regime (M,D,U) [35]:
Lt(θ) = ρ
prior
M,t LM,t(θ) + ρ
prior
D,t LD,t(θ) + ρ
prior
U,t LU,t(θ) (6.15)
Each weight is the prior probability of being in that regime. For time t, the prior probability is
the probability of being in a particular regime calculated without knowing the data at time t.
The posterior probability, at time t, is the probability of being in a particular regime calculated
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after knowing the data at time t.
Figure 6.13: Relation between prior and posterior probabilities. The posterior probability at a certain
time step is obtained from the prior probability and the data at that time step. The prior probability
in the next time step is obtained from the posterior probability at the previous time step and the
Markov transition probability matrix.
The relation between the prior probabilities at time t and the posterior probabilities at time t
is:
ρpostr,t = ρ
prior
r,t
Lr,t(θ)∑
r
Lr,t(θ)
(6.16)
where Lr,t(θ) is the likelihood function at time t for the regime r. Therefore, the posterior
probabilities for the three regimes at time t, given the prior probabilities at time t, are:
ρpostM,t = ρ
prior
M,t
LM,t(θ)
LM,t(θ) + LD,t(θ) + LU,t(θ)
ρpostD,t = ρ
prior
D,t
LD,t(θ)
LM,t(θ) + LD,t(θ) + LU,t(θ)
ρpostU,t = ρ
prior
U,t
LU,t(θ)
LM,t(θ) + LD,t(θ) + LU,t(θ)
On the other hand, in order to obtain the prior probabilities at time t, given the posterior
probabilities at time t − 1, one uses the relation given by the Markov transition probability
matrix:
ρpriort = ρ
post
t−1T (6.17)
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For our case:
(
ρpriorM,t ρ
prior
D,t ρ
prior
U,t
)
=
(
ρpostM,t−1 ρ
post
D,t−1 ρ
post
U,t−1
)


1− p p 0
0 0 1
1 0 0

 (6.18)
In order to maximise the likelihood function (6.15), we need to derive the expressions for the
likelihood functions of each regime: LM,t(θ), LD,t(θ) and LU,t(θ). Since the two ’spiky’ regimes
(D and U) have a similar stochastic equation whose only difference is the sign in the mean of the
normal ǫs, our problem is simplified to find two likelihood functions: LM,t(θ) and LS,t(θ), being
the latter the likelihood function for one of the spiky regimes, which later will be particularized
for D and U .
6.6.1 Derivation of the Likelihood Function for the Mean-reverting
regime
Deriving the likelihood function of the mean-reverting regime implies deriving the density
function of the stochastic process in that regime, which in turn implies finding the distribution
of the stochastic process. The mean-reverting regime (M) is:
dxt = α(µ− xt−1) + σǫ, (6.19)
which, for clearer viewing, in continuous form is the mean-reverting Ornstein-Uhlenbeck pro-
cess:
dX(t) = α(µ−X(t))dt+ σdW (t); X(0) = X0, (6.20)
where W (t) is a Wiener process or Brownian motion, whose increments dW (t) are independent
and normally distributed as
dW (t) ∼ N(0, dt) =
√
dtN(0, 1). (6.21)
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In order to find the distribution of X(t), we first solve (6.20) for X(t).
Taking into account that:
d(eαtX(t)) = X(t)αeαtdt+ eαtdX(t), (6.22)
we then have:
eαtdX(t) = d(eαtX(t))−X(t)αeαtdt (6.23)
Multiplying (6.20) by eαt:
eαtdX(t) = eαtα(µ−X(t))dt+ eαtσdW (t), (6.24)
which is equal to (6.23), and combining them gives:
d(eαtX(t)) = αeαtµdt+ eαtσdW (t). (6.25)
Integrating (6.25):
eαtX(t) = X0 +
∫ t
0
αeαsµds+
∫ t
0
eαsσdW (s), (6.26)
dividing by eαt:
X(t) = X0e
−αt +
∫ t
0
αe−α(t−s)µds+
∫ t
0
e−α(t−s)σdW (s), (6.27)
and solving the first integral:
X(t) = X0e
−αt + µ(1− e−αt) +
∫ t
0
e−α(t−s)σdW (s), (6.28)
Now we call the remaining integral in (6.28):
I(t) :=
∫ t
0
e−α(t−s)σdW (s), (6.29)
I(t) has a Brownian motion as the integrator and an adapted process as the integrand, and
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therefore I(t) is an Itoˆ integral. Furthermore, in this case the integrand is nonrandom, conse-
quently I(t) is normally distributed [85]. It then remains to find out the mean and variance of
I(t).
Since I(t) is an Itoˆ integral, then I(t) is a martingale (see Page 22). Furthermore, we also can
see that, for t = 0, we have I(0) = 0. And therefore:
E[I(t)] = 0 ∀t ≥ 0 (6.30)
It follows that the variance of I(t) is:
V ar[I(t)] = E
[(
I(t)− E[I(t)])2] = E[I2(t)], (6.31)
which can be calculated by Itoˆ isometry (see Page 22):
E[I2(t)] = E
[( ∫ t
0
e−α(t−s)σdW (s)
)2]
= E
[ ∫ t
0
(e−α(t−s)σ)2ds
]
(6.32)
Since the remaining expression in (6.32) is not stochastic:
E
[ ∫ t
0
(e−α(t−s)σ)2ds
]
=
∫ t
0
e−2α(t−s)σ2ds (6.33)
and solving the integral: ∫ t
0
e−2α(t−s)σ2ds =
σ2
2α
(1− e−2αt), (6.34)
we have that the variance of I(t) is:
V ar[I(t)] =
σ2
2α
(1− e−2αt) (6.35)
Therefore finally, the process X(t) given by (6.20) is normally distributed with mean:
E[X(t)|X0] = X0e−αt + µ(1− e−αt) = µ+ (X0 − µ)e−αt (6.36)
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and variance:
V ar[X(t)|X0] = σ
2
2α
(1− e−2αt) (6.37)
We can now write the conditional density of the discrete process xt defined in (6.19) as a normal
density with mean (6.36) and variance (6.37):
fi(xti ;µ, α, σ) =
1
√
2π
√
σ2
2α
(1− e−2α∆t)
exp(− [xti − (µ+ e
−α∆t(xti−1 − µ))]2
2[σ
2
2α
(1− e−2α∆t)] )
= (2π)
−1
2 [
σ2
2α
(1− e−2α∆t)]−12 exp(− [xti − (µ+ e
−α∆t(xti−1 − µ))]2
2[σ
2
2α
(1− e−2α∆t)] ),
(6.38)
where ∆t = ti − ti−1. Then the likelihood function for one time step for the mean-reverting
regime, LM,t(θ), is:
LM,t(θ) = LM(xti ;µ, α, σ) = (2π)
−1
2 [
σ2
2α
(1− e−2α∆t)]−12 exp(− [xti − (µ+ e
−α∆t(xti−1 − µ))]2
2[σ
2
2α
(1− e−2α∆t)] )
(6.39)
Applying the logarithm we get the log-likelihood function for one time step for the mean-
reverting regime:
lM,t(θ) = lM(xti ;µ, α, σ)
= −1
2
log(2π)− 1
2
log
σ2
2α
− 1
2
log(1− e−2α∆t)− [xti − (µ+ e
−α∆t(xti−1 − µ))]2
2[σ
2
2α
(1− e−2α∆t)]
(6.40)
And we can get rid of the constant term −1
2
log(2π), obtaining finally:
lM,t(θ) = −1
2
log
σ2
2α
− 1
2
log(1− e−2α∆t)− [xti − (µ+ e
−α∆t(xti−1 − µ))]2
2[σ
2
2α
(1− e−2α∆t)] (6.41)
6.6.2 Derivation of the Likelihood Function for the Spiky regimes
For the spiky regimes, the discrete time equation is similar, but with a different normal distri-
bution:
dxt = α(µ− xt−1) + ǫs, (6.42)
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where now ǫs is a certain normal: ǫs ∼ N(µs, σ2s), which can be decomposed as: ǫs ∼
N(µs, σ
2
s) = µs +N(0, σ
2
s) = µs + σsN(0, 1).
And then we can write (6.42) in continuous form as:
dX(t) = α(µ−X(t))dt+ µsdt+ σsdW (t), (6.43)
with X(0) = X0, and where we assume that µs is multiplied by a mean-reversion coefficient
αs = 1, which we will omit from now on, but we will take into account when considering the
physical meaning of the equation. Following an analogous procedure as in the previous section,
we find that the solution to (6.43) is:
X(t) = X0e
−αt +
αµ+ µs
α
(1− e−αt) +
∫ t
0
e−α(t−s)σsdW (s), (6.44)
which means that X(t) for the spiky regimes is again normally distributed, this time with mean:
E[X(t)|X0] = X0e−αt + αµ+ µs
α
(1− e−αt) (6.45)
and variance:
V ar[X(t)|X0] = σ
2
s
2α
(1− e−2αt) (6.46)
The likelihood function for the ’up’ spiky regime LU,t(θ) is then the density of a normal distri-
bution with mean (6.45) and variance (6.46).
The continuous-time equation that models the ’down’ spiky regime is
dX(t) = α(µ−X(t))dt− µsdt+ σsdW (t), (6.47)
with X(0) = X0, and therefore its likelihood function LD,t(θ) is the density of a normal distri-
bution with mean
E[X(t)|X0] = X0e−αt + αµ− µs
α
(1− e−αt) (6.48)
and variance (6.46).
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6.6.3 Maximum Likelihood Estimation implemented in R
In this section we focus on maximising the likelihood function (6.14) in order to estimate its
parameters. We do this by software using the R language for statistical computing [31]. The
first step consists of implementing the likelihood function in R; the second step consists of
applying to this likelihood function one of the optimization tools that R provides. Among
these tools, we decided to use the function optim, which performs optimization.
Observing expressions (6.10), (6.11), (6.12) and (6.13); the set of parameters that needs to
be estimated is θ = {µ, µs, α, p, σ, σs}. An initial set of values for these parameters θ0, as
well as the time series of the logarithm of the spot price of computing power (lnS(t),∀t), are
given as input parameters to optim. The function optim minimises by default. Since we are
interested in maximising the likelihood (or equivalently log-likelihood) function, adding the
argument control=(fnscale=-1) to optim makes the function perform maximization. In the
function optim, we use the method L-BFGS-B, which allows the specification of lower and
upper bounds for the parameters. We use this method with bounds because we can make an
initial estimation for the value of the parameters, as well as an estimation of the range in which
the optimum value must be. This fact simplifies the analysis.
We provide as an initial value for the parameters the set θ0 = {µ = 8.52, µs = 3, α = 0.1, p =
3 · 10−4, σ = 0.4, σs = 0.6}, whose simulation as explained in section 6.8 is shown in Fig.
6.14. We use this initial set of parameters because its simulation is similar to the original
market behaviour shown in Fig. 6.1. The probability density function of the log-returns of
the simulation in Fig. 6.14 is shown in Fig. 6.15. We see in this distribution of log-returns
that there are three curves that form the density; the central one follows a normal distribution
and corresponds to the ’normal’ mean-reverting regime, and the two other curves on the sides
correspond to the log-returns generated by the downside spikes. The two curves on the sides
that appear in this density seem to be equivalent to the two small peaks in the tail in the
density of the original log-returns in Fig. 6.4. However, the two curves on the sides in Fig. 6.15
are larger and more separated from the average returns than in Fig. 6.4; this appears to be an
effect of having separate equations that model the spikes in price.
6.6. Estimation of Parameters via Maximum Likelihood 121
0 50000 100000 150000 200000
5
6
7
8
9
10
Time
Lo
g−
pr
ice
 o
f C
om
pu
tin
g 
Po
we
r
Figure 6.14: Exact numerical simulation of the Markov-regime switching model for the set of param-
eters θ0 = {µ = 8.52, µs = 3, α = 0.1, p = 3 · 10−4, σ = 0.4, σs = 0.6}.
After calling the function optim, the output set of parameters returned by the function is
θ = {µ = 8.52, µs = 3.00, α = 10−6, p = 1.02 · 10−3, σ = 10−6, σs = 10−6}, together with the
message of “no feasible solution”. The simulation of the Markov-regime switching model with
these values is shown in Fig. 6.16.
As we can see in Fig. 6.16, the output given by optim is not similar to the original market
behaviour shown in Fig. 6.1. Note that higher values of σ and σs would provide an output that
would be much more similar to the original market behaviour, since they would increase the
variability in the ’normal’ mean-reverting regime and in the size of the downside spikes. This
is easier to appreciate in Fig. 6.17, which is a zoom of the first 20,000 Epochs of Fig. 6.16.
We also plot in Fig. 6.18 the probability density function of the log-returns of computing power
for the simulation result of Fig. 6.16. It is possible to appreciate that there are mainly two
values for the log-returns. One value is close to 0, which corresponds to the small (almost
negligible as we can see in Fig. 6.17) variations of the log-price evolution during the ’normal’
mean-reverting regime. The second value is around 3 (and −3), and corresponds to the size of
the downside spikes that we can also appreciate in Fig. 6.17. The fact that the variations in
price in Fig. 6.17 are so constant (since σ and σs are very small) make the density in Fig. 6.18
have only three points that represent those variations.
The maximization of the likelihood function seems to be very sensitive to the changes in the
initial values of the parameters. For instance, with the set of initial parameters θ0 = {µ =
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Figure 6.15: Probability density function of the log-returns of computing power for the simulation
results in Fig. 6.14. The red solid line is the density of a normal distribution with same mean and
variance. The y axis is in log scale. We can see that the central curve corresponds to the distribution
of log-returns in the ’normal’ mean-reverting regime, whereas the two small curves on both sides
correspond to the distribution of log-returns in the downside spikes (down jump and subsequent up
jump).
15, µs = 6, α = 10, p = 10
−8, σ = 10, σs = 10}, the output given by optim is θ = {µ =
9.18, µs = 5.15, α = 13.98, p = 7.12 · 10−1, σ = 10−6, σs = 4.07}, whose simulation is shown in
Fig. 6.19, and the probability density function of its log-returns is shown in Fig. 6.20.
In this second case, the simulation shown in Fig. 6.19 presents much more variability in the
evolution of the log-price than the simulation result in Fig. 6.17, although there is a lack of
downside spikes. In addition, Fig. 6.20 shows that the log-returns for the simulation results in
this second case are normally distributed, corresponding to the ’normal’ mean-reverting regime;
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Figure 6.16: Exact numerical simulation of the Markov-regime switching model for the set of param-
eters θ = {µ = 8.52, µs = 3.00, α = 10−6, p = 1.02 · 10−3, σ = 10−6, σs = 10−6}.
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Figure 6.17: Exact numerical simulation of the Markov-regime switching model for the set of param-
eters θ = {µ = 8.52, µs = 3.00, α = 10−6, p = 1.02 · 10−3, σ = 10−6, σs = 10−6}. Zoom of the first
20,000 Epochs of Fig. 6.16.
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Figure 6.18: Probability density function of the log-returns for the simulation results in Fig. 6.16.
The red solid line is the density of a normal distribution with the same mean and variance. The y
axis is in log scale.
and there are no curves on the sides in Fig. 6.20, since there are no spikes in Fig. 6.19.
6.7 Estimation of Parameters via Generalized Method
of Moments
We also make use of the generalised method of moments to estimate the parameters in the
Markov regime-switching model.
To this end, we need to identify the moments that have to be matched. We first of all transform
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Figure 6.19: Exact numerical simulation of the Markov-regime switching model for the set of param-
eters θ = {µ = 9.18, µs = 5.15, α = 13.98, p = 7.12 · 10−1, σ = 10−6, σs = 4.07}.
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Figure 6.20: Probability density function of the log-returns for the simulation results in Fig. 6.19.
The red solid line is the density of a normal distribution with the same mean and variance. The y
axis is in log scale.
the system of three equations given by (6.20), (6.47) and (6.43) in a single equation that
combines the three possible states:
dX(t) = α(µ−X(t))dt+ C(t)dt+D(t)dW (t), (6.49)
with X(0) = X0, where C(t) is a stochastic process with three possible values {0,−µs, µs},
which correspond to the ’normal’ regime, the ’down’ regime and the ’up’ regime respectively;
and D(t) is another stochastic process with three possible values {σ, σs σs}, where the first one
corresponds to the ’normal’ regime and the second and third ones correspond to the ’down’ and
the ’up’ regime respectively. The processes C and D take these values according to the values
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in the transition probability matrix of the hidden Markov chain of the regime-switching model
(6.13).
For later use, we estimate convenient to calculate the steady state probabilities of the hidden
Markov chain. In order to calculate these probabilities, we solve the system:
πT = π, (6.50)
where π = (π0, π−1, π1) is the vector with the steady state probabilities for the ’normal’, ’down’
and ’up’ states respectively, and T is the transition probability matrix of the Markov chain
defined in expression 6.13. Solving the system 6.50, we get that π = m(1,−p,−p), with m ∈ ℜ.
Since π is a vector of steady state probabilities, their components must add up to 1, i.e.:
m−mp−mp = 1, (6.51)
which yields m = 1
1−2p
. Therefore, the steady state probabilities of the Markov chain are
π = (
1
1− 2p,
−p
1− 2p,
−p
1− 2p). (6.52)
Now, we come back to equation 6.49, which can be approximated by the following discrete
version:
Xt+1 −Xt = a+ bXt + Ct+1 +Dt+1Nt+1, (6.53)
where a = αµ and b = −α. Nt+1 is normally distributed with Et[Nt+1] = 0 and Et[N2t+1] = 1.
We need to identify in equation 6.53 the moments that are going to be used for the estimation of
parameters. Our strategy will consist of grouping all the variables that add ’noise’ in equation
6.53 in one single variable, so we define:
Yt+1 := Ct+1 +Dt+1Nt+1, (6.54)
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and therefore equation 6.53 is rewritten as:
Xt+1 −Xt = a+ bXt + Yt+1. (6.55)
Next we target the moments estimation by calculating the moments of Yt+1. Specifically:
Et[Yt+1] = Et[Ct+1 +Dt+1Nt+1] = Et[Ct+1] + Et[Dt+1]Et[Nt+1] (6.56)
since Dt+1 and Nt+1 are independent processes. Using the steady state probabilities (6.52), we
can calculate
Et[Ct+1] = (0)π0 + (−µs)π−1 + (µs)π1 = 0. (6.57)
Since Et[Nt+1] = 0, the first moment of Yt+1 is then:
Et[Yt+1] = 0. (6.58)
The second moment of Yt+1 is:
Et[Y
2
t+1] = Et[(Ct+1 +Dt+1Nt+1)
2] = Et[C
2
t+1] + Et[D
2
t+1] (6.59)
because Et[Nt+1] = 0 and Et[N
2
t+1] = 1. We have:
Et[C
2
t+1] = (0)
2π0 + (−µs)2π−1 + (µs)2π1 = −2pµ
2
s
1− 2p (6.60)
And:
Et[D
2
t+1] = (σ)
2π0 + (σs)
2π−1 + (σs)
2π1 =
σ2 − 2pσ2s
1− 2p (6.61)
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Therefore the second moment of Yt+1 is:
Et[Y
2
t+1] =
σ2 − 2p(µ2s + σ2s)
1− 2p (6.62)
The rest of the moments of Yt+1, from the third to the twelfth, are calculated in Appendix B.
We summarize the first twelve moments of Yt+1 in Table 6.1.
Moment Theoretical value
Et[Yt+1] 0
Et[Y
2
t+1]
σ2−2p(µ2s+σ
2
s)
1−2p
Et[Y
3
t+1] 0
Et[Y
4
t+1]
−2pµ4s−12pµ
2
sσ
2
s+3σ
4−6pσ4s
1−2p
Et[Y
5
t+1] 0
Et[Y
6
t+1]
−2pµ6s−30pµ
4
sσ
2
s−90pµ
2
sσ
4
s+15σ
6−30pσ6s
1−2p
Et[Y
7
t+1] 0
Et[Y
8
t+1]
−2pµ8s−56pµ
6
sσ
2
s−420pµ
4
sσ
4
s−840pµ
2
sσ
6
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1−2p
Et[Y
9
t+1] 0
Et[Y
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t+1]
−2pµ10s −90pµ
8
sσ
2
s−1260pµ
6
sσ
4
s−6300pµ
4
sσ
6
s−9450pµ
2
sσ
8
s+945σ
10−1890pσ10s
1−2p
Et[Y
11
t+1] 0
Et[Y
12
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−2pµ12s −132pµ
10
s σ
2
s−2970pµ
8
sσ
4
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6
sσ
6
s−103950pµ
4
sσ
8
s−124740pµ
2
sσ
10
s +10395σ
12−20790pσ12s
1−2p
Table 6.1: First twelve moments of Yt+1.
The six parameters of our model θ = {µ, µs, α, p, σ, σs} can be estimated using the following
six moment conditions:
E[f(xt, θ)] = E


Y 7t+1Xt
Y 4t+1 − Et[Y 4t+1]
Y 6t+1 − Et[Y 6t+1]
Y 8t+1 − Et[Y 8t+1]
Y 10t+1 − Et[Y 10t+1]
Y 12t+1 − Et[Y 12t+1]


= 0 (6.63)
We choose these moment conditions because these are the ones that provide a non-singular
covariance matrix of coefficients.
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6.7.1 Generalised Method of Moments Estimation implemented in
R
In this subsection we focus on estimating the parameters (θ = {µ, µs, α, p, σ, σs}) of our stochas-
tic model by making use of the moment conditions previously derived (6.63). We do this with
the function gmm of R, which estimates parameters with the generalised method of moments.
An initial set of values for these parameters (θ0), as well as the time series of the logarithm of
the spot price of computing power (lnS(t),∀t), are given as input parameters to gmm. In the
function gmm, we use the method optfct=”nlminb”, which allows the specification of lower and
upper bounds for the parameters. This is an appropriate method, since we know that some
parameters are constrained to a specific interval (e.g., p ∈ [0, 1]).
We use the following set of initial values for the parameters in equation (6.49): θ0 = {µ =
8.52, µs = 3, α = 0.1, p = 3 · 10−4, σ = 0.4, σs = 0.6}, which correspond to the set θ0 = {a =
0.852, b = −0.1, µs = 3, p = 3 · 10−4, σ = 0.4, σs = 0.6} when the system takes the form of
(6.53), since a = αµ and b = −α. The simulation of the Markov-regime switching model with
these parameters is shown in Fig. 6.14.
After calling the function gmm, the output for the values of the parameters is: θ0 = {a =
3.49, b = −0.44, µs = 1.17, p = 1.25 · 10−4, σ = 0.69, σs = 0.43}, or equivalently: θ0 = {µ =
7.96, α = 0.44, µs = 1.17, p = 1.25 · 10−4, σ = 0.69, σs = 0.43}. By using the Gillespie al-
gorithm explained in section 6.8, we can do an exact numerical simulation of the Markov
regime-switching system with this calculated set of values. This exact simulation is shown in
Fig. 6.21. We also plot the probability density function of the log-returns of this simulation in
Fig. 6.22, where we can see that they are normally distributed.
As it is possible to observe in Fig. 6.21, the optimization of the moment conditions does not
provide a similar result to the original market behaviour observed in Fig. 6.1, mainly due to
the lack of downside spikes, as it happened in Fig. 6.19. The probability density function of the
log-returns of 6.21 is shown in Fig. 6.22, where we can see that they are normally distributed,
as expected from having the evolution of the ’normal’ mean-reverting regime without noticeable
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Figure 6.21: Exact numerical simulation of the Markov-regime switching model calculated with the
generalised method of moments, resulting in the set of values θ = {µ = 7.96, α = 4.38 · 10−1, µs =
1.17, p = 1.25 · 10−4, σ = 6.91 · 10−1, σs = 4.29 · 10−1}.
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Figure 6.22: Probability density function of the log-returns for the simulation results in Fig. 6.21.
The red solid line is the density of a normal distribution with the same mean and variance. The y
axis is in log scale.
downside spikes.
Other different initial values for the parameters θ0 provide other different results θ, although
none of them is similar to the original market behaviour. This might be due to the fact
that the function presents many local maxima, as well as to the difficulty in detecting the
spikes. We can conclude that the Markov-regime switching model presents significant difficulties
in the estimation of its parameters; however, the Markov-regime switching model is a good
approximation of the market’s behaviour, since it is possible to find a combination of parameters
θ that closely resembles the evolution of the original market, as we can see in Fig. 6.14.
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6.8 Exact Numerical Stochastic Simulation
In this section we show how to make an exact numerical stochastic simulation of the Markov
regime-switching model presented in section 6.5. In order to do this, we need to derive the
exact updating formulas for the stochastic processes in expressions (6.20), (6.47) and (6.43).
Approximate updating formulas for these expressions can be constructed simply by replacing the
positive infinitesimal dt with a positive finite variable ∆t. Taking also into account expression
(6.21), this results in the following three updating expressions:
X(t+∆t) ≈ X(t) + α(µ−X(t))∆t+ σn
√
∆t (6.64)
X(t+∆t) ≈ X(t) + α(µ−X(t))∆t− µs∆t+ σsn
√
∆t (6.65)
X(t+∆t) ≈ X(t) + α(µ−X(t))∆t+ µs∆t+ σsn
√
∆t (6.66)
for the ’normal’ mean-reverting regime, the ’down’ regime and the ’up’ regime, respectively. In
these three expressions, n is a sample value of the standard normal random variable N(0, 1).
However, as pointed out in [48] by Gillespie, these updating formulas for X(t) are only accurate
if ∆t is ’suitably small’, and exact updating formulas should be derived.
Since a normal random variable X = N(m,σ2) can be written as:
X = N(m,σ2) = m+ σN(0, 1) (6.67)
and we have derived that X(t) (and therefore X(t+∆t)) is normally distributed with a certain
mean and variance (which depend on each of the three regimes), we can use expression (6.67)
to write the exact updating formulas for X(t) in each of the three regimes.
Specifically, for the case of the normal mean-reverting regime (M), we have shown that X(t) is
normally distributed with mean (6.36) and variance (6.37). Replacing the time interval (0, t)
by (t, t+∆t) in expressions (6.36) and (6.37), we derive that X(t+∆t) is normally distributed
with mean
E[X(t+∆t)|X(t)] = X(t)e−α∆t + µ(1− e−α∆t) (6.68)
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and variance:
V ar[X(t+∆t)|X(t)] = σ
2
2α
(1− e−2α∆t) (6.69)
and therefore we can finally write X(t+∆t) (using expression (6.67)) as:
X(t+∆t) = mX(t+∆t) + σX(t+∆t)N(0, 1)
= E[X(t+∆t)|X(t)] +N(0, 1)
√
V ar[X(t+∆t)|X(t)]
= X(t)e−α∆t + µ(1− e−α∆t) + n
√
σ2
2α
(1− e−2α∆t)
(6.70)
which is an exact updating formula for the process X(t) of the normal mean-reverting regime.
In this expression, n is again a sample value of the standard normal random variable N(0, 1).
Similarly, we can derive exact updating formulas for the down and the up regimes. Following
an analogous deduction, we derive that X(t+∆t) for the down regime is normally distributed
with mean
E[X(t+∆t)|X(t)] = X(t)e−α∆t + αµ− µs
α
(1− e−α∆t) (6.71)
and variance
V ar[X(t+∆t)|X(t)] = σ
2
s
2α
(1− e−2α∆t); (6.72)
and therefore according to expression (6.67):
X(t+∆t) = X(t)e−α∆t +
αµ− µs
α
(1− e−α∆t) + n
√
σ2s
2α
(1− e−2α∆t). (6.73)
Finally, X(t+∆t) for the up regime is normally distributed with mean
E[X(t+∆t)|X(t)] = X(t)e−α∆t + αµ+ µs
α
(1− e−α∆t) (6.74)
and variance (6.72), and consequently the exact updating formula for X(t) in the ’up’ regime
is
X(t+∆t) = X(t)e−α∆t +
αµ+ µs
α
(1− e−α∆t) + n
√
σ2s
2α
(1− e−2α∆t). (6.75)
The exact stochastic simulation is made with the three exact updating equations for the three
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regimes: (6.70), (6.73) and (6.75). Random samples n from the normal distribution N(0, 1) are
used for the three exact updating equations; whereas a uniformly distributed random number
generator in the interval (0, 1) is used to decide the switches between regimes according to the
probabilities in the transition matrix given by (6.13).
We illustrate one possible simulation using the following set of parameters θ = {µ = 8.52, µs =
3, α = 0.1, p = 3 · 10−4, σ = 0.4, σs = 0.6} and ∆t = 1, which is shown in Fig. 6.14. As
we can see, the exact numerical simulation of the Markov-regime switching model with these
parameters resembles quite well the original evolution of the logarithm of the spot price of
computing power of Fig. 6.1.
6.9 Conclusion
In this chapter we have presented a first stochastic calculus model for the development of the
logarithm of the spot price of computing power in our global Grid market. Our simulation
results for this market suggested that the logarithm of the spot price of computing power tends
to follow a mean-reverting process with down spikes. The mean-reversion characteristic is in
agreement with many other commodity markets like the one of crude oil; and the spikes are in
common with the electricity market as well. Furthermore, we have shown that the distribution
of returns in the Grid market is similar to the ones observed in other markets, like the electricity
market in New England and the DAX index.
In order to model the spot price evolution of computing power, we have used a Markov-regime
switching model, which is able to capture both the mean-reversion and the spikes in the price.
This is possible because this model is formed by different states, or regimes, each of them
modelling a different characteristic of the system. An independent Markov process causes the
change between the regimes. We have used a model with three regimes: the first one is a
mean-reverting process, the second one is a mean-reverting process that includes a jump down,
and the third one is a mean-reverting process that includes a jump up, returning the price to
a similar original value, and causing in this way a spike.
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We have focused next on how to estimate the parameters in this model via maximum likelihood.
We have analytically derived the likelihood function of the system and the estimation of its
parameters has been carried out by software in R. Similarly, we have used the generalised
method of moments as an alternative way of estimating the parameters in the system; for
this case we have also derived analytically the moment conditions of the three-regime system,
and then we again have estimated the parameters by software. With both methods for the
estimation of parameters we have found that the results returned by the optimization function
show an evolution of the system that has little similarities with the original market behaviour;
in particular, there is a lack of downside spikes in some of the results.
We think that this disagreement between the original market behaviour and the estimated
parameters is due to the fact that the function to be maximised presents many local maxima,
which makes difficult an accurate estimation of the parameters. The difficulty in detecting the
spikes also complicates the parameters estimation.
However, just by trial and error we have shown that the Markov-regime switching model is
a good approximation of the market’s behaviour, since it is possible to find a combination of
parameters that closely resembles the evolution of the original market.
We have performed exact numerical simulations of the regime-switching model via the imple-
mentation of exact updating expressions for the stochastic processes.
Further work will consist of the development of more accurate models that characterise the
evolution of the spot price of computing power in the Grid market. For instance, an improved
model could incorporate a dynamic mean for the price of computing power, apart from the mean
reversion, since in the long run the mean price should change, for example, as a consequence
of new technological developments. Future work will also consist of the improvement of the
optimization techniques for parameter estimation.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
7.1 Summary of Thesis Achievements
This thesis has presented the modelling and analysis of a possible future global market for
computing power. We envision a global market connected by the Internet where anyone in pos-
session of a computing device can sell his computing power, and anyone demanding computing
power can acquire it in exchange for money. This open market for the trading of computing
power does not exist yet, and current similar projects are reduced to private networks and re-
stricted to few market participants. Our envisioned market is open to anyone and has millions
of potential participants; it just remains to deploy the necessary trading platform to make it
a reality. Since such a large system would not scale as a central server, we have focused on a
peer-to-peer market model for it.
First of all, we have developed a simulation program that models our peer-to-peer global Grid
market, similar to the system suggested in [78]. This program, which we have intentionally
tried to keep simple so that it were under control, models the evolution of a market formed
by both money-driven buyers and sellers of computing power connected on a peer-to-peer net-
work. We have modelled the overlay peer-to-peer network with two different kinds of graphs:
Baraba´si-Albert and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi. The market participants send messages to each other via
their neighbours and the trading is distributed in every node. We have found that the pa-
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rameters in our system get stable after an initial transient state, and the number of messages
per buffer, the utilization of resources and the volume of contracts reach an equilibrium state.
This equilibrium state depends on the type of network, but not on its size. With regard to
the evolution of price over time, we found in the first version of the program that price tended
to go either to zero or to infinity. It is for this reason that we have analytically studied the
price formation in the market and found the conditions under which the price gets stable. We
then have implemented these conditions in the form of adaptive agents that are able to adjust
their individual parameters by only using local knowledge, and which results in price stability
of the whole system. Further changes in the simulation program included Pareto distributions
for the wealth of the buyers, as well as for the capacity and demand of computing power of
the nodes. In addition, we have included the modelling of delays in transactions between the
nodes. The system is able to automatically achieve the equilibrium state independently of the
initial conditions.
We then have moved on to develop an analytic model of a futures market for computing power.
In this case, market participants trade futures contracts for the delivery of computing power
at a fixed date in the future, instead of trading on the spot for immediate delivery. We are
convinced that a parallel market of derivatives for computing power will emerge together with
the spot market. This is because the CPU cycles are non-storable, and therefore non-tradeable;
however, it is still possible to decide their price for a date in the future. The use of derivatives
will therefore maximise the use of the computing power. Furthermore, derivatives will be used
for reasons of both hedging and speculation. The theoretical analysis of the futures market
has been carried out with the use of Markov chains. We have designed a bottom-up model,
modelling the behaviour of each market participant with a particular Markov chain that reflects
his aversion to risk. In order to model the market as a whole, we have introduced the concept
of market pressure, and we have focused on the variation of price rather than on the price
itself, which has allowed us to avoid the state space explosion problem. We have derived then
a global transition probability matrix that models the evolution of the market as a whole. The
simulation results for the ideal centralised version of the system have proved to be in exact
agreement with the analytic model. For the case of the simulation results in the non-ideal
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decentralised version of the system, both shifting and multiplicative scaling factors need to be
found so that the simulation results coincide with the centralised analytic model.
Furthermore, in this Markov market model, we have analysed the performance of a futures
trader that operated in such a market, and derived an optimal trading strategy by using Markov
decision processes (MDPs). The MDP has been established as an infinite-horizon problem and
has been solved with linear programming.
Finally, we have also introduced a stochastic differential equation model that captures the
essence of the spot price evolution of computing power shown by our simulation program. In
this case, the model is top-down, i.e. we have modelled the behaviour of the general market
as a whole, instead of modelling the individual market participants. Firstly, we have found
how the returns in our Grid market are similar to those of other existing markets, such as
the DAX index or the electricity prices. Secondly, we have shown that the behaviour of the
spot price of computing power in our market model has two main characteristics: a long-term
mean-reversion similar to other commodities like crude oil, and the presence of short-term
spikes similar to other non-storable commodities like electricity. In order to capture such two
different characteristics in a single model, we have decided to use a Markov regime-switching
model, based on the one introduced by Hamilton to model the US business cycles [50], and
later on applied by Huisman to model electricity prices [55]. Our model consists of three states
or regimes: one regime models the general mean-reverting trend of price, whereas the other
two regimes are used to model the sudden short-term spikes in price. In the Markov regime-
switching system, the change between regimes takes place according to the state of a hidden,
independent Markov chain. With this model we can include the additional presence of spikes
without using a jump process with an unrealistic large value for the mean-reversion coefficient.
We then have estimated the parameters of the stochastic model with the market data pro-
vided by the output of our simulation program. The estimation of parameters has been carried
out using two different methods: maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) and the generalised
method of moments (GMM). For the case of MLE, first we have derived analytically the likeli-
hood function of the model, and then we have maximised the function by software with R. In
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the GMM, we have analytically derived the moment conditions of the three-regime system, and
then we again have estimated the parameters by software. The simulation of the model with
the estimated parameters has been done by a previously proposed algorithm by Gillespie for
the exact update of the stochastic mean-reverting equation, together with the random changes
in the regimes of the system. The results of both estimation methods are in disagreement
with the original market behaviour. We estimate that the disagreement in the result is due to
the difficulty in detecting the spikes of the model and the many local maxima of the function
that needs to be maximised. Nevertheless, just by trial and error we have been able to find a
combination of parameters that makes the Markov regime-switching model have a very similar
behaviour to the evolution of the original market, which shows the suitability of the model for
our system.
7.2 Applications
First of all, we expect an open global market for computing power to become a reality soon,
and it is something that we encourage. The possibility of straightforward profit-making for the
millions of owners of computing devices worldwide is the key element that can make the market
emerge and grow at a high pace. Middleware platforms that will allow the trading of computing
power are already in development, such as MAGOG [78]. In the context of such a market, the
models and analysis introduced in this thesis represent a starting point to forecast the market
behaviour. We therefore estimate our analysis will be useful to both market participants and
regulators. On the one hand, market participants will be in need of trading strategies and
market analysis. On the other hand, market regulators will be interested in detecting cartels
and price manipulation. Our models provide the basis for both of them.
Furthermore, the analysis carried out in this thesis can be applied to areas outside the potential
Grid market itself. The design of peer-to-peer networks is benefited from our studies. We have
shown how a peer-to-peer network is able to scale when the system gets larger, and we have
found that the parameters in our system get stable. This is also related to the economic concept
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of Catallaxy, which predicts the emergence of a stable system from the individual actions of
agents that only use local knowledge. This stability is also useful for the case of systems that
are systematically growing and changing from their initial planning, and therefore they need
to automatically adjust themselves, as it happens in the Internet. Moreover, we expect our
agent-based simulations to contribute to general markets analysis.
In addition, our analysis of the market with Markov decision processes can be applied to a
variety of situations where decisions must be taken within an uncertainty setting, such as stock
planning in a retail business or the production of agricultural products. Finally, our Markov
regime-switching stochastic model finds applications as diverse as the modelling of perishable
products such as the available slots in cargo ship containers or the occurrence of solar sunspots.
7.3 Future Work
Future work may evolve in different directions due to the large scope of the project. The
deployment of real systems for the global trading of computing power like MAGOG would allow
us to obtain data in order to validate our models. In this case, it would be possible to acquire
market data from individual nodes that belong to different parts of the network. With these
data, we could first compare whether the market conditions are very different depending on the
location, which might lead to arbitrage opportunities, and then we could calculate an average
of the local parts in order to obtain a global estimation of the system. Since our simulation
model is still quite abstract, we would not expect to match exactly the price behaviour of the
real market, but statistical measures like the autocorrelation function (or its Fourier-transform
equivalent, the power spectral density) might show similar behaviour. Then, with the feedback
provided by the real system, we would be able to improve and adjust our models.
In our simulation, a possible addition would be the incorporation of other commodities, such
as network bandwidth. In this setup, it is likely that users (or buyers) will request both a
certain amount of computing power and a certain amount of network bandwidth. The analysis
of the system under these conditions can therefore get quite complicated. However, there is
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generally a correlation between the amount of computing power and the amount of network
bandwidth that applications need. Normally, the more computing power an application needs,
the more network bandwidth it needs as well. For instance, data-mining applications need lots
of network bandwidth in order to upload the large amounts of data, and then they need lots
of computing power in order to process the data. In our simulation, sellers have an amount
of computing power that is directly proportional to the number of connections that they have
(i.e. directly proportional to the amount of network bandwidth that they have), and therefore
sellers with a lot of computing power are already provided with a lot of network bandwidth.
This consideration might eventually simplify the analysis. Another commodity that should be
added to the system is disk space. Optimization of the amount of each stock depending on
demand could then be done in a similar way to portfolio optimization at the stock market.
In addition, future work should consider the analysis of the market under a dynamic network
scenario. In other words, the analysis should include the possibility of nodes leaving and joining
the network, which would cause a dynamic change in the topology of the network and might
leave some nodes disconnected from others. It needs to be said in this context that, for the case
of a BA network (where most of the nodes have a few number of neighbours and only a few
nodes have a large number of neighbours), most of the nodes that randomly disconnect from
the network will be nodes with a few number of neighbours, and therefore the connectivity
of the network will not be badly affected. Only in the case of a targeted attack, where the
objective would be to disconnect nodes with many neighbours, the connectivity of the network
would suffer. In any case, a targeted attack would always be worse in a centralised network,
since the objective in this case could only be the central node, and its collapse would cause the
collapse of the whole network.
We also consider that trust can be a relevant aspect in a peer-to-peer Grid market, where buyers
of computing power will seek for a reliable service. In this scenario, quality of service may be
enforced with service level agreements that guarantee the contracted specifications. Sellers
who systematically fail to fulfill their agreements would be subject to a penalty. In this case, a
system that allows agents to file complaints against malicious users could be implemented, so
that future market participants could consult the past activity of other agents before closing a
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deal with them. Moreover, buyers of computing power could create their own lists of trusted
sellers, and therefore the list of a node’s nearest neighbours could be transformed into the list of
a node’s trusted providers. This would presumably isolate malicious users from the rest of the
network. It would be interesting in this context to analyse whether the buyers would benefit
from being loyal to specific sellers, and viceversa, similarly to the analysis of the fish market in
[57]. Finally, a study regarding congestion control in the network should be taken into account
as well, since this will also affect the quality of service in the system.
In order to tackle the analysis of the distributed Grid market model, another approach would
consist of assuming that the nodes are connected in a square-shaped network. With this regular
structure, the analytic study would be heavily simplified, and further analysis of the system
could be developed.
Furthermore, investigations need to be done on the level of dispersion of prices in different parts
of the network. The fact that the peer-to-peer market model is distributed brings the possibility
of having different prices in different parts of the network simultaneously. Future work should
contemplate to what degree nodes could take advantage of potential arbitrage opportunities,
and for how long these opportunities might exist.
In addition, agents could be made more intelligent. For example, a division could be made
between agents with fundamental knowledge of the value of the underlying commodity and
agents that only focus on the price variations; or agents with developed strategies and agents
that act randomly. Agents trading on the spot with a developed strategy could therefore apply
the results of the stochastic model and profit from selling or buying at better prices.
In relation to the estimation of parameters of the stochastic model, other optimization methods
could be applied. Moreover, an intensive sweep of the initial conditions could be done in order
to detect the different local maxima that the optimization function presents. For the case of
the Markov market model, an analysis could be done on the shifting and multiplicative factors
needed in order to scale the results of the decentralised simulation to the ones of the centralised
analytic model.
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With respect to the derivatives market for computing power, further work could consist of
pricing options on this market. This could be done by reflecting the agents’ behaviours into
utility functions, which then would be use to price options as suggested in [62]. Another possible
approach to price options could be through the construction of a binomial/trinomial tree with
its underlying grid, as explained in [33]. Furthermore in this area, it will also be interesting
to consider swing options, which allow a flexible delivery regarding both volume and timing.
These options are useful in the electricity market, and we expect them to be widely used in the
computing power market as well.
Appendix A
Analytic Average Price
A.1 Assumptions
• We define a new unit of time: the round. In each round, nodes try to find a deal. They
might find a deal, and they go to the satisfied state for that round. They might not find
a deal, and they remain unsatisfied during that round. When the round ends, and the
next round begins, all nodes start in the unsatisfied state again (and so all nodes look for
a deal again), but nodes remember their state at the end of the previous round, so they
know whether they closed a deal or not, and they change their price accordingly.
• Time is synchronous for all the network, is discrete and is defined in rounds.
• All nodes start in the unsatisfied state in round 0.
• All buyers start bidding the same initial price B0 = P0 and all sellers start asking the
same initial price S0 = P0.
• There is enough time for all messages to reach all nodes in the network before a node
has to change its price due to unsatisfaction. In other words, the TTL of the messages
allows the messages to reach all nodes in the network in one round. Consequently, a node
can close a deal with any other node in the network in one round, providing that price
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requirements match. We assume that the graph/network is fully connected. Due to all
these reasons, the topology of the network does not affect our study.
• Nodes do not know the price of the deals they make; this price is not relevant to them.
They only know their current ask/bid price and whether they have been able to close a
deal or not in the previous round.
• The way a buyer changes its price is the following: if at the end of the round, the buyer
has been able to find a deal, its bid price for the next round will be its previous bid price
multiplied by (1−∆). If at the end of the round, the buyer has not been able to find a
deal, its bid price for the next round will be its previous bid price multiplied by (1 +∆).
• The way a seller changes its price is the following: if at the end of the round, the seller
has been able to find a deal, its ask price for the next round will be its previous ask price
multiplied by (1 + ∆). If at the end of the round, the seller has not been able to find a
deal, its ask price for the next round will be its previous ask price multiplied by (1−∆).
• There is no maximum budget for the buyers nor minimum price for the sellers.
• Buffer sizes (pub sizes) are unlimited, so they do not obstruct any deal from being made.
A.2 Objective
The objective is to derive an expression that gives the average price of all deals that are made
per round as a function of time, in particular in the long run, when the system has already
passed the initial transient and has reached the steady state. In other words, when time goes
to +∞.
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A.3 Analysis of several cases depending on Buyer-Seller
ratio
We analyse in this section several cases depending on the proportion of buyers and sellers in
the network.
For all this section:
PB(n) is the price a buyer or a group of buyers are bidding in round n
PS(n) is the price a seller or a group of sellers are asking in round n
P (n) is the average price of all deals that are made in the network in round n
A.3.1 50% Buyers and 50% Sellers
We consider for this case a network formed by 2a nodes (with a = 1, 2, 3 . . . ): a buyers and a
sellers.
At the beginning, in round 0, we have stated in the assumptions that all buyers are bidding
B0 = P0 and all sellers are asking S0 = P0.
We analyse in the following the evolution of the bid price of the buyers and the ask price of the
sellers in every round.
Round 0:
There are a buyers bidding:
PB(0) = P0
There are a sellers asking:
PS(0) = P0
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Since the bid price of the buyers matches the ask price of the sellers (for all buyers and all
sellers), a deal is done by everyone, because the network is fully connected, the TTL of the
messages allows the messages to reach any other node in the network, and there are the same
numbers of buyers and sellers. The price of all deals is P0. For the next round, since all nodes
have been successful, the buyers will reduce their bid price by (1 − ∆) and the sellers will
increase their ask price by (1 +∆). Consequently, in round 1, with all nodes unsatisfied again,
there will be:
Round 1:
a buyers bidding:
PB(1) = P0(1−∆)
a sellers asking:
PS(1) = P0(1 + ∆)
Since PB(1) < PS(1) for all nodes in the network, no deals are possible in this round. For the
next round, since all nodes have been unsatisfied during this round, the buyers will increase
their bid price by (1 + ∆) and the sellers will reduce their ask price by (1−∆).
Round 2:
a buyers bidding:
PB(2) = P0(1−∆)(1 + ∆) = P0(1−∆2)
a sellers asking:
PS(2) = P0(1 + ∆)(1−∆) = P0(1−∆2)
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Now prices match again for every node in the network, so all nodes can make a deal in the same
way that they did in Round 0, but at a different price. Because all nodes have been successful
in this round, for the next one they will change their price in their own interest: all buyers will
reduce it by (1−∆) and all sellers will increase it by (1 + ∆), and there will be:
Round 3:
a buyers bidding:
PB(3) = P0(1−∆2)(1−∆)
a sellers asking:
PS(3) = P0(1−∆2)(1 + ∆)
No agent in the network can make a deal now, since prices don’t match for any buyer nor seller.
Therefore, all nodes change their price against their own interest for the next round, and there
will be:
Round 4:
a buyers bidding:
PB(4) = P0(1−∆2)(1−∆)(1 + ∆) = P0(1−∆2)(1−∆2) = P0(1−∆2)2
a sellers asking:
PS(4) = P0(1 + ∆
2)(1 + ∆)(1−∆) = P0(1−∆2)(1−∆2) = P0(1−∆2)2
Prices match (for everyone) again, so all nodes make a deal, and all nodes change their price
in their own interest for the next round.
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This process continues endlessly, and we can see that, every two rounds, the price of all buyers
equals the price of all sellers. So we could write a general expression for the bid price of all
buyers and the ask price of all sellers:
Price of any of the a buyers:
PB(n) = P0(1−∆2)n2 , for n = 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, . . . (A.1)
Price of any of the a sellers:
PS(n) = P0(1−∆2)n2 , for n = 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, . . . (A.2)
If the bid price of all buyers is given by (A.1) and the ask price of all sellers is given by (A.2),
the price of the deals that are made is forced to follow the expression:
P (n) = P0(1−∆2)n2 , for n = 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, . . . (A.3)
because this is the only possible price at which PB(n) ≥ PS(n).
We can also write the expression of the deal prices (A.3) as:
P (n) = P0(1−∆2)n2 = P0[(1 + ∆)(1−∆)]n2 = P0[(1 + ∆)0.5(1−∆)0.5]n
and we have that the deal prices for a network of 50% buyers and 50% sellers, with the as-
sumptions of section A.1, is given by:
P (n) = P0[(1 + ∆)
0.5(1−∆)0.5]n, for n = 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, . . . (A.4)
where:
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P0 ∈ R ∩ [0,+∞[
is the initial price all buyers are bidding and all sellers are asking, and
∆ ∈ R ∩ ]0, 1[
is a parameter to make prices change.
A.3.2 60% Buyers and 40% Sellers
We consider for this case a network formed by 5a nodes (a = 1, 2, 3 . . . ): 3a buyers and 2a
sellers.
We also consider that, as before, all buyers are bidding B0 = P0 and all sellers are asking
S0 = P0 at the beginning, i.e. in round 0. Following a similar reasoning as before, we arrive to
the conclusion that deal prices for a network of 60% buyers and 40% sellers are given by:
P (n) = P0[(1 + ∆)
0.6(1−∆)0.4]n, for n = 0, 5, 10, 15, . . . (A.5)
A.3.3 General case
We consider a network formed by 100 b% buyers and 100(1− b)% sellers, for b ∈ R∩ [0, 1]. We
also consider, as in all previous cases, that the network is fully connected and the TTL of the
messages allows the messages to reach any node in the network in one round, so the topology
of the network does not affect our study. We also consider that all buyers are bidding B0 = P0
and all sellers are asking S0 = P0 at the beginning, i.e. in round 0.
Then the price of the deals as a function of rounds (time) is given by:
P (n) = P0[(1 + ∆)
b(1−∆)1−b]n (A.6)
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where:
P0 ∈ R ∩ [0,+∞[ is the initial price all buyers are bidding and all sellers are asking,
∆ ∈ R ∩ ]0, 1[ is a parameter to make prices change,
b ∈ R ∩ [0, 1] is the number of buyers out of 1 in the network,
n ∈ N is the time in rounds*,
P (n) is the average price of all deals that are made in round n.
* Note that P (n) is not defined for all n, since in some cases n = 0, 2, 4, 6, . . . (like in (A.4)); in
other cases n = 0, 5, 10, 15, . . . (like in (A.5)); etc. However, this does not restrict our analysis,
because we are not interested in calculating the price for a particular round in time, but to find
out the tendency of prices in the long run, i.e. when n goes to +∞, and we will always be able
to make this analysis.
By making the following change of variables:
δ+ = 1 +∆
δ− = 1−∆
we can write expression A.6 as:
P (n) = P0(δ
b
+δ
1−b
− )
n
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Therefore the fourth moment of Yt+1 is:
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The sixth moment of Yt+1 is then:
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It is possible to check out that the odd moments of Yt+1 are 0, and therefore:
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For the tenth moment:
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previous moments, the tenth moment is:
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